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Introduction: A Research and  
Policy Agenda
George Papaconstantinou and Jean Pisani-Ferry 1
Why is international cooperation successful in some fields and not in 
some others? What are the most promising templates for international 
collective action in the present context? These are the questions at the 
origin of the “Transformation of Global Governance”2 project that we 
initiated at the European University Institute as a joint endeavour of 
the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa chair of the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies and the recently created School of Transnational Gov-
ernance.3 
The motivation for addressing these questions stems directly from 
policy concerns. The rise of interdependence, its new and deeper pat-
terns, as well as the emergence of true global commons of which climate 
is the most epitomic as well as the most important all call for enhanced 
and more effective forms of international collective action. At the same 
time, concerns about sovereignty, geopolitical rivalries and heterogeneity 
across nations limit the ability of the global community to engage in such 
an action. The institutional architecture of globalisation remains seri-
ously incomplete, multilateralism is on the retreat, and the global insti-
1 We are grateful to Adrien Bradley of the EUI for very effective research assistance 
throughout the project.
2 The Transformation of Global Governance Project is a horizontal initiative at the Eu-
ropean University Institute, a joint endeavour of the School of Transnational Govern-
ance and the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Chair in European Economic and Monetary 
Integration at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. More information: 
https://tgg.eui.eu/
3 The Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Chair was established in 2014 in honour of the for-
mer Italian Minister of Finance and member of the Executive Board of the European 
Central Bank. It is jointly funded by Italian institutions (Banca d’Italia, Banca Intesa, 
Generali) and the EUI. Its first holder was Professor Richard Portes.  
2
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tutions that constituted the pillars of global governance have weakened.    
In short, the global community is confronted to the need to to address 
heightened challenges with enfeebled instruments.  
The issue
“A house in order is not a city in order”, said Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa 
in one of his latest writings. “There are commons that bear no relation 
with what goes on within houses, but between houses [...] The commons 
can only be managed in common. This implies supranational authorities” 
(Padoa-Schioppa, 2009). Growing concerns about global commons are 
indeed a distinctive feature of the present times. Deepening global inter-
dependence increasingly challenges the once-prevalent view that inter-
national collective action problems can be regarded as second-order if 
governments follow sound, but domestically-centred policies – the Own 
House in Order doctrine. 
The last sentence of Padoa-Schioppa’s quote, however, is problem-
atic: It may be right that supranational institutions equipped with legally 
enforceable instruments would provide the best possible response to the 
modern tragedy of the commons, but the probability that they would 
be created in today’s geopolitical and political conditions is virtually 
nil. Today’s world is not one where international law institutes “compul-
sion” (Kelsen, 1934). It is closer to a world governed by an “unorganised 
and incoherent” World-State that has “neither an office nor an address” 
(Angell, 1915).    
There might furthermore be fewer true “global commons” than gen-
erally thought. After it was developed by World Bank economists at the 
turn of the millennium (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999), the “global 
public goods” concept started being applied in an indiscriminate way to a 
large set of concerted action issues, many of which did not really exhibit 
the features of a true global public good. Somehow any common resource 
problem was metaphorically looked at as a global public good problem, 
which led to the conclusion that nothing short of a global institution 
equipped with financial resources and/or legally grounded powers could 
help solve it. In the same way, any international coordination problem 
was metaphorically looked at as a prisoners’ dilemma problem, with the 
conclusion that nothing short of a binding coordination mechanism 
could help solve it.4       
The policy coordination and collective action problems raised by 
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international interdependence are in fact subtler than suggested by 
simplified models. Theoretically, their underlying game structures are 
diverse, and not all of them call for the same degree of centralisation 
(Sandler, 2004). In a whole range of cases, creating trust, ensuring trans-
parency, defining common objectives and monitoring outcomes goes a 
long way towards addressing these problems; in others, leadership helps 
internalise externalities. Institutionally, there is also much more variety: 
in the same way that the local arrangements uncovered and analysed by 
Ostrom (2009) escape the black-and-white alternative between market 
and state, the scope of possible – and existing – arrangements is much 
wider than the textbook alternative between independent policymaking 
and compulsory coordination or centralisation. 
These observations provided the basis for our research agenda: to 
explore and assess how international collective action and coordina-
tion issues are being addressed in a range of fields, to determine which 
problems the international community is confronted to, to decipher how 
these problems are being addressed, and to determine how effective are 
the corresponding mechanisms. 
Method
Global governance covers a huge range of fields. There are nowadays 
some 2400 international organisations and 200,000 UN-registered inter-
national treaties and actions that cover both the fundamental and the 
minuscule aspects of international interaction.5 Political scientists have 
devoted considerable effort to the analysis of international arrangements 
and they have turned the study of global governance into an active sub-
field of their discipline. To this end, they have created concepts such as 
“regime complexes” (Alter and Meunier 2009, Alter and Raustiala 2018) 
or “orchestration” (Abbott, Genschel, Snidal and Zangl, 2015). Impor-
tantly, they have also produced comprehensive assessments of the state 
and perspectives of global governance (Hale, Held and Young 2013, Hale 
and Held 2017). 
Our perspective is different. First, our aim is more normative than 
positive: we are interested in policy outcomes and for this reason in 
finding out what works, why, and whether arrangements that prove suc-
cessful in one field can be replicated in others. Naturally, this cannot be 
5  See Alter and Raustiala (2018).
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done without relying on a precise analytical framework, but one that can 
ultimately help formulating prescriptions. Second, while we acknowledge 
and try to incorporate the insights from other disciplines, we approach 
the question as economists. We are not blind to the wealth of research 
accumulated in other fields, but we reason primarily with the concepts 
and tools of economic analysis. This can lead to quite different outcomes. 
Third, we focus in priority on the main channels of present-day economic 
interdependence. 
We do not start from a holistic approach, rather from a limited set of 
fields, each of which corresponds to a significant channel of interdepend-
ence. We have selected eight such fields (see Box below): three of them 
correspond to the basic channels of international economic interdepend-
ence (international trade, capital flows and cross-border migrations, 
i.e. the mobility of goods, capital and people) – of which two (trade and 
capital flows) also correspond to key pillars of the post-WW2 global 
governance regime;  three explore what can be called deep integration 
issues, the relevance of which has risen with economic opening and its 
sometimes unintended consequences: the extraterritoriality of compe-
tition policy, tax competition and coordination, and the regulation of 
international banking; one (climate change mitigation) epitomises the 
challenge of managing global commons; and one (internet governance) 
embodies new form of interdependence arising from data flows.     
In each case, we aim to determine: 
• The nature of interaction at work. This may be more challenging than 
it looks, because interactions evolve and may change in nature over 
time as interdependence deepens or as a consequence of technology. 
Indeed, one of the significant consequences of globalisation has 
been the obsolescence of the interaction models that underpinned 
existing coordination and governance arrangements;6 
• The corresponding game structure. This depends on the interaction at 
work and the way of aggregating the individual players’ outputs that 
is best suited to represent the common policy aim;
6 A telling example is the obsolescence of the interdependence through net savings flows 
(i.e. current account balances) and exchange-rate fluctuations model that underpinned 
IMF surveillance. In a world of free capital movements and deep international integra-
tion, a major channel of interdependence arises from gross credit flows and cross-bor-
der assets holdings. Underestimation of the consequences of this emergence was a key 
factor behind the failure of international surveillance in the run-up to the Global Fi-




• The identity of the players. These can be states only, or a subset of 
them, or other players such as subnational entities, firms, individ-
uals, or NGOs. Interactions vary considerably depending on the 
degree of concentration of these players and the heterogeneity of 
preferences among them; 
• The preferences of the players. Are they homogeneous or is there a 
wide dispersion of desired outcomes?  
• The constraints that the various players are facing. These can espe-
cially (but not exclusively) be of a political nature;
• The intertemporal dimensions involved. This includes aspects related 
to uncertainty and how it affects the different players’ perspective. 
After having characterised the problem, the second step of the analysis 
is to assess the governance arrangements and how they contribute to 
solving the problems identified. As said, the range of outcomes goes from 
outright failure to remarkable success. Our aim is to determine why this 
is the case. We start by asking what is/are:
• The membership in the governance arrangement. Is it universal, or 
partial, for example in a setting where the main players cooperate 
within a club?  
• The mechanisms leading to cooperation. Are there common rules, 
and if so how are they enforced? Are there incentive-based mecha-
nisms such as pledge and review procedures? How effective are these 
mechanisms? 
• The institutional support that cooperation can rely on. Is it provided 
by a dedicated international institution, and if so of which nature? 
What is the role of epistemic communities in informing negotiation? 
• The overall effectiveness of the mechanisms in place. Do they resolve 
or at least address adequately the original international collective 
action problem? Do they produce other side-effects?    




The first step of this research has been the organisation of a series of 
seminars dedicated to the analysis of specific fields. Most of these semi-
nars have been (or are being) co-organised with specialised institutions 
and all of them involve academics, field experts, policymakers and other 
stakeholders (from private institutions or NGOs). 
Ten seminars on the transformation of global governance
1. International trade (with the Robert Schuman Centre, EUI): Flor-
ence, June 2018 
2. The extraterritoriality of competition policy (with Bruegel): Brussels, 
October 2018
3. Capital flows and the Global Financial Safety Nets (with the LSE): 
London, April 2019
4. The regulation of international banking (with Bocconi University and 
the Florence School of Banking and Finance): Milan, September 
2018 
5. Tax competition and tax coordination (with the OECD): Paris, Feb-
ruary 2019
6. International migration (with the Migration Policy Centre): Flor-
ence, May 2019
7. Climate change and climate action (with the European Climate Foun-
dation): Paris, June 2019 
8. Internet governance (with the Hertie School and the Oxford Internet 
Institute): Berlin, November 2019
9. Historical perspectives on trade, finance and macro coordination: 
Florence, November 2018 




Eight seminars have been organised since the project started in Spring 
2018, the outcomes of which are presented in the following sections. 
Seven of them covered specific sectors and an eighth, smaller-scale one, 
was devoted to the lessons to be drawn from the history in the fields of 
trade, finance and macroeconomic coordination. 
Migrations is the only case of outright failure of international gover-
nance: with the (increasingly disputed) exception of asylum, there is no 
comprehensive regional, let alone global migration regime to speak of. 
This is despite the importance of the challenge and the significance of the 
spill-overs across host countries. There are several reasons for this state 
of affairs: wide heterogeneity of preferences, the strong distributional 
consequences of migration, its intensely politicised nature, the lack of an 
authoritative epistemic community, and the fragmentation of governance 
into different regimes corresponding to different layers, without the sup-
port of any strong institution. This failure has major economic, social 
and political consequences, with little hope that things may change in 
the years to come. The backlash with the Global Compact on Migrations, 
despite it being softer than soft law, is indicative of the extreme difficulty 
of collective action.  
Global governance is experiencing serious challenges in the two fields 
where it was best established and had delivered the most, international 
trade and the global financial safety nets. Trade is suffering from wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the existing regime, feeble rule enforcement, 
a weakening of its central institution (the WTO), a strong tendency 
towards plurilateral solutions and the creation of clubs which does not 
need to result in fragmentation, but is likely to in the absence of a strong 
multilateral core. The global financial safety net is also undergoing a 
process that may lead to fragmentation. Again, regional safety nets and 
bilateral arrangements such as central bank swap lines can be regarded 
as complements rather than substitute to the IMF: absent a major over-
haul, it would be an illusion to rely on a single institution to respond to 
the diversity of the liquidity needs of countries and financial institutions. 
The reality, however, does not only reflect a natural evolution: although 
the Fund remains nominally at the centre of the system, distrust for the 
central institution has grown. 
These problems have some common roots: in both cases a mismatch 
between the nature of interdependence and a governance regime pred-
icated on an increasingly outdated model of international interaction; 
a growing differentiation across participating countries, some of which 
Introduction: A Research and Policy Agenda - George Papaconstantinou and Jean Pisani-Ferry
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are engaged in new forms of deep interdependence while others remain 
part of a mostly shallow integration model; and an intensifying dispute 
between the incumbent and the emerging countries, which concerns 
either the rules of the game (for trade) or the power balance within the 
governance regime (for finance). 
The three fields where governance is confronted to deep integration 
issues exhibit similar patterns of paradoxical progress despite weak insti-
tutionalisation and weak mechanisms. In competition, institutions in the 
major countries and the EU acting independently on the basis of sim-
ilar mandates have been able to define and implement principles that 
organise the coexistence of their extraterritorial reach. They have taken 
advantage of a strong EU-US oligopoly providing leadership, with China 
emulating and not contesting. There are questions however on whether 
this progress will be tested in the future by negative spill-overs from other 
policy areas (trade, industrial policy) in a more adversarial geopolitical 
setting. 
In banking, common standards are being implemented in a fairly 
coherent way despite the lack of any mandatory requirement. The coor-
dinate-and-review model in operation has proven effective for the har-
monisation of banking solvency and liquidity standards, with the EU 
playing an important leadership role. The adequacy of the international 
standards resulting from this “confidence game” is however disputable, 
while the regulatory regime is vulnerable to disruptions emanating from 
new entrants and from outsiders such as fintechs, new platforms and 
market places. 
In taxation, major tax avoidance challenges have been tackled, 
prompted by acute public finances needs in a series of countries and 
public opinion pressure for international tax fairness following the 
crisis. Further action has started to tame corporate tax avoidance.  Prog-
ress initially concentrated in those tax areas with a conceptually simple 
problem to solve (abolishing banking secrecy) and where the interests of 
the largest advanced and emerging sovereigns participating in the G20 
are aligned (with US leadership). Action has relied on existing (but not 
tax-specific) international arrangements and on the support of a nimble 
institution, the OECD, that had not been designed to this end. Corporate 
taxation and the challenges of digitalisation have not been successfully 
tackled yet. They will be more difficult to address, if only because of their 
distributional dimensions.
Climate change mitigation is of particular interest because the inter-




mechanism a problem that can in principle only be tackled through hard 
law and a sanctions system. The novelty of the Paris agreement is that it is 
meant to gain strength by involving a strong epistemic community, sub-
national governments and a variety of private players, from NGOs inves-
tors and to major companies. From a static point of view, it is bound to 
fail. Dynamically, it may achieve results if endogenous technical progress 
is significant enough and if even a soft agreement succeeds is sufficiently 
credible for private investors and corporations to bet on the ultimate suc-
cess of decarbonisation. The risk, however, is one of increased divergence 
between the behaviours of the front-runners and the laggards that the 
Paris agreement brought under the same umbrella.         
A seminar on history was indispensable, if only to correct the usual 
tendency to idealise the past. We may feel that there was a golden age of 
global governance, but a critical examination of the past shows that the 
framework of rules and institutions was never comprehensive enough to 
cover the multiple channels of interdependence, that complains about its 
fragmentation date back to the 1970s, and that the rules-based regime 
was never entirely rules-based.  
Summing up, analysis of the cases examined so far suggests that 
overreliance on the traditional forms of global governance may be mis-
placed. Established rules and experienced institutions are no guarantee 
of effectiveness, while softer forms of collective action have in some cases 
delivered surprising results. While these insights must be underpinned 
by more systematic analysis, they do not invalidate the hypotheses we 
started with.     
The leadership dimension
As indicated, prime candidates for explaining why cooperation is 
more successful in some fields than in others are the heterogeneity of 
preferences and the nature of the interaction at work, which in turn 
determines what are the incentives to cooperate and to deliver on com-
mitments. Another important dimension is concentration: whether the 
essential interactions take place between a small group of players or 
whether actual participants in the game are many. 
The eight fields selected for this study are significantly different in this 
regard. Calculations indicate that the Herfindhal index of concentration 
for a variable that is representative of the interaction at work varies con-
siderably across fields. These differences are due both to the distribution 
Introduction: A Research and Policy Agenda - George Papaconstantinou and Jean Pisani-Ferry
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of activity and power across countries globally, and to the fact that the EU 
(or the Eurozone) acts mostly as one in certain fi elds whereas member 
states decide independently in some others It is certainly not by accident 
that cooperation has delivered more than expected in fi elds where the 
concentration of players is the highest.  
Figure 1: Concentration Index (Herfi ndhal), various fi elds, late 2010s
Source: Own calculations. See Pisani-Ferry and Mazza (2019) for details. 
Variables considered are market capitalisation for competition, bank assets for 
banking regulation, gross external assets for the GFSN, exports and imports for 
trade, CO2 emissions for climate, the corporate tax base for taxation, the number 
of internet users for internet regulation, and the stock of inward migrants for 
migration. A star indicates that the EU (or the Eurozone for the GFSN) is assumed 
to play as one in the fi eld. In the fi elds indicated with a °, competence belongs to 
both the EU/EZ and the member states. Two values of the indicator are therefore 
reported: when the EU is considered a single player (left  column) and when 
member states are considered acting individually (right column). GDP, PPP GDP 





The next steps for the Transformation of Global Governance Project 
involve conducting two additional seminars, while completing the ana-
lytical work to date with quantitative evidence and a formal analysis of 
the various governance cases.
• Internet governance: The decentralized and multi-stakeholder 
internet governance model has come under strain and seems 
increasingly inadequate to cope with Issues of security, privacy and 
more generally data sovereignty and concentration in the hands of a 
few private actors. Important analytical and policy questions centre 
around coordination and control in the presence of externalities; 
international equity regarding equal and non-discriminatory access; 
and intertemporal issues, brought about by the irreversibility and 
path dependency of outcomes in processes such as large data flows, 
privacy, or security.
• Geopolitical perspectives:  Geopolitics, once largely separated from 
the governance of economic interdependence, are increasingly rel-
evant for the analysis of sectoral cooperation arrangements. Some 
claim that interdependence is now at risk of being “weaponised” 
(Farrell and Newman, 2019). In this context, and after taking stock 
of the findings from the previous sectoral seminars, this event will 
review current geopolitics through the lens of global governance. 
The seminar will examine the significant changes to the balance of 
power between the US, China, and the EU, and what they may mean 
for the future of global governance. 
The analytical work to date and the result from the sectoral seminars 
will be complemented with the incorporation of systematic evidence on 
the character of the collective action problems global governance should 
address, the nature of the resulting game, the arrangements in place to 
tackle cooperation incentive, and the evolution of these characteristics 
over time. Indicators on the intensity and structure of interdependence as 
well as on the heterogeneity of preferences of the players involved and the 
degree of concentration among them will also be added.  This will involve 
empirical work in a number of sectors (trade, competition, migration, 
global financial architecture, banking, taxation, climate change, digital 
Introduction: A Research and Policy Agenda - George Papaconstantinou and Jean Pisani-Ferry
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infrastructure) across a number of dimensions highlighting structural 
and governance characteristics. 
The analytical and policy conclusions of the project will be presented 
and discussed in a 2-day conference to be held at the EUI in Spring 2020, 
bringing together participants from academia, policy making, business 
and civil society. A series of sectoral papers as well as a publication on 
the transformation of global governance are foreseen as outputs of the 
project, which will also feed into teaching at the School of Transnational 
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The Governance of International 
Trade: Reshape or Demise? 
Seminar insights1
Bernard Hoekman2, George Papaconstantinou and  
Jean Pisani-Ferry
1. The geopolitics of trade have changed. Whilst free trade was once 
meant to create bonds, trade policy is now used confrontationally 
in a power struggle between the US and China with spillover effects 
for the rest of the world. Because of its enforceability, trade policy is 
increasingly used as a substitute for the lack of other instruments to 
promote issues that have little to do with it. There is danger in these 
developments.
2. Widespread dissatisfaction with the global trade system pre-
dates  Trump.  Most US grievances (about dispute resolution, the 
abuse of developing country status, weak rules for subsidies, China) 
pre-date the Trump administration. It’s not only the US: there is 
widespread dissatisfaction with the outcome of past multilateral 
negotiations and the functioning of the world trading system. Senti-
ment of being treated unfairly is shared in both developed and devel-
oping countries.
1  The seminar was held on 19-20 June 2018 in Florence (Italy), jointly organised with the 
Global Governance Programme at the European University Institute’s Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies. 
2 Professor and Director, Global Economics at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 




• In advanced countries, the rapid erosion of technology rents 
that benefitted all, including relatively unskilled employees 
(aggregate factor), and the lack of appropriate policies that 
could have tilted the sharing of trade gains between pro-
ducers and consumers (distributional factor); 
• Developing countries worry that manufacturing relocation 
away from advanced countries has benefitted a handful of 
EMs only and that insufficient market opening in advanced 
countries has prevented food-producing countries from ben-
efitting;  
• China feels it has been subject to discriminatory rules by 
advanced countries.  
Future outcomes will hinge on: 
• Whether, in advanced countries, the growing current chal-
lenge to the positive-sum game nature of international 
trade can be reversed or complemented with policies which 
convince (and compensate) an increasingly skeptical elec-
torate;  
• Whether, in certain developing countries, the values under-
pinning international trade can coexist with increasingly 
politically illiberal regimes.  
3. Trade principles are sound but trade rules and institutions are out-
dated. The nature of international trade has changed fundamentally 
with the development of global value chains (GVCs) and the blurring 
of the distinction between goods and services. It is bound to change 
further as a consequence of the digital revolution. Multilateralism, 
national treatment and the most favored nation principle remain 
essential. But the trade negotiation architecture is increasingly out-
dated:  
Section 1: International trade
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• GVCs challenge traditional specializations and trading inter-
ests;  
• The categorization of participants in global trade on the basis 
of development level is at odds with growing heterogeneity 
within countries;  
• Increasingly important ‘behind the border’ issues (regulation, 
competition, taxes, intellectual property protection) are not 
properly addressed. 
4.  Clubs are the way forward, provided they abide by a set of strong 
principles. Plurilateral agreements and critical mass agreements are 
nimble instruments that can be used in an open, non-discriminatory 
way. They can serve to fight the abuse of consensus and tackle the 
diversity in degrees/patterns of integration and national preferences/
priorities. Their purpose remains ambiguous: Are they temporary 
patches, flexibility instruments, conduits for gradual emergence of 
new forms of multilateralisation or a basis for alternatives to existing 
multilateral arrangements? It is highly desirable that variable-geom-
etry agreements be rooted in strong multilateral principles and be 
regarded as complements rather than substitutes to the multilateral 
order. 
5. Trade is shifting to digital and trade policy and is increas-
ingly linked to other policies. As the economy and trade are increas-
ingly digitalised, traditional trade governance norms and instruments 
have become increasingly ineffectual or irrelevant. With this trend set 
to continue, future governance outcomes will depend on the current 
system’s ability to develop tools and governance formats which are 
more in tune with these new digital trade patterns and characteristics. 
The long-standing debate on whether trade issues should be treated 
in isolation, or understood instead in conjunction with other policy 
areas (trade and environment, trade and labour standards,…) has 
decidedly shifted in favor of the latter. This is due both to the struc-
tural transformation of trade patterns but also to an understanding 
that this may be tactically the only way to save an open trade regime. 
The remaining question is whether this trade-plus policy stance will 
act to further destabilize open trade or instead help save it.
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6. The EU should address the Trump and China challenges simul-
taneously. The EU shares some of the US grievances towards 
China but opposes its transactional approach. It should voice its con-
cerns to both partners. It should position itself as an active proponent 
and, alongside the US and China, as one of the key potential architect 
of a reformed trade system. A “WTO 2.0” hinges on China-EU-US 
cooperation. The battle will be a hard-fought one as China and the US 
may share an interest in a purely transactional management of their 
rivalry.
Future outcomes will hinge on:  
• whether the US will go “all the way” in rejecting the multilat-
eral system of rules, or instead will stay within it, all the while 
challenging its individual tenets and pushing for reforms;  
• whether the EU will be willing or able to assume the mantle 
of the main defender of this system, or be bogged down by its 
internal contradictions and weaknesses; 
• whether China will be convinced to “play by the rules”, or 
instead veer towards an illiberal regional and confrontational 
solution;
• whether the WTO membership will support and implement 
reform efforts, or instead the WTO will be pushed to irrele-
vance.
7. Broadly speaking, there are three ways forward  for  trade gover-
nance: 
• Attempting to salvage the multilateral system, by rewriting 
some rules, buttressing its institutions, and generating polit-
ical support for it. In the current circumstances, this not only 
seems like an unlikely outcome, but also one at odds with the 
structural transformation of international trade under way.  
• Further breakdown, with countries increasingly opting 
for unilateral action or pursuing bilateral deals, in essence 
destroying the current system in all but name. This is cur-
rently perhaps the most realistic scenario, but also one with 
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the most downside for trade, growth and more generally the 
future of global governance. 
• A new plurilateral system which draws and builds on the 
characteristics of the current multilateral system, but also 
recognizes the need to amend and complement it in way that 
reflects the diversity of trade patterns and actors. This would 
be by far the most desirable – and probably also relatively 
likely – outcome; as a hybrid however, much will depend on 
its specific characteristics, i.e. on how far it will deviate from 
current multilateral rules. 
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Keynote – Trade governance today3
Lim Hng Kiang, Former Minister for  
Trade of Singapore 
The trade governance system no longer reflects current geopolitical 
and business situations. Paralysis within the WTO makes it necessary to 
develop new rules for the new economy. Nevertheless, it would be wrong 
to break with the Doha Development Agenda, and unilateral action is not 
useful. Bypasses exist within the current framework, and issues may be dis-
cussed in other fora (OECD, G7/20, APEC). These can be opportunities 
to set rules in areas currently not dealt with. This is particularly salient 
regarding China, which needs to be involved constructively and induced to 
lead.
The election and actions of President Trump are a shock mandating 
adjustment, but on a deeper level, he represents a backlash against free 
trade and a rules-based governance system. While it may be true that by 
some measures the US is quite open, the perception of unfairness towards 
it is more important. Complacency in explaining the benefits of trade liber-
alisation and globalisation, as well as insufficient adjustment policies have 
soured the political base in developed countries. While some argue for such 
policies to be equally multilateral, it may be preferable to develop them 
domestically. 
It is becoming less pertinent to analyse trade on an international basis. 
Competition is no longer really between states, but between companies, 
between cities. Major developed and developing states should recognize this, 
not expect special and differential treatment, and focus on writing rules for 
the 21st century.
3 Summary by Adrien Bradley.





Session I - Has global trade governance broken down?
Multilateral trade governance has not broken down completely yet — but 
collapse is threatening. Optimists argue that trade continues to grow and 
trade facilitation agreements are still being agreed upon (both within 
the WTO framework and plurilaterally), while none of the threatened 
massive trade disruptions have occurred yet. Pessimists argue that the 
agreements being struck are stopgap at best, while the WTO and the mul-
tilateral trading regime face an existential crisis. 
There is consensus to observe that many of the challenges the WTO 
face predate the current US President and his outright rejection of the 
multilateral system. While President Trump’s unilateral actions and offen-
sive rhetoric have been baffling, the grievances they express are not new. 
US complaints about China, the categorization of emerging powers as 
developing countries of power-grabbing by the WTO’s arbitration system 
were already expressed by previous administrations. What has changed is 
that Trump appears to prioritize above all else outcomes rather than rules 
, procedures or alliances with like-minded states. Tackling the stalemate 
therefore requires to be “tough on Trump but also tough on the cause of 
Trump”. 
The WTO functions according to several principles that now con-
tribute to paralyse it and to fuel these grievances. 
• It is member-driven: rather than propose initiatives or make 
decisions, it has more of a convening or facilitating function. 
• It is incomplete in terms of coverage (e.g. services and invest-
ment).
• It has no independent monitoring and verification capacities, 
relying instead on state notification. 
The single undertaking principle makes it easy for one issue to derail an 
agreement; the consensus principle makes it easy for one country to do 
the same. Now, the long paralysis of the Doha round has, in all likelihood, 
made a single undertaking unrealistic to pursue for the future. 
Bypassing the consensus principle remains a possibility, provided for 
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by art. IX of the WTO agreement itself. But it is an unattractive option for 
member states, as they fear that departure from unanimity might end up 
putting them in the minority someday. 
The most pressing problem is the threat to the Appellate Body, where 
the Trump administration is blocking the nomination of new judges due 
to a perceived mission creep that constraints the scope for transaction 
with trade partners, and more generally to a perceived unfairness of its 
decisions towards the US. This heightens the risk of an all-out trade war. 
Only two reactions could reverse the dynamic of punitive measures and 
counter-measures: a high-level initiative, or untenable market pressure. 
Perceived unfairness towards the trade governance system, however, 
lies much more widely than with just the US government: China’s per-
ception is that it has paid a steep price to accede to the WTO, has been 
subject to discriminatory and disadvantageous rules, and has still man-
aged to succeed while remaining very polite to boot. In the EU and the 
US, citizens are anxious about the distributional consequences of trade 
liberalization, which are not being compensated for by domestic poli-
cies. Governments in both the US and Europe point to persistent dis-
tortionary Chinese practices (intellectual property infringement, state 
aid, direct or indirect control of commercial companies). Large emerging 
economies which might have an important role to play in upholding the 
system are in fact a heterogeneous group, requiring different incentives 
to buy into it.
Despite this crisis there is a systematic abandonment of leadership 
due to a lack of both willingness and capacity. Governments remain 
silent, but so does business. Scant progress can be observed on the issues 
of tomorrow (e-commerce, data),  while older issues remain undealt 
with. It is possible that China and the US might strike a bilateral deal 
which would seal the irrelevance of the WTO and undermine the whole 
trade governance system as it currently exists. 
A better alternative would be for the US, the EU and China (each 
accounting for roughly equal shares of global trade) to stop blaming each 
other for free-riding, and to reaffirm their common commitment to a 
system of multilateral  trade principles. This system should be designed 
so as to provide a level playing field. Some suggest that since the US is 
suffering decline, while China is cautiously ascendant, the EU, by default, 
should lead the way. It may, however, have to focus on solving its own 
internal problems with the Single Market and EMU first.
Section 1: International trade
25
index
Session II - Trade structures and trade institutions
While the rules and institutions governing trade have remained largely 
static for 20 years, the structure of trade has been changing. After Bald-
win’s Second Unbundling (which, by disaggregating knowledge from 
location, triggered the global value chain revolution) we are witnessing 
the incipient Third Unbundling (disaggregating service from location, 
through telepresence and telerobotics). Companies and cities now play 
a far more important role than when the rules were designed. This has 
made pre-existing gaps between rules and reality yawn wider, threat-
ening to dissolve the already fragile consensus over the principles under-
pinning those rules. 
Three problems arise. First, that of multipolarity. The high noon of 
multilateralism of the 1990s is being relegated to a distant past by the 
advent of a much more multipolar world. Against this background, the 
definition and mechanics of multilateralism are increasingly contested. 
The system requires some good will for consistent application, but stra-
tegic competition is creeping back in: trade is never just a tool, but can be 
an objective per se. The US exemplifies this currently. There is also scope 
for opportunity, as multilateralism was launched precisely in a multipolar 
context.
Second is the problem of late joiners to the system. The special and 
differentiated treatment they benefit from fuels resentment towards the 
multilateral system: while they feel they have made significant conces-
sions and benefited little, incumbent trading countries feel the opposite. 
This has led to the rise of status quo-prone or garrulous new powers, like 
China or India.
China presents a particular problem as it seeks to reshape its trade 
environment through its Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) and promo-
tion of the RCEP as alternative or complement to the CPTPP/TPP-11. 
The BRI can be seen as China’s alternative to creating a parallel WTO. 
Support for it in the region should not be underestimated as China pro-
vides badly needed infrastructure. On one hand, it can be argued that 
China understands its weight and seeks to be modestly constructive 
both regionally and globally, and that space should be made for it under-
standing its internal dynamics. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
China has “emerged without having converged”, and is simply playing 
veiled power politics. An important question is how to involve China in 
a constructive governance agenda, and on which issues: connectivity and 
the environment may be suitable. 
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Third, technological advancement is leading the world into a zero 
marginal cost knowledge economy with the potential to radically shift 
comparative advantages (though it is debatable whether this takes place 
more predominantly on a geographic basis due to legacy issues or a func-
tional one). With only loose, difficult to enforce disciplines, the current 
rules over intellectual property rights and state subsidies cannot prevent 
a brutal erosion of technological rents enjoyed by developed countries to 
the benefit of countries capitalizing on this gap between rules and reality. 
This is a major concern vis-à-vis China.
The question is how to (re)establish and maintain core principles. 
Fast-changing trade structures call for distinguishing the foundational 
principles of trade, which should remain invariant, from the operational 
rules, which need to be adapted as trade patterns evolve. Since it is easier 
to create new rules than to reform existing ones, recent practice has 
been to bypass WTO blockage through club arrangements, which often 
explore deeper regulatory policy coordination. 
Session III - Clubs and the new trade governance 
arrangements
Wide differences in development levels and degrees of economic inte-
gration call for a differentiation of trading arrangements. Arms-length 
exchange of goods and deep integration within the framework of global 
value chains and bundles of goods and services cannot be governed in 
the same way. The latter especially do not require border provisions but 
also behind-the-border provisions. As the WTO is increasingly unfit for 
purpose, countries are bypassing it through club arrangements, with the 
more or less sincere hope of integrating the rules thus agreed upon into 
the WTO framework.  
There are three main forms of club arrangements compatible with 
WTO principles: preferential trade agreements (PTAs); plurilateral 
agreements (PAs); and critical mass agreements (CMA). PTAs are excep-
tions, provided for by WTO rules, to the most-favoured nation (MFN) 
principle, and are generally concluded on a regional basis. PAs allow sub-
sets of the WTO membership to agree to certain disciplines applying to 
signatories only; CMAs are agreements among a set of countries that 
have the greatest stake/interest in an issue, with the benefits of whatever 
is agreed extended to all WTO members, whether they join or not. They 
are all, primarily, responses to the abuse of the consensus requirement, 
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put in place to tackle the differences in sectoral priorities and patterns of 
integration among states within the WTO.
PTAs, while to some extent discriminatory and trade-diverting, can 
extend to regulatory policy, allowing for the creation of harmonized rules 
and thus deeper economic integration, dealing with the gaps in WTO 
rules (although some argue they do not have a good track record in that 
respect). On the other hand, they generally do not address certain dis-
tortionary policies giving rise to large spill-overs, like state subsidies or 
production origin requirements. Excepting the CPTPP/TPP-11, they are 
generally closed clubs, lacking clauses allowing for third-party accession. 
PAs and CMAs, as a form of “open plurilateralism”, may be useful to 
multilateralise some PTA elements within the WTO framework. How-
ever, it appears that they can only work for some issues and operate at a 
lower level of ambition, acting more as a focal point for good practices 
fostering regulatory convergence instead of actively mandating it. Never-
theless, relying on the WTO framework, they offer greater transparency 
and accession opportunities, lower administration costs, and a surer dis-
pute settlement mechanism. Different trade instruments can be consid-
ered depending on the issue or objective at hand and the size of the set of 
countries involved.
At the end of the day, any system of clubs will have to build on basic 
trade principles, and will require institutional machinery that would be 
inefficient to re-create for each club. The WTO can provide the needed 
support functions and other machinery clubs will need. The MFN and 
national treatment principles, endowed with the necessary flexibility, 
ensure multilateral reciprocity. The WTO’s single undertaking principle, 
however, is a major constraint, and is arguably no longer realistically 
achievable due to the abuse of the consensus requirement. On the other 
hand, in negotiation there is a temptation to link issues, so as to pair gains 
and concessions and present a give-and-take narrative; though this may 
only be applicable if a country enjoys actual leverage. 
An underlying issue is the purpose of the trade arrangement: trade 
per se, or trade as a vector to project influence. It is obvious that the latter 
is the case for the US and China, and less so for the EU. When this is the 
stake, incentives to participate must go beyond those of just trade. More 
generally, these arrangements can serve as patches to the trade govern-
ance system; alternatives to it, or a means to make it evolve.
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Session IV - Governance implications of the interaction 
between trade and other policy areas 
Stimulating trade, at some point, begins to necessarily involve some reg-
ulatory coordination in order to maintain a level playing field, and turns 
into deepening economic integration. Four major policy areas interact 
with trade in this sense:
• First is currency. Countries may seek to benefit by manipulating the 
exchange rate to their advantage, and managed trade and managed 
exchange rates may be trade-offs. In a world of floating exchange 
rates, however, prices adjust leading to short terms gains only at best. 
In terms of governance, this issue is best managed by its proper insti-
tution, the IMF.
• Second is tax policy. It is claimed by some in the US that the WTO 
ignores distortions caused by the fact that not all countries impose 
VAT. This is not necessarily discriminatory under WTO rules and 
can be addressed in its current framework, but could benefit from 
dialogue (with the OECD for example).
• Third is environmental policy. Trade policy has long ignored the 
negative externalities it entails which drive climate change. One way 
to address these could be Nordhaus’ proposal of a Climate Club, 
a club arrangement imposing tariffs on non-members as a sort of 
carbon border tax; it appears difficult to craft one in a non-discrim-
inatory fashion, however. Another way would be to negotiate an 
elimination of fossil fuel subsidies within the WTO framework, on a 
similar template to that of the agreement on agriculture. These sub-
sidies could be redeployed to fund renewable energy projects or to 
alleviate energy poverty, but industry lobbying and lack of political 
will are serious obstacles to this scheme.   
• Fourth is national security. Trump has recently alleged this reason as 
grounds to levy tariffs on steel and aluminium imports. It is held to 
be self-judging, as no country can credibly judge the national secu-
rity interests of another, and until now has been seldom invoked: 
there is therefore little jurisprudence to turn to for guidance. Such a 
linkage is dangerous because of its inherent lack of justification and 
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scope for unduly seeking to constrain a partner’s foreign policy: the 
US threatening to impose sanctions on EU companies after with-
drawing from the JCPOA, for example.
It is true that linkage of trade and other issues has at times been abusive, 
as special interest groups can wield influence to extract advantages. These 
special interest groups can have concerns at first glance far removed from 
trade. It is questionable whether trade agreements and the WTO are the 
proper fora for advancing and adjudicating these claims. However, deep-
ening economic integration means that interaction of trade and other 
policies becomes inevitable. This involves going beyond minimal, rela-
tive standards mandated by national treatment, to advance harmonized 
standards. This can threaten democratically determined national pref-
erences. These should be debated openly in top level discussions rather 
than being left solely within the WTO. 
Trade is one of the rare fields of global governance where a binding 
dispute settlement system (still) exists. Since it is difficult to parse the 
degree to which trade can be dealt with as a standalone issue, linkage 
with other policy areas runs the risk of overburdening it. This is not 
necessarily the case, as WTO rules allow for forbearance and flexibility 
for measures which may be distortionary to trade but are informed by 
genuine national preferences, on labour or environmental standards for 
example. Some, even more optimistically, are confident that if restored to 
its proper functioning it can be used to impose genuine duties on states. 
Be that as it may, there is consensus that a narrow focus on trade may 
foreclose dealing with the “causes of Trump”.
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Extraterritoriality and Cooperation in 
Competition Policy
Seminar insights1
George Papaconstantinou, Jean Pisani-Ferry and  
Guntram Wolff2
In a context where a few global firms dominate key sectors worldwide, 
the proper functioning of product markets rests on enforcing both a 
non-distortive trading regime and pro-competitive competition laws. 
Whereas trade is governed by multilateral rules, however, there is no 
global competition law nor a global competition authority. Competition 
policy remains in the sole remit of national authorities operating under 
national law. National decisions, however, have strong extraterritorial 
effects. This raises significant international coordination issues.  
1. A case of voluntary cooperation amongst national authorities. 
Competition provides an illuminating case of global governance through 
voluntary cooperation of independent national authorities. The key 
ingredients of this model are the following: 
• Policy objectives are largely similar across countries;
• Policy implementation is almost everywhere delegated to inde-
pendent national authorities whose mandates are therefore 
largely similar;
• National authorities cooperate informally in assessing potential 
cross-border effects of policies; 
1 The seminar was held on 16 October 2018 in Bruxelles (Belgium), jointly organised 
with Bruegel.
2 Director of Bruegel.
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• They recognise the right of their partners to take decisions 
which apply to firms in their own jurisdiction, provided they are 
respond to demonstrably harmful effects of firms’ behaviour; 
• Within the framework of their mandates, national authorities 
refrain from taking decisions that would be disproportionately 
harmful to partner countries. 
While this model has some resemblance to the one at work amongst cen-
tral banks, there is a significant difference: central bank decisions do not 
target specific economic actors in partner countries, whereas competi-
tion authorities do. In merger control cases, they may impose remedies 
such as the sale of assets located outside the border of their jurisdiction.  
2. A model whose permanence cannot be taken for granted. This model 
has been in operation successfully for more than two decades. About 
half of the competition cases dealt with by authorities in large countries 
explicitly involve cross-border dimensions. The global competition net-
work includes about 130 countries. The resilience of this model however 
rests on ingredients whose permanence cannot be taken for granted: 
• The convergence of competition mandates was largely due to the 
similarity of those of the two main players: US and EU. Until recently, 
China’s competition policy was underdeveloped and competition 
laws were largely copied on those of the two incumbent powers. As 
China develops its own competition policy philosophy and as other 
newcomers play a greater role, the commonality that has character-
ised competition regimes worldwide may not last; 
• Even if legal texts remain similar, the environment of competi-
tion authorities may change. Pressures from policy departments 
in charge of industrial or trade policy may undermine the peaceful 
coexistence between competition policy authorities; 
• Ad-hoc cooperation between competition policy authorities does not 
deliver a first-best result. Depending on the size of the corresponding 
market and the degree of concentration of the firms involved, deci-
sions by national authorities may suffer from under-enforcement 
(for small countries) or over-enforcement (for large ones). Equity 
in the distribution of costs and benefits of competition rulings can 
therefore not be taken for granted. Such asymmetry will grow as 
digital business develops and gives rise to heightened competition 
concerns.      





Session I - The extraterritorial reach of competition 
policy decisions: evidence, successes and pitfalls
There is no global competition policy, nor a global authority in charge of 
coordinating national competition authorities (CAs). National (or Euro-
pean) authorities rule independently on the basis of their domestic man-
date, which is to uphold the welfare of domestic consumers. But intensi-
fied cross-border economic integration increasingly leads them to 
pronounce on the behaviour of foreign firms and to impose extraterrito-
rial remedies (for example, to condition the approval of a merger on the 
divestiture of assets held outside the jurisdiction of the competition 
authority). Such extraterritoriality especially regards merger control, but 
may also apply to cases of abuse of dominant position or to cartels. More 
than half of merger or cartel cases investigated by the European Commis-
sion nowadays involve an extraterritorial dimension.     
The origins of the extraterritorial reach of competition policy are to 
be found in the US Sherman Act 
of 1890, which spelled out what 
became known as the “effects doc-
trine”: that the reach of competi-
tion policy decisions can extend 
beyond borders when foreign firms’ behaviour is having “direct, substan-
tial and reasonably foreseeable effects” on domestic consumers. This was 
broadly endorsed by the EU and provided the basis for a series of land-
mark decisions, of which best known is the 2001 decision declaring the 
GE-Honeywell merger incompatible with EU law. 
Extraterritoriality in competition policy raises five main issues. 
• First is the obvious question of sovereignty: states targeted for the 
allegedly anti-competitive behaviour of undertakings based in their 
jurisdiction may complain of overreach and infringement into their 
domestic affairs. Until now cooperation has prevailed and disputes 
have been avoided, but this is by no means guaranteed.
“It is a strange system, that 
shouldn’t work on paper, but 
does in practice” 
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• Second is the issue of consistency. Peaceful coexistence among 
national authorities requires as a necessary (though not necessarily 
sufficient) condition a high degree of convergence of competition 
laws and their applications. 
• Third is increasing complexity in the system and the widening scope 
for potential conflict. The number of competition authorities and 
regimes has more than doubled in the last decade, numbering some 
130 currently, forming a network of different rules, standards and 
procedures, with both overlaps and gaps. Their status vary: they can 
be independent authorities, or tied to the judicial system, which can 
impact their work and cooperation.
• Fourth is the opportunistic use of competition policy. A state’s com-
petition authority, especially if it is insufficiently independent, may 
selectively or strategically enforce its rules, furthering domestic 
interests and favouring protectionism. One participant pointed out 
that a CA’s mandate can include elements that go beyond competi-
tion policy as commonly understood, which can enable this kind of 
behaviour (South Africa’s competition authority’s remit over “diver-
sity of ownership” of undertakings, for example).
• Fifth is the problem of under- and over-enforcement of competition 
regimes depending on the size of the relevant markets. No firm can 
disregard the EU market, but the competition regime of small, less 
economically robust states might be under-enforced, even if there is 
significant economic harm to people, because of little effective power 
on the global stage. Conversely, a state’s competition regime may be 
over-enforced due its global power; or because that state’s competi-
tion authority is the last one involved in a case to deliver its ruling, 
and thus will hold much greater bargaining power and influence on 
the final result.
Cooperation among competition authorities: principles and practice
In legal terms, extraterritoriality is asserted, in principle, to preserve the 
integrity and proper functioning of one’s own market. In the US, the 
well-established effects doctrine has led to quite broad claims. The EU’s 
dominant approach is similar but slightly narrower: its implementation 
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doctrine aims to catch activities “implemented” by undertakings in its 
jurisdiction. The EU has been prudent in adopting the effects doctrine 
approach, though it has been less shy to do so for merger control cases. 
Participants all acknowledged that legal determination of where and 
when it is justifiable to claim extraterritoriality is necessary and impor-
tant, but many highlighted the fact that in practice, however, it cannot 
ignore political concerns, as well as the geopolitical and geoeconomic 
weight of the parties involved. 
In practice, competition authorities manage these concerns by coor-
dinating on three levels. First is the important, still emerging practice 
among competition authorities of the use of comity, whereby they attempt 
to take into account principles, rules and interests of their counterparts 
in elaborating their rulings. This is meant to avoid direct jurisdictional 
conflict and calling the sovereignty of another state into question. 
Comity can be negative or positive. In its negative form, a CA will vol-
untarily refrain from intervening if that would lead to a hard conflict of 
law in implementing the remedy it deems appropriate. In its positive (and 
less frequent) form, one competition authority may ask its counterpart 
to remedy the anti-competitive behaviour affecting it, which originates 
in its counterpart’s jurisdiction. Comity can be stronger or weaker, and 
more or less institutionalised. One practitioner, however, cautioned that 
comity is observed more in books than in practice, and that the main 
competition authorities do not often formally invoke this principle.
Negative comity corresponds to unilateral restraint, and positive 
comity consists in asking and relying on another authority to provide 
redress. In between are less defined forms of cooperation, based on 
case-specific discussions between competition authorities. For example, 
the Australian competition authority may assess a global merger, and 
decide to defer to the EU and the US authorities, which are investigating 
the same case. One participant estimated that around half of merger cases 
are settled this way.
Fully institutionalised comity consists in a formal bilateral coopera-
tion agreement on competition policy. This corresponds to a second level 
of cooperation and was inaugurated between the US and the EU in 1991. 
This kind of agreement officialises agreed-upon cooperation processes, 
a step up from unilateral notification regimes and ad hoc consultations, 
and has proliferated internationally in the past decade.
On a third level, CAs participate in exchanges in international forums, 
most often within the OECD and the International Competition Network 
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(ICN) established in 2001 following the failed attempt to create a global 
competition system with a home in the WTO. These interactions have 
allowed progress on aligning views and establishing best practices, cre-
ating a solid epistemic community. ICN principles (as well as the OECD 
ones) help ensure convergence of views between competition authorities 
and provide guidance in case of differences.
One participant deemed the resulting rules to be fairly robust, and 
remarked that states are in fact changing their laws to comply with them, 
but also observed that they may have been “low-hanging fruit” and that 
further convergence may prove more difficult, for example on tools of 
industrial policy, or on issues raised by digitalisation.
State of play
The strongest points of convergence so far have involved, for the most 
part, catching the worst offenses and risks in competition policy, where 
enforcement interests are highest, namely cartels and horizontal mergers. 
One participant noted no major divergences in approach across the world, 
both in legal and effective terms. The weaker points, where divergences 
remain, are more ambiguous categories of cases, such as foreclosures, 
abuses of a dominant position, or export cartels. Participants agreed on 
the difficulty of getting states to agree on what constitutes anti-competi-
tive behaviour for these. 
Furthermore, legal mandates may represent obstacles to a proper 
enforcement of competitive behaviour: whereas the EU law neither 
mandates nor prohibits taking into account the effect of anti-competi-
tive behaviour on foreign consumers, US law explicitly excludes it. One 
participant underlined the fact that the legal appreciation of these cases 
is still evolving, even in the EU, while reminding that there is a strong 
incentive for common approaches to avoid conflicts and diverging out-
comes, as they may damage a competition authority’s legitimacy. Peer 
pressure was deemed an effective tool.
Participants speculated on what a global competition authority might 
look like. Such a global body would 
require a large-number multilateral 
agreement, establishing rules compat-
ible with all involved states’ sovereignty 
claims. It would be optimal for enforce-
ment in theory, though the cost and methods of doing so remain open 
“Ironically enough, 
competition authorities 
may work best as a cartel.” 
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questions. It would also raise serious redistribution issues. Thus, it is far 
from clear that it is a realistic possibility. 
Participants also debated the scope for including competition policy 
in the WTO, as has long been proposed, and as was the original plan 
for the International Trade Organization in the Havana Charter of 1948. 
They tentatively agreed that while the issue of subsidies could be inte-
grated to the WTO, there is little scope for much else. The idea of an 
international body dealing with competition issues is by no means new, 
and its repeated failure has led to cooperation between CAs as a “third 
best”.
Session II - Rivalry and cooperation among competition 
authorities: towards fragmentation or convergence?
The China challenge
The multiplication of competition authorities in recent years has raised 
the fear of more frequent international tensions. Of particular concern 
has been China: first due to its unsanctioned, or even government-led 
anti-competitive behaviour of its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and 
second due to the evolution of its competition policy and authorities and 
their increasing assertiveness on the international stage. 
The concept of competition policy in China was in large part 
“imported”, so the mandate of its authorities is quite similar to those it 
mimics in the West. In practice however, there is a lack of experience and 
expertise, and much depends on which authority is dealing with which 
undertaking. Fundamental ques-
tions such as the respective role 
of SOEs, the Party, and the gov-
ernment in competition policy, 
or the very compatibility of a 
planned socialist market economy and competition policy, remain unan-
swered, if not unasked.
China’s competition policy has developed gradually and very recently. 
Its Antimonopoly Law came in force in 2008 with three main bodies 
tasked with enforcing it (including the Ministry of Commerce), in dif-
ferent domains and at different levels. Consumer protection is not a key 
objective; rather, it is to curb inflationary pressure. The enactment of the 
“Protectionism and easy 
politicisation make it difficult to 
deal with China” 
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Fair Market Review System followed in 2016, designed to allow some of 
the competition agencies to review local government actions for poten-
tial negative effects on the market. Only a few cases have been examined 
though, and there are no clear guidelines or sanctions. Finally, three large 
agencies, including one of the CAs empowered by the Antimonopoly 
Law, were merged in March 2018 into a “super market supervisor”. It is 
an ongoing process whose effects are not yet discerned. 
Three avenues can be envisaged for cooperation with China. The first 
is to give China some latitude, while making efforts to elaborate rules 
for a proper role of SOEs at the technical level. A second is to refuse to 
let competition policy be used for protectionist purposes. At this point, 
this means discouraging China’s temptation to escalate the trade war the 
US has launched. The third would be to aim for a higher goal, namely 
co-writing new rules for a new economy, characterised by platforms, big 
data and AI. China is moving very fast in these fields, aided by Chinese 
consumers who adopt technology avidly as well as by Chinese govern-
mental support; one participant assured there is genuine interest in coop-
erating with the EU and US in this field.
The future of US-EU cooperation
Participants engaged in a historical analysis of the development of com-
petition policy in the EU and the US and their relationship, in order to 
review critically claims of convergence and divergence. As one recounted, 
the US led in this area before the EU caught up around the turn of the 
century, fostering deregulation in member states and establishing the 
Single Market. Now, most EU member states rate better than the US in 
industry competition indexes. The same participant compared a frag-
mented US competition policy system to a more coherent EU one, and 
shared three concerns: that broadening the sphere of public policy will 
raise the risks of conflict between competition policy stakeholders; that 
a self-proclaimed “political” Commission can lead to increased misun-
derstandings, especially on state aid; and that populism could unwind 
competition policy and impact European integration itself. 
What can be expected from US competition policy looking forward? 
In the last decades US authorities seem to have been more lenient than 
their EU counterpart. Will the stance of the Trump administration lead 
to a more pronounced departure from pro-competition practices and a 
divergence between EU and US policy philosophies? This would involve 
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heightened risks of transatlantic conflict. Beyond the bilateral dimen-
sion, divergence between the US and the EU would have profound con-
sequences for competition policy globally.  
Several participants pointed out elements of continuity in the US 
approach. As far as competition policy is concerned, until now the cur-
rent administration has not broken with past behaviour. But things may 
change, and President Trump’s apparent willingness to selectively enforce 
competition policy risks damaging its reputation. One may question how 
resilient current arrangements may prove to be in the face of potential 
profound changes in behaviour. 
Participants debated whether the fact that competition authorities 
share common objectives ensures similar outcomes: one participant 
made a parallel with central banks, their domestic objective of price 
stability, and their tradition of cooperating closely. Several participants 
remained unconvinced that disputes can be avoided, pointing out com-
petition authorities’ differentiated effects on customers of different coun-
tries, temptation to interpret or distort their mandate in service of other 
objectives, and lack of dispute settlement mechanisms.
There was also debate over the definitions and delimitations of com-
petition policy and industrial policy. As one participant characterised 
it, to general approval, industrial policy means industrial development 
spurred by the state, using tools that can be categorised as anti-compet-
itive behaviour such as exclusionary practices, vertical mergers or state 
aid. Thus, competition policy, with its focus on non-discrimination and a 
level playing field, is perceived to have a strong potential to hinder indus-
trial policy, especially in China. One participant asserted that industrial 
policy seldom works, generating instead negative spill-overs such as 
overcapacity and bad loans, giving examples from the Chinese solar and 
electric vehicle industries.
How resilient is the global competition regime? 
Participants agreed that changing patterns of trade and the development 
of services and digitalisation made closer cooperation in competition 
policy a necessity, and some regretted the impossibility of a global body 
dedicated to dealing with this field. It was recalled that strong epistemic 
communities, like that of competition policy, can fall prey to self-absorp-
tion and disconnection from the flow of events, even if it is underpinned 
by a robust body of theory and common understanding of its practice. 
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Another participant judged that global governance of competition 
policy has functioned fairly well as 
a “second best” system, buttressed 
by a commonality in its implemen-
tation and understanding of its 
relevant law, coexistence (or comity) promoting cooperation and lim-
iting damaging assertions of extraterritoriality, and a common culture 
reflected in the epistemic community. But the governance system seems 
to be somewhat fragile and non-resilient, relying on assumptions that all 
stakeholders are pursuing the same goals and playing by the rules.
“The functioning of the global 
competition policy system is a 
miracle to be preserved.” 
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The Governance of Global Financial 
Safety Nets: Fit for Purpose?
Seminar insights1
Erik Berglof2, George Papaconstantinou, Jean Pisani-
Ferry and Andrés Velasco3
1. Financial globalisation has reshaped financial interdependence and 
increased the demand for global financial safety nets. The IMF-centred 
safety net of the post-war decades was quantitatively and qualitatively 
adequate in a world of limited capital flows and mostly national banking. 
It does not respond to the needs of a world of unfettered capital flows, 
global value chains, market interdependence and international banking. 
Under such conditions, global financial safety nets must consist of sev-
eral coordinated layers whose combination matches the potential needs 
of financially open countries.
The current international regime departs from the 1990s template 
in fundamental ways. Capital flows are increasingly driven by push fac-
tors resulting from the global financial cycle and US monetary policy, 
rather than pull factors from domestic policies. Ergo, while conditional 
assistance remains the right response to capital outflows from domestic 
policy errors, it may not be the right response to externally-driven boom-
bust financial cycles and self-fulfilling crises. At the same time, in times 
of stress, commercial banks doing business in foreign currency face 
1 The seminar was held on 1-2 April 2019 in London (United Kingdom), jointly organ-
ised with the London School of Economics.
2 Director of the Institute of Global Affairs, Professor in Practice in the Department of 
Economics at the London School of Economics.
3 Dean of the School of Public Policy at the London School of Economics; former Fi-
nance Minister of Chile.
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liquidity shortages but may lack adequate foreign currency collateral, 
needing access to an international lender of last resort.
2. Economic and political reasons explain why the IMF alone cannot 
respond to such needs. Tackling financial account crises may require 
amounts of financial assistance that exceed by a wide margin what the 
multilateral system can realistically mobilise. Whereas the overall pool 
of resources available for international financial assistance has tripled in 
proportion to world GDP, IMF permanent resources represent only one-
eighth of available resources excluding national reserves. In addition, 
whereas IMF governance correctly limits the politicisation of lending, 
it also limits availability of precautionary support. Despite attempts to 
broaden the scope of its facilities, the Fund is not yet well equipped to 
provide unconditional liquidity to prequalified countries. Stigma effects 
and a reluctance to move away from conditional lending explain why it 
has not succeeded.    
The IMF is also not better prepared to provide liquidity support to 
commercial banks operating in foreign currency. Covering such needs is 
an extension of the traditional role of central banks acting as lenders of 
last resort to commercial banks. They cannot be substituted in this role by 
an international institution. By the same token, the Fund cannot exercise 
conditionality towards central banks providing liquidity to their banking 
sector. Speed and scale require this operation to be based on trust. 
3. Massive accumulation of reserves at national level is indicative of 
pervasive distrust in the multilateral Bretton Woods system. Reserves-
to-GDP and reserves-to-trade ratios have reached unprecedented levels. 
Preference for such costly self-insurance, most notably in Asia where it 
emerged in reaction to the Asian crisis of the late 1990s and the IMF 
programmes that followed. Its rise amounted to a first major departure 
from the principle of mutual insurance embodied in the IMF articles 
of agreement. It signalled that several emerging countries regarded the 
Fund as excessively driven by the perspective, and even the interest of the 
advanced Western countries.    
4. In a significant departure from the established multilateral regime, 
a three-layer system has come into existence. In addition to national 
reserves, it consists of: 
• Bilateral support schemes, especially through swap lines. Such swap 
lines may serve as confidence-signalling devices, macro-financial 
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support, trade- or currency-promoting instruments, or channels of 
provision of international currency liquidity to banks ;      
• Regional safety nets to provide financial assistance to participating 
countries. There are by now seven, uneven in terms of size, institu-
tional infrastructure and potential effectiveness, developed in part 
for resources, in part in response to IMF mistrust;
• Multilateral financial assistance through the IMF, in the form of 
traditional conditional assistance or of liquidity provision schemes 
granted to prequalified countries. 
• Such a system is necessary in a world of deep financial integration 
with private financial institutions, not only states, needing access to 
liquidity and with regional spillovers, especially in currency unions, 
justifying mobilising resources from neighbours and partners. As 
things stand, however, this network does not constitute a coherent 
system, in terms of coverage, resources, capabilities, predictability. 
It is questionable whether it will evolve into a coherent system, or 
degenerate into fragmentation.
5. Within the GFSN, coordination problems are being addressed prag-
matically, but difficult issues remain unsolved. Coordinating them 
raises issues of: 
• Availability. Commercial, political or geopolitical considerations 
weigh on the choice of countries to which liquidity lines are being 
provided by major central banks;
• Conditionality. Even if institutions share the same philosophy the 
aims, maturity and scope of loans may differ, and so will the associ-
ated conditionality; 
• Terms of lending. Whereas Fund lending conditions are broadly uni-
form across countries, bilateral or regional lenders may tailor theirs 
to programme countries; 
• Debt relief. Multilateral debt relief granted to insolvent borrowers is 
in principle based on objective criteria and broadly uniform across 
countries; this is less true for bilateral or regional lenders, which may 
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be based on economic or strategic interest and even seize collateral 
instead of participating in a multilateral restructuring;   
• Seniority. The hierarchy of official creditors raises difficult issues of 
principle, especially when loans were provided at the same time and 
on the basis of tightly coordinated conditional programmes.         
6. While the central role of the IMF in the global financial archi-
tecture is generally regarded as essential, its future cannot be taken 
for granted. The Fund is now part of a heterogeneous network where 
it is neither dominant nor indispensable. This may affect fundamental 
principles of the international financial architecture such as equality of 
treatment and transparency. More fundamentally, the IMF was part of 
a post-war order characterised by a monetary and financial architecture 
dominated by the US. Whether this can evolve into a more symmetric 
multipolar architecture where several currencies coexist and power is 
more evenly distributed is highly uncertain.
7. Architecture issues and governance issues cannot be separated. As 
the dominant veto player, the US exercises overwhelming influence over 
the IMF but is not willing to increase its resources significantly. China, 
India and other emerging countries are unlikely to invest much into 
the future of the institution as long as they feel massively underrepre-
sented in its governance. Europe is a staunch supporter of the Fund but 
is unwilling to renounce the influence that it currently enjoys within it. 
Unless addressed as a matter of urgency, this configuration portends the 
risks of a persistent deadlock in the reform of the international financial 
architecture and of its eventual fragmentation.  
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Keynote – Financial Safety Nets: A European 
Perspective4
Thomas Wieser, Non-resident fellow at Bruegel. Former 
President of the Economic and Financial Committee/
Euro Working Group
We are gathering ten years after the Vienna Initiative was launched. 
It was a cooperative solution to a problem whose gravity few suspected at 
first and which needed adaptability and flexibility to arrive at. The banking 
system in central and eastern Europe (CEE) was largely owned non-do-
mestically, and when the crisis hit, liquidity started to flow out. There was 
strong incentive to be “first out the door”, to defect first, as in a standard 
prisoners’ dilemma. And there was a deplorable Western European lack of 
concern about potential consequences. The lesson from this episode is that 
closer integration implies spillovers, which have consequences for the alloca-
tion of supervision responsibilities and for the distribution of losses.
Back then the risks were understood, but not taken seriously by sover-
eign decision-makers. Western Europe governments had to be convinced 
that it was in their interest to nudge banks headquartered in their coun-
tries to stay in CEE in order to stabilise the macroeconomic situation. No 
coercion mechanisms existed, so leadership had to emerge, and cooperative 
structures and principles of loss attribution had to be invented in a crisis 
situation. The stars aligned and good cooperation was achieved, thanks 
perhaps to enlightened self-interest or the positive dynamic of an epistemic 
community, but these are all but guaranteed in a future crisis. Crisis struc-
tures and clear and transparent principles for crisis management should 
rather be put in place in good times. 
Turning to the euro crisis, the situation can be likened to “trapeze artists 
with only some safety nets”. It is only when the ECB provided assurance 
of a full safety net that speculation was deterred and that the doom loop 
was dampened. Yet the ECB cannot play the role of a national central bank, 
and despite the fact that the ESM is fairly well equipped, monetary union 
remains incomplete. 
The relation of regional to global safety nets in the European case 
remains unclear. The division of labour between the ESM and the Euro-
4 Summary by Adrian Bradley
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pean Commission, as well as the role of the ECB in future Eurozone pro-
grammes remain in question, as does the involvement of the ESM with 
countries outside the Eurozone, and their cooperation modalities, both in 
and out of crisis situations. Moreover, the participation of the IMF in pos-
sible future Eurozone programmes is now uncertain. Should it participate, 
the combination of EU and IMF conditionality remains an issue; and were 
the IMF not be involved, there is the question of member states’ buy-in to 
the institution.  
One reason why IMF participation is likely to remain necessary is that 
the ESM has little to no autonomy from national governments and par-
liaments, while the IMF does. Although the nature of the contingent lia-
bilities resulting from conditional assistance are the same for IMF and for 
ESM loans, member states’ parliaments do not regard them in the same 
way. The autonomy of the IMF and, to be clear, the lack of direct democratic 
control of its decisions are a good thing, because otherwise it would be a 
slow-moving Leviathan. It should also be observed that it has thus far been 
insulated from the vagaries of the Trump administration. 
The EU should better prepare to deal with financial turmoil in its neigh-
bourhood. Both the ESM (for assistance) and the ECB (for swap lines) 
face legal and political limitations. Yet the implicit interdependence model 
of policymakers relies too much on trade linkages and tends to underesti-
mate financial linkages. In view of the situation in the near neighbourhood 
(Ukraine, Balkans, Mediterranean), the EU should develop a strategy for 
contributing to financial stability beyond its borders.





Session I - The GFSN: An irreversible departure from 
Bretton Woods?
The first speaker enumerated a number of points touching on recent 
developments: 
• Governance issues and the GFSN are linked: revised IMF gover-
nance through its quota increase made recourse easier, especially in 
emerging markets (EMs). Quota issues are very political; but politics 
can change, especially in crisis. It is however difficult to convince pol-
iticians to increase resources for safety nets: to maintain momentum, 
it is thus important to keep making the point it is necessary. 
• It is difficult for the IMF (or other international organisations) to 
handle swap lines: providing quick, cheap and large amounts of 
money is incompatible with its governance structures. Despite Fed 
support in short-term liquidity lines for EMs, the resulting Flexible 
Credit Line (FCL) was too small and expensive; however, it paved 
the way for large balance of payment precautionary facilities. It may 
be the avenue of precautionary arrangements is more fruitful to 
pursue for the IMF and RFAs. 
• Discussions of governance must confront the roles of the US and 
China. The US has a de facto veto on IMF reform, and does not 
yet accept the necessity of a safety net with more resources. China’s 
approach to multilateral safety nets is unclear, while being forth-
coming bilaterally with its own conditionality and lack of transpar-
ency.
• The relationship between global and regional safety nets is a diffi-
cult one. There has been much back-and-forth with Chiang Mai, but 
progress is slow. The urgency of the situation with the ESM made it 
so that modalities (e.g. debt solvency analyses) were not discussed 
ex ante. Cooperation guidelines are developed, but more is needed.
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• The role the private sector can play is underestimated: crises can be 
attractive times to invest, but only if there is “light at the end of the 
tunnel”. Precautionary arrangements can be helpful in these situa-
tions, though exit may be tricky.
The second speaker recalled that freeing capital movement was a major 
departure from Bretton Woods. He then criticised the mental model 
whereby crises requiring financial assistance are the result of either policy 
mistakes or exogenous shocks; it would be more correct to analyse them 
as shifts of expectations leading to self-fulfilling moves to bad equilibria. 
Such shifts can arise from several mechanisms, including the “original 
sin” of borrowing in dollars (Argentina) or the “doom loop” between 
banks and sovereigns (Europe). To rule some of these out a lender of last 
resort is necessary.
This analysis implies that the standard debt solvency paradigm and 
the categorisation of countries as “sinners” vs. “virtuous” are both prob-
lematic. This suggests a large, rapid, and ex-post unconditional (though 
ex-ante conditional) GFSN, as a deterrent which would not need to be 
used. Potential recourse could be granted by prequalification to avoid 
stigma. This seems preferable to uncertain access to non-transparent 
swap lines or patchy RFAs with heterogeneous rules. 
A large part of the discussion revolved around assessing the relative 
successes of the IMF and ways forward. Many agreed with the first speaker, 
arguing that the Fund had in fact performed well in the past 15 years: the 
GFSN commands eight times more resources than in 2007, IMF cooper-
ation with the EU has worked well 
in most cases (excluding Greece), 
and no one questions its central 
role any longer. While in the 1990s 
the proposed Asian Monetary 
Fund was rejected as a rival to the IMF, now all RFAs cooperate with 
it: ESM assistance for example is conditional to participating in an IMF 
programme. Nevertheless, the Fund’s firepower is insufficient. Crisis cat-
alysed action to increase it, but growing capital flows means it will have 
to work with RFAs. In the crisis the ESM disbursed in the EU three times 
more than the IMF has done so globally. 
The IMF should also rely more on precautionary facilities; attempts 
to develop them, however, have been frustrated by member reluctance, 
often for contradictory reasons. To increase its firepower, the IMF could 
“In governance discussions, 
there are two elephants in the 
room: the US and China.
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involve the private sector or borrow itself on financial markets, though 
this last option, a taboo in debates, would likely require a politically her-
culean change in quota nature, and imply higher lending costs.
 To one participant’s interrogation on the appropriateness of capital 
flow management measures, another responded that the IMF’s stance was 
coming to “a more modern view”; one participant recalled such measures 
have been common in many Asian countries, and perceived as sensible 
by financial markets there. Another put forth the idea that the IMF could 
review the quality of sovereign assets to instil a measure of trust, but was 
answered that it could never do so in sufficient depth.
Some participants cautioned against the IMF having to rely on RFAs 
or swap lines to supplement its activity, as clear lines of responsibility 
and governance practices are still missing, and impartiality cannot be 
assured. Others warned that overly ambitious conceptions of safety nets 
invite moral or political hazard. Prequalification for assistance could be a 
problematic signal if made public, and may carry a stigma, while poten-
tial subsequent disqualification could trigger adverse market reaction.
One participant questioned why the IMF’s centrality is unchallenged. 
It used to rest on its resources, expertise, and the quality of the institution 
itself; only the last justification still stands, but it is unclear for how long. 
Another answered that it is the only institution with a global mandate; 
it provides a forum for all to discuss issues, and is equipped with a good 
decision structure for what it is meant to do. Its expertise derives from its 
large number of programmes, giving it unique hands-on practical knowl-
edge. Another however recalled the importance of getting the diagnostic 
right, to justify conditionality. 
In concluding, the first speaker nuanced IMF success: before the 
crisis, its funds were in decline, and their emergency increase was tempo-
rary: they expire in 2020. 
Internal discussions on gov-
ernance and norms of behav-
iour were set aside during the 
crisis to “keep everyone in the 
room” and achieve quota 
reform; it is an open question how long the status quo can last. Prequali-
fication and precautionary arrangements are the solution to moral 
hazard: this was discussed but deadlocked over subsequent potential dis-
qualification. Two issues remain outstanding for private sector involve-
ment: unclear conditions for debt restructuring, and possibility of capital 
flows management measures. 
“We are learning to do 
internationally what we learned to 
do nationally a century ago: create 
a lender of last resort.”
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The second speaker summed up the problem of the GFSN as creating 
an international lender of last resort. Central banks perform this function 
quickly with large amounts ex post. Thus, developing prequalification 
mechanisms is important, and would imply turning the IMF into a kind 
of rating agency; which in turn would imply that it would be tougher ex 
ante, in order to be able to provide assistance unconditionally ex post. 
The speaker concluded on a pessimistic note: that the global financial 
crisis had huge repercussions, deteriorating political conditions world-
wide, and that it is uncertain whether democracy could survive another 
crisis of that magnitude. The problem is deeper and the system needs 
more than just tweaks.
Session II - Swap lines: What are they for?
Swap lines address different problems than the IMF does. They are meant 
to assist international banks facing foreign currency funding pressures 
(usually in dollars). Drawing on bilateral swap lines, central banks can 
perform the function of lender of last resort to the banking system. The 
alternative would be for the requesting central bank to use up its foreign 
exchange reserves and risk capital outflows. The question is whether to 
move from specific uses of swaps to broader uses, to avoid the need for 
costly self-insurance, and what framework would be necessary to do so. 
The crux of the problem is that there is a tension between the full discre-
tionary firepower of central banks and an institutionalisation that would 
abolish this discretionary character.
The first speaker highlighted key lessons from the use of swap lines 
from a market point of view. They served two different purposes in the 
crisis, depending on destination. To 
advanced economies, they were moti-
vated by self-interested domestic mone-
tary policy concerns: they alleviated a 
dollar crunch in destination states but also avoided unwanted dollar 
appreciation domestically. To EMs, they were motivated by geopolitics 
and a genuine desire to fight contagion. They were useful in turning 
market sentiment around, despite the fact that only four states were des-
ignated recipients, and only two (S. Korea and Mexico) drew upon their 
swap line. 
From the point of view of European banks these lines are still needed, 
due to remaining dollar liquidity mismatches and low dollar coverage 
“At the time, Fed swap 
lines were the only game 
in town.” 
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ratios. Dollar lending has doubled since 2007, which may be creating 
conditions for another potential dollar crunch. There is no substitute for 
Fed swap lines since they are liquidity creation from scratch; but other 
pockets of liquidity exist and could be made available. As the Fed is 
unlikely to extend swaps to EU EMs (e.g. Poland), the ECB could play 
a role in stewarding swaps for the entire banking union. The question of 
euro swap lines must also be confronted in view of an enhanced global 
role for the euro.
The second speaker recalled that there are three types of swap lines: 
Fed swap lines, meant to support banks, and explicitly not for balance 
of payments difficulties; small, conditional and discretionary Fed swap 
lines to a few selected Ems, designed to provide means to intervene in 
capital flows or exchange rates; and (of a clearly different nature) People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC) swap lines to its 32 counterparts, meant to sup-
port exporters and the push for the renminbi to become an international 
invoicing currency.
IMF facilities and swap lines are both meant to remedy capital flows 
crises, which affect banks. In the crisis, banks faced acute currency mis-
matches; only the Fed could remedy this by lowering the cost of “synthetic 
dollars”, but it made sense that partner central banks operated according 
to their domestic market knowledge and carried the counterparty risk. 
It was an effective strategy. Two issues can be pointed out however: first, 
swaps can strengthen the bank-sovereign doom loop, rendering IMF 
intervention necessary; second, swaps are by design meant to deal with 
short-term liquidity problems; but if the problem is one of solvency, its 
scope could require IMF intervention. 
In sum, central banks are best equipped to deal with certain dis-
ruptions, and therefore swap lines are an essential tool that cannot be 
replaced by IMF programmes. However, the IMF can have a role to play, 
for example by evaluating the contingent liabilities involved in swap lines, 
by drafting swap line arrangements, or by underwriting some swap con-
tracts as a fiscal counterpart to monetary programs. This need not trigger 
conditionality, but the quality of the collateral could be a problem; in 
turn, the IMF could take the exchange rate risk and play a role in deter-
mining the haircut if necessary. One participant noted that the IMF had 
considered underwriting swap lines but concluded it was difficult to do 
so within its current framework. This has been the origin of its Short-
term Liquidity Swap proposal, which might materialise in the next few 
years. 
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Another participant suggested the ECB, like the Fed, gave swap lines 
out of self-interest for domestic financial stability, using monetary policy 
tools in line with its mandate. But, mindful of its own balance sheet risks, 
it could only give them to member states with sound fundamentals. This 
meant that it had to offer some member states (PL, HU, LT) repos instead 
of swap lines. It has standing arrangements with G10 countries, Den-
mark and China, and temporary arrangements with other countries. He 
suggested the ECB approach is flexible, tested, replicable, part of a frame-
work and effective; but found it difficult to see how it could be developed 
further. Another participant recalled the growing interest in turning the 
euro into a global currency, and called for making clear the implications 
of this: the ECB would have either to endorse the fiscal risk, or be backed 
by a treasury, both of which are not yet possible.
One participant argued that the forex swap line network had been 
the key backstop in the crisis, and pointed out that in addition to uncer-
tainty about their renewal in the future, there is a large gap as there is 
no line between the US and China. The participant argued that if swap 
lines are now key and the system is more bilateral, there is considerable 
uncertainty over what might happen if a crisis hits China. One avenue 
the participant sketched out was a “chain swap”, whereby the ECB would 
draw on the Fed to extend a line to the PBC; but others considered this 
an abuse of the system that would quickly see the line shut down. One 
participant returned to the question of the political contingency of swap 
lines, questioning why European countries were relying on swaps and not 
building dollar reserves like Asian countries.
Discussion also revolved around the political questions and risks of 
central banks wielding such discretionary power given the non-negli-
gible fiscal risk. The argument that they perform the function of lender of 
last resort in foreign exchanges was broadly accepted, though necessarily 
context-dependent. Some participants were uncomfortable with central 
banks taking inherently political decisions, conditional on the tacit agree-
ment of political authorities; one 
added that despite the demon-
strable usefulness of swaps for 
domestic monetary management, 
they are (especially in the US) not perceived well by the public, who see it 
as “lending to foreigners”. One participant recalled the awkward experi-
ence of having the IMF push for a swap line with another country while 
both the government and the parliament were opposed. 
“We’re all second-guessing 
what central banks will do the 
next time around.”
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The discussion concluded in broad agreement that multilateral nets 
cannot substitute swap lines: both layers are necessary, and it is equally 
necessary to minimise the blurring of their edges. It was argued that cen-
tral banks should provide clear principles for their use of swap lines so 
that market actors can make informed decisions. 
Session III - Regional financing arrangements: IMF 
complements or substitutes?
The first speaker recalled the importance of the links between trade and 
finance: apart from traditional trade finance proper, the development 
of global value chains has driven FDI and financial support for trans-
actions along the chain, thereby increasing liquidity needs. EMs have 
become more exposed to market sentiment. Whereas in the past they 
built foreign exchange reserves to avoid having recourse to the IMF, they 
are doing so now to counteract market volatility. At the same time, they 
are being denied swap lines by the central banks of advanced economies. 
In a similar process to the one that led foreign exchange accumulation, 
RFAs have emerged in reaction to advanced countries’ lack of trust in 
the emerging countries and to the latter’s mistrust of the IMF. As long as 
these problems are not fixed, RFAs will continue to flourish. But, swaps, 
RFAs and the IMF are not substitutable: it comes down to which is most 
easily callable. 
The second speaker delved deeper into the details of RFAs. There are 
seven major ones today (ESM, CMIM, 
BRICS CRA, EU BoP assistance facility, 
EU EFSM, AMF, FLAR) but are hetero-
geneous in age, types of issues they deal 
with, funding source, conditionality, 
terms/duration of lending, relationship with the IMF. They have been 
interacting and learning from each other and the IMF more intensely 
since the crisis. They accept the centrality of the Fund, and are collabo-
rating with it on surveillance, coordination of programme design, and 
co-financing. RFAs are considered as potentially more lenient than the 
IMF, but also as having better expertise due to being “closer to the 
ground” – an expertise that can conversely be clouded by partisanship. 
The speaker highlighted the positive role of RFAs and the cooperation 
they can produce thanks to different competitive advantages. 
One participant challenged this view of complementarity, taking the 
“The odds are getting 
stacked against having an 
orderly system.”
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example of the EFSF and Greece. The EFSF was born because a large part 
of the European political system was adverse to involving the IMF and 
there were disagreements over Greece’s debt sustainability. The speaker 
answered that those arguing 
against IMF involvement eventu-
ally lost out; the subsequent ESM 
made IMF involvement manda-
tory. Another participant reported 
the IMF has developed flexible 
principles for coordination with 
RFAs and the learning process is 
still ongoing. The Greek case had prompted the Fund to revamp its debt 
sustainability toolkit and take political considerations (keeping the Euro-
zone together) into account. Another participant expressed concern over 
RFAs encountering the same problems the IMF and the ESM have, such 
as enforcing conditionality, market misperception and negative reac-
tions, and blame-shifting.
Discussion revolved around the mechanics of cooperation, as well as 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative. One participant classified the BRI as an 
unorthodox RFA, and expressed concern over its political underpinnings 
and future deployment; there was agreement that concern was warranted, 
and that IMF reform is necessary to maintain China’s buy-in to the insti-
tution. On the mechanics of cooperation, one participant advocated joint 
scenario planning for crises, while stressing the importance of communi-
cation in ensuring acceptability of measures taken. 
A participant opined that the true issue at stake, along with govern-
ance structures, is the constituency to which the institutions involved 
respond to, and deplored the lack of top-down coordination from the 
G20. Another suggested the important issue was resource size. As regards 
cooperation between RFAs and central banks and RDBs, it was said that 
there are always informal talks, as central banks are shareholders in both. 
The discussion concluded with participants concurring that common 
principles are needed, sufficiently strong to ensure a degree of consist-
ency across safety net layers; but it is unrealistic to expect common rules, 
as circumstances and political environments differ.
“There are two kinds of 
arrangements: those with 
money, and those without. A 
regional arrangement without 
the elephants is just a bunch of 
monkeys.”
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Session IV - Managing a multi-layer and more diverse 
GFSN
The first speaker suggested that the international system may be more 
asymmetric than acknowledged and more fragile than recognised. He 
recalled the Bretton Woods system was designed to serve US interests, 
and US hegemony over the 
current system is still far 
stronger than the UK’s was 
over the 19th century’s gold 
standard. He dissented from 
the earlier agreement that 
the IMF stands at the centre 
of the system (and disagreed that it can in any sense be apolitical), putting 
forth that the central actors in the system are the US Treasury and Fed. 
With the dollar as international currency, the lender of last resort is in 
fact the Fed, and it will not pre-commit itself to granting swap lines: the 
US will keep its options open on weaponising its currency. Accumulation 
of dollar reserves is no protection; holders can be prevented from 
accessing them. 
With China seen as a challenger to the system, the IMF is in an 
impossible position: if moves are made to give China and India the 
weight they deserve, the US may oppose its veto or walk away; if they 
are not, it cannot be called truly multilateral and its legitimacy suffers. It 
is still possible, but not likely, that the “China threat” will dissipate like 
that of Japan in the 1980s, and that the US will pivot back from President 
Trump’s politics. But otherwise, the development of regional currency 
blocks ($, €, RMB) is a real possibility. 
The second speaker tempered this view, suggesting the US has always 
had a pragmatic, if instrumental relationship with the IMF, and that its 
current behaviour is simply more naked. China professes a commitment 
to multilateralism, but is at the same time sowing the seeds of a parallel 
financial universe by building up its own structures such as the BRI and 
the AIIB, and massively developing its fintech and data handling capaci-
ties. The world may end up being split between the PayPal world and the 
Alibaba world. 
Both speakers agreed that the IMF’s governance is outdated, but 
expressed doubts that the articles of agreement could be reformed. Nev-
ertheless, technical work is being carried out under the “Integrated Policy 
Framework” umbrella. Further revamping, for example through larger 
“The current system may be shifting 
in uncomfortable ways. Have we 
been thinking radically enough? […] 
In this field, power politics is the 
name of the game.” 
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arrangements to borrow, may be possible; G20 impulse is helpful in this 
respect. 
Discussion bore on the previously discussed themes of the impor-
tance of maintaining the IMF as an institutional lender of last resort and 
as the key, multilateral part of the financial safety net in a multipolar 
world. Doing so requires at minimum the 
buy-in of the democracies, to ensure pull on 
others. It was observed that there is some 
room to reallocate quotas without the US 
losing its veto power, playing on their three 
components (overall resource levels, calculation formula, and member 
state weights) - probably to Europe’s detriment, and the possibility is at 
the mercy of US electoral timings. 
Turning to the EU, recommendations were made to strengthen its 
participation in, and linkages with, the GFSN. This should be achieved 
in several ways, more or less politically probable: by producing safe 
assets, consolidating swap lines and developing forward market capacity 
to favour euro invoicing, also deepening EMU and giving itself fiscal 
capacity, and completing banking union. Some participants argued that a 
multipolar currency system has already emerged.
Several participants recalled the difficulty of reconciling slow, small-
scale technical reform within the IMF and other international financial 
organisations and the political necessity to ensure continued democratic 
allegiance. The system is already not seen as completely legitimate any-
more in advanced economies. A 4-pillar system might serve the interests 
of EMs better than that in the past. One participant countered however 
that GFSN elements are patchy and that the IMF’s share in GFSN reserves 
is falling. Another highlighted the importance of unpacking the IMF: its 
staff, its board, its different constituencies. 
Wrap-up - Lessons for global governance
The first speaker likened the GFSN to a bucket, half-full after the crisis 
but leaking. The system is fragile: one or more of its nodes may fail in a 
crisis, which bolsters the case for RFAs as another layer in it. He asked 
whether the IMF might be split into its surveillance and lending func-
tions. In his opinion, it makes sense to more actively involve the private 
sector; central banks were originally private, it would be more productive 
to make private players part of the solution rather than a problem to deal 
“The hegemon tends 
to endure; but until 
when?” 
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with. He concluded by urging the recognition that more crisis prevention 
measures are needed: regulation, macroprudential instruments, and cap-
ital flow measures.
The second speaker summed up by giving seven points. 
1. The evolution of the GFSN has been conditioned by governmental 
wills, and has caused at times large and unequally distributed costs. 
2. Different parts of it perform different actions; 
3. And this diversity can be seen as a sort of strength.
4. The IMF cannot do the job alone; it is stretching its statutes as it is, 
has little room or time to evolve to work with the rest of the system, 
and faces strong political and social headwinds.
5. RFAs are very heterogeneous and still finding their place — and it is 
clear some matter much more than others (ESM). 
6. The purpose of the GFSN itself is changing, due to both endogenous 
and exogenous factors. 
7. Governance of the GFSN is an increasingly messy affair, as there is 
little political drive to reform and clear it up. The G20 may play a 
role here, but it is worrying that its legitimacy is being corroded in 
advanced economies and emerging markets alike.
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The Governance of International 
banking: Regulating for Crises, Past 
and Future
Seminar insights1
Elena Carletti2, George Papaconstantinou and Jean 
Pisani-Ferry
In 2009 then-Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner described the newly cre-
ated Financial Stability Board (FSB) as the “fourth pillar” of global eco-
nomic governance alongside the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank. 
In reality, the FSB is far from having the legal competences, clout and 
resources of the other three organisations. It serves as a coordinating 
body and as an intermediary between the political G20 and the series of 
public and private bodies in charge of the various segments of financial 
regulation. 
1. International banking regulation: A coordinate-and-review model. 
In this context, international banking regulation – a segment of global 
financial regulation – provides a telling test case for assessing the effec-
tiveness and adequacy of international regulatory coordination. Its modus 
operandi is to set common non-mandatory standards, whose implemen-
tation is subject to external monitoring – in short a coordinate-and-re-
view mechanism:
1 The seminar was held on 11-12 September 2018 in Milan (Italy), jointly organised with 
Bocconi University and the Florence School of Banking and Finance.
2 Professor of Finance, Bocconi University; Scientific Director, Florence School of Bank-




• Common regulatory standards (for, e.g., capital and liquidity ratios) 
are agreed upon within the framework of the Basel Committee for 
Banking Supervision (BCBS), a 28-members body hosted by the 
Bank for International Settlements. These standards are negoti-
ated amongst participating governments, with significant indirect 
involvement of industry representatives; 
• Participating countries or entities such as the EU are free to decide if 
and to what extent they transpose the standards in their legislation, 
while they remain fully responsible for their enforcement;  
• The BCBS monitors both the legislative transposition of the agreed 
standards (adoption) and their effective implementation at jurisdic-
tion and bank levels. It carries out quarterly compliance assessment 
reports, whose results are published. Other governments and market 
participants are therefore informed in real time of both the confor-
mity of the national legislation with the agreed standards, and their 
actual implementation; 
This micro-prudential regulatory coordination system is complemented 
by cooperation procedures for macro-prudential oversight and banking 
crisis resolution. However, these procedures are less formalised and as 
things stand their effectiveness is disputed. At any rate, there is no evi-
dence one can rely on to assess their effectiveness.  
The regulatory coordination system can be assessed from three comple-
mentary perspectives: 
- First, how effective is the overall harmonisation of financial stability 
standards?
- Second, how adequate is the regulatory framework resulting from inter-
national coordination?
- Third, how resilient to disruption emanating from outsiders is the pre-
vailing regime?
2. An effective harmonisation of banking solvency and liquidity stan-
dards. The answer to the first question is that the overall harmonisation 
of banking solvency and liquidity standards is fairly effective. Although 
not mandatory, the agreed standards are implemented in most partici-
pating jurisdictions, as illustrated by the general rise in capital ratios and 
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liquidity ratios. Cases of non-compliance are limited. Furthermore, the 
system seems to have successfully passed an important test, as the US 
under President Trump has not significantly departed from commit-
ments inherited from the previous administration.    
There are several reasons for this qualified success. To start with, 
standards are negotiated by national regulators with the indirect par-
ticipation of industry representatives. This ensures a high degree of 
ownership of the agreed benchmarks, which then serve as yardsticks of 
financial soundness. External compliance monitoring provides national 
regulators an incentive to implement them thoroughly; failure to do so 
is regarded by markets and the community of the other regulators as a 
sign of fragility. Banks themselves, especially international ones, have a 
strong incentive to anticipate the agreed compliance deadlines, in order 
to ensure high-quality ratings. In short, reputational concerns on the part 
of regulatory jurisdictions and the banks reinforce the effectiveness of an 
otherwise toothless regime.        
3. The adequacy of international standards is however disputable. The 
answer to the second question, regarding the adequacy of the regulatory 
standards resulting from international coordination, is much less positive. 
Basel II, the set of regulatory standards agreed upon in 2005 that went 
into force shortly before the Global Financial Crisis, has gone down in 
financial history as a blatant case of regulatory capture: major banks had 
successfully lobbied for low, loosely defined capital and liquidity ratios, 
and an excessive reliance on the largest financial institutions’ internal risk 
assessment models. In retrospect, Basel II regulation was evidently not 
demanding enough, not strict enough and not uniform enough. 
Arguably, this failure – which contributed to the severity of the crisis 
– has largely been corrected with the substitution of the Basel II stan-
dards by those in Basel III. Nevertheless, even the Basel III framework 
can be criticised for regulatory limitations and gaps.       
4. The regulatory regime is vulnerable to disruptions emanating from 
outsiders. The answer to the third question regarding the resilience of the 
existing regime, is unfortunately that it is vulnerable. As for any sectoral 
regulation, economic agents outside its scope – fintechs, but also plat-
forms and market places – benefit from relative regulatory leniency. The 
growing blurring of the distinction between “banks” and “non-banks” 
may provide a significant regulatory advantage to the latter, with the 
result that overall effectiveness is being diminished. The same applies, 
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though to a lesser extent, to the participation in global banking of finan-
cial institutions not headquartered in the major advanced economies. 
These may benefit from excessive regulatory leniency or forbearance. 
5. Trade-offs in international regulation. Analysis therefore suggests 
that international regulatory harmonisation through voluntary coordi-
nate-and-review schemes involves three significant trade-offs: 
• An implementation-quality trade-off: The closer the involvement 
of national regulators and industry representatives in regulatory 
design, the stronger the chances of thorough implementation. How-
ever, this may be at the cost of biases in the content of the regulation; 
• A thoroughness-coverage trade-off: As for any regulatory club whose 
membership remains open to new applicants and does not provide 
defined advantages, stricter regulation may discourage certain juris-
dictions to participate; 
• An ownership-resilience trade-off: ownership is facilitated by the 
like-mindedness of participants, be it in institutional or sectoral 
terms. But to leave out the potential disruptors involves the risk of 
leaving the problems they may pose outside the scope of the regula-
tory endeavour.         
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Keynote – Global dimensions of  
Banking Regulation1 
Vítor Constâncio, Former Vice-President of the  
European Central Bank
I thank the Organisers for inviting me to speak at this event, included in 
the very topical project on the Transformation of Global Governance. 
There are certainly several drivers behind the idea of this project. The 
first, is the concern about the potential fragmentation of the multilateral 
system of international governance that has been built up after 1945. The 
fears stem from the present disturbing US policies, the emergence of new 
powers, especially China, and the growing relevance of populist nation-
alism as the backlash to the crisis and the excesses of globalisation. These 
tendencies have been historically the harbinger of global disasters. 
The deep geo-political change induces a second motivation for our 
general subject, as it simultaneously increases the need for cooperation 
but also adds to the complexity of getting consensual decisions on all 
kinds of domains. Multipolarity increases the heterogeneity of interests, 
the intricacy of new problems generates institutional inertia, the whole 
process leading to what David Held and co-authors characterised as grid-
lock in international cooperation. 2 
 However, I see gridlock not just as a difficulty to act but rather as 
an incapacity to provide appropriate responses to the problems that now 
beset the world, our democracies, and a liberal multilateral system. The 
system cannot be protected without significant changes, correcting flaws 
that became more apparent after the Big Recession: extreme inequalities 
in advanced economies; more intrusive trade agreements intruding too 
much on national social contracts; financial instability generated by the 
ever-increasing role of finance; environmental damage.  
There were many warnings about the potential socio-political conse-
quences of hyper-globalisation, beyond the benefits of higher economic 
1 Keynote speech at the Workshop on “The Governance of International Banking: Regu-
lation for crises, past and future” included in the “The Transformation of Global Gov-
ernance Project” - Milan, 12th September 2018. 
2 See Hale, T., Held, D, and K. Young (2013)  “ Gridlock: why global cooperation is failing 
when we need it most”  Cambridge: Polity Press; and Hale, T., Held, D, (ed) (2017)  “ 
Beyond gridlock”  Cambridge: Polity Press.
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efficiency. In 1996, Ralf Dahrendorf wrote about the contractor trinity of 
competitiveness, social cohesion and freedom and foresaw that “A new 
authoritarianism may indeed be the main challenge to liberal democracy 
in decades to come.” 3 In 1997, Rodrik published his first book expressing 
concerned with “…making globalization compatible with domestic 
social and political stability” 4 and introduced his globalization paradox 
in 2011, exploring the incompatibility between deep global integration, 
democracy and national sovereignty” 5. Already in 1988, on the pages 
of the magazine Foreign Affairs, and later in some scholarly papers, Jag-
dish Bhagwati, a staunch defender of free trade and globalisation, railed 
against the excessive instability of free capital movements that did not 
have the same theoretical justification of free trade and were more an ide-
ology of the “Wall-Street / Treasury complex” as he put it6.  In 2004, Paul 
Samuelson published a paper demonstrating with impeccable theory, 
that a productivity jump by a less developed country, China, could gen-
erate trade effects negative to an advanced economy, the US, showing that 
free trade may lead to some country losses, beyond the well-known losers 
and winners within each country. In a spirited answer to the critics who 
worried about his supposed apostasy on free trade, Samuelson concluded 
that “It may be of interest that none of my chastening pals expressed con-
cern about globalization’s effects on greater inequality in a modern age 
when transfers from winners to losers do trend politically downward in 
present-day democracies.”7 
These and other warnings were not heeded by many ruling estab-
lishments, including in our profession, blinded by the gains in economic 
efficiency and general growth, the spectacular decline of poverty in 
emerging countries and the illusory hopes on pure trickle-down distri-
3 In a speech at the British Academy in 1996, included as chapter 7 in the book “After 
1989: morals, revolution and civil society” MacMillan Press, 1997.
4 Rodrik, Dani (1997) “Has globalization gone too far?” 
5 Rodrik, Dani (2011) “The globalization paradox: Democracy and the future of the 
world”, WW Norton & Co. ; see also Rodrik, Dani (2018) “Straight talk on trade: ideas 
for a sane world economy” Princeton UP 
6 Bhagwati, J. (1988) “The Capital Myth: the difference between Trade and Widgets and 
Dollars” in Foreign Affairs, Vol 77, no 3; see also Bhagwati, J (2002) “Globalization and 
appropriate Governance” UNU/Wider Annual Lecture
7 Samuelson, P.A. (2005) “Response to Dixit and Grossman” in Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol 19, no 3; see the original article in 
Samuelson, P.A. (2004) “ Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of 
Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization” in  Journal of Economic Perspectives 
, vol 18, no 3, Summer of 2004
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bution in advanced economies. The consequences are now being felt in 
the spreading of populism in an increasing number of democracies and 
widespread divorce between populations and expert elites. The global 
system of governance was not able to address the identified risks and 
challenges, continues to be unprepared to correct flaws and steer a more 
intelligent inescapable globalisation. 
Fortunately, I don´t have to dwell on these big subjects today, as my 
remit is much narrower, centred on financial regulation, particularly on 
banking. International standards and governance for finance and banking 
developed over the years into a complex network of institutions with dif-
ferent degrees of independence, sometimes with some overlapping com-
petences. Some of them are even private, like the IASB in accounting or 
ISDA in derivatives contracts. What they produce is some form of soft 
law, made of standards and recommendations, and expect compliance 
via legislation transposition by different jurisdictions or simply volun-
tary implementation. The public institutions of the network decide by 
consensus and are involved in a diplomatic game subject to significant 
asymmetries of international power and a relevant role played by the big 
private institutions that are addressees of the regulations and are part of 
the domestic politics that interacts with the diplomatic negotiations, as 
theorised by Robert Putman (1988)8. 
This multilateral system evolved with the growing internationalisa-
tion of finance and the occurrence of disturbances that triggered waves 
of regulatory initiatives. In Banking, it started modestly in 1972 with 
the creation of the Groupe de Contact, followed quickly by the Basel 
Committee in 1974, formed by the G10 on the wake of turbulences in 
exchange rates and banking markets with the failure of the German bank 
Herstatt. The Concordat, signed in 1975, focused in matters of supervi-
sory guidelines for subsidiaries and branches of international banks. The 
Basel I Accord emerged in 1988, following the Latin American debt crisis 
and the S&L disaster in the US. Both created the need and the domestic 
pressure for higher capital for American banks and Basel was used by the 
US to generalise the additional requirements internationally and ensure 
a level playing field. This logical pattern of the influence by the finan-
cial hegemon, usually seconded by the UK, has been repeated in other 
instances. The outcome was, nevertheless, a compromise, as the US had 
a preference for a leverage ratio but had to accept a risk weighted capital 
ratio solution. 
8 Putman, R. D.  (1988) “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games” 
in International Organization, vol 46(3) 639-64
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Basel I was crude and created incentives for banks to go for riskier 
assets with the same capital charge and to take off assets from the bal-
ance-sheet, spurring securitisation in the early 90s. Developments of risk 
management, particularly the invention of Value-at-Risk (VAR) mod-
eling led to the major victory for the industry of convincing regulators 
to include it in the 1996 Market Risk Amendment to Basel I. VAR is not 
even a good measure of risk, as it says little about the amount of losses. 
Assuming normality and the principle that a reliable estimation requires 
at least 30 observations per parameter, the introduced rule of a capital 
charge 3 times the VAR for a horizon of 10 days at the 99% percentile, 
implies for statistical reliability, the existence of 109 years of data that are 
obviously not available9. 
As capital ratios were decreasing, in 1998, the Basel Committee 
announced a new Accord to substitute Basel I, to promote “safety and 
soundness” of banks, stating that the new regime would keep at least the 
same capital as with Basel I and would ensure “competitive equality” of 
treatment. In the end, the powerful lobbying by industry through the IIF, 
ISDA, ICMA, ISLA and other industry bodies, influenced the final out-
come in two important ways:  first, the introduction of internal models 
to assess also credit risk, reserved in practice for the big banks that could 
build them; second, an exceptionally low risk weight for securitizations 
and the elimination of an initial proposal for an explicit capital charge for 
credit derivatives risk10.  Consequently, the 4th official QIS estimated that 
the Advanced-IRB banks would have a median reduction of 31% and 5th 
QIS showed a 26.7% average capital reduction for Advanced-IRB banks 
and an increase of 1.7% for banks on the Standardised Approach, in stark 
contrast with the initial announced objectives11. Basel II was an egregious 
example of regulatory capture by the big credit institutions. 
Despite its limitations, concluded in 2005, the new standard had little 
9 At 1% occurrence probability, one day horizon event occurs 3.65 times a year; so, to 
have 30 observations, 10.95 ears; for a ten days horizon that means 109.5 years, as 
pointed out in Brown, Aaron (2012) “  Red-blooded Risk: the secret history of Wall-
Street”  John Wiley $ Sons. Aaron also explains that while since 1980 GDP almost dou-
bled but financial business quadrupled and the additional capital needed for that did 
not come from more invested savings but from “capital creation” by re-defining it in 
terms of risk-based assets value (see page 348).  
10 See Lall, R (2012) “From failure to failure: the political economy of international bank-
ingn regulation” in Review of International Political Economy, 19:4 609-638. See an-
other critical view of Basel II in Tarullo, Daniel (2008) “Banking on Basel: the future of 
international financial regulation” Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
11 Lall, R. (2012) ibid
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time to start before the financial crisis came to change everything. Even 
so, Basel II was not fully applied, in the US by absence of timely legisla-
tion and in Europe because subtle interpretations allowed jurisdictions 
not to apply the output floor of 80% of the Standardised Approach cap-
ital calculation, defining a maximum deviation of 20% that could result 
from using internal models, an issue that would beset the negotiations to 
finalise Basel III. 
I went through this brief historical detour, to illustrate some of the 
conditions surrounding the production of multilateral standards and 
regulations. Naturally, the financial crisis, triggered a major new effort 
to step up financial regulation. The standards already approved and 
implemented, although positive in general, are below what was initially 
expected. 
The new capital requirements for high quality capital for loss absorp-
tion were on the low side and part of them even in the form of a buffer, 
supposedly to be depleted in stressful situations. Adding the 2.5% con-
servation buffer, the total common equity requirement was set at 7%. The 
leverage ratio was finally fixed a just 3% of Tier 1 capital, allowing a mul-
tiplier of 33 times that capital.  Fortunately, market pressure and the use 
by supervisors of the SREP and Pillar 2, led to the present situation of a 
common equity capital ratio on average of 14% in the euro area. Recall 
that 7% was precisely the average ratio in 2007 for the euro area banks. 
Significantly, the leverage ratio has also been increasing and the average 
for euro area banks is now above 4. Before the crisis, the extraordinary 
expansion of the financial sector was not enabled by savings invested in 
the capital of financial institutions but mostly by a redefinition of risk 
capital and its endorsement by regulators. A few significant European 
banks had a leverage ratio (equity over total assets) of just 1.5% to 2% 
while capital ratios were well above the regulatory minimum of 8%. The 
“magic” of internal models to calculate risk weights in regulatory capital 
explains the difference, although the low leverage ratio meant that a loss 
of 3% of total assets would wipe out banks’ capital.
Resistance to the new standard was, nevertheless, fierce. The IIF pub-
lished a study in 2010 with the conclusion that a 2 percentage points 
increase in the capital ratio would induce a 3.1 loss of GDP in the euro 
area. A justified level of capital between 15% and 20% has been the con-
clusion of numerous papers in academia or in central banks: Miles et al 
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(2011)12, Brooke et al  (2015)13, William Cline (2017)14, Morris Goldstein 
(2017)15 or Firestone et al (2017) from the FED showing that even con-
sidering the protection of TLAC, the optimal range of the capital ratio lies 
between 13 % and 25%16.  
The same pattern of resistance manifested itself in relation with the 
two new liquidity ratios. In the end, the LCR was weakened but the 
NSRF essentially resisted and played already a role in the reduction of 
the credit/deposits ratio of European banks from 144% in 2007 to 116% 
today. In the deciding period about the two ratios, what we heard from 
the industry referred to the impending catastrophes if the standards were 
approved. Both are nowadays complied with without any upheaval. 
Regarding the too-big-to-fail problem, the series of adopted measures 
were more consensual: the prohibition of public bailouts in Dodd-Frank 
and the BRRD; the G-SIB surcharge; the TLAC or higher MREL in the 
EU; the streamlined cross-border bank´s resolution. This last point is in 
a state of flux with details about implementation among major jurisdic-
tions still to be finalised. For instance, the somewhat ambiguous changes 
introduced by the US in its Orderly Liquidation Authority, created some 
doubts about the single point of entry regime. The remaining concern is 
that the framework may not be appropriate to deal with general financial 
crises like the one we just had, when the problem is the existence of too-
many-to-fail banks. Examining the history of crises, it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that such situations require public intervention to backstop 
liabilities and recapitalise the system. Exceptional interventions that were 
carried out in the crisis are, however, no longer legally possible in several 
12 Miles, D., J. Yang and G. Marcheggiano (2011), “Optimal bank capital”, Bank of En-
gland, External MPC Unit, D.P.No. 32.
13 Brooke, M., O. Bush, R. Edwards, J. Ellis, B. Francis, R. Harimohan, K. Neiss and C. 
Siegert (2015), “Measuring the macroeconomic costs and benefits of higher UK bank 
capital requirements” Bank of England Financial Stability Paper 35.
14 Cline, W. (2017), “The right balance for banks: theory and evidence on optimal capital”, 
Peterson International Institute of Economics.
15 Goldstein, M. (2017), “Banking’s final exam: stress testing and bank capital reform”, 
Peterson International Institute of Economics.
16 Firestone, S., A. Lorenc and B. Ranish (2017), “An empirical economic assessment of 
the costs and benefits of bank capital in the US”, Finance and Economics Discussion 
Series, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C., No. 2017-034.




Other reform domains were treated in a much lighter way. For 
instance, the one related with the so-called shadow banking, whose 
role was in the crisis greatly depended from the use of securitisation, 
repos and OTC derivatives. The creation of inside liquidity by repos was 
important for the funding of the housing bubble18. 
The crisis itself made securitisations and repos shrink significantly. In 
the U.S., broker-dealers changed into banks, making the shadow banking 
sector smaller. Post-reform, securitisations became less attractive being 
now subject to higher capital charges, securities vehicles were consol-
idated with bank sponsors and repos and some OTC derivatives have 
moved to central clearing, which leaves the still unresolved issue of CCPs 
safety and resolution. The overall progress in reducing risk in STFs and 
derivative markets has been significant but might not be enough. No 
effective regulations prevent the expansion and misuse of those instru-
ments in any future euphoric episode. The recent recommendations by 
the FSB regarding the re-hypothecation and re-use of securities in repos 
are in my view not sufficiently far-reaching19. Concerning the use of mar-
gins and haircuts, the FSB recommendations to introduce minimum 
initial levels are also quite narrow: they exclude sovereign paper and 
transactions between regulated institutions and apply only to non-cen-
trally cleared operations. Going forward, more may have to be done. 
Setting minimum margins and haircut floors would limit the build-up 
of leverage and reduce the procyclicality of current margin and haircut 
setting practices20. 
17 For the U.S. see Geithner, T. (2016), “Are we safer? The case for strengthening the Bage-
hot arsenal”, Per Jacobson Lecture at the 2016 Annual Meetings of the IMF and WB. See 
also  Bernanke, Geithner and Paulson in the NYT “ What we need to fight the next fi-
nancial crisis” at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/opinion/sunday/bernanke-le-
hman-anniversary-oped.html?smid=tw-nytopinion&smtyp=cur
18 See Bayoumi, T. (2017) ibid , page 73.
19 See Financial Stability Board (2017), “Non-cash collateral re-use: Measure and met-
rics”, Policy Report and Financial Stability Board Policy Report (2017), “Re-hypoth-
ecation and collateral re-use: Potential financial stability issues, market evolution and 
regulatory approaches”.
20 See Constâncio, V. (2016), “Margins and haircuts as a macroprudential tool”, remarks 
at the ESRB international conference on the macroprudential use of margins and hair-
cuts, 6 June 2016 available at8 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/
sp160606.en.html ; see also Constâncio, V. (2017), “Macroprudential policy in a chang-
ing financial system”, remarks at the second ECB Macroprudential Policy and Research 
Conference, 11 May 2017 available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/
html/ecb.sp170511.en.html
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Furthermore, the policy recommendations by the FSB to address 
vulnerabilities arising from asset management activities are also too soft. 
They cover guidelines for the sector and reporting and monitoring but 
not real new powers for supervisors. They refer to liquidity mismatch 
between fund investments and redemption terms, operational risk, 
securities lending activities and leverage reporting by investment funds, 
including synthetic leverage built up usually with OTC derivatives. 
Leverage requirements for investment funds, already partially intro-
duced in Europe, represent an important point. 
The final aim should be to extend LR requirements to a broader set 
of financial institutions as recently proposed by Dirk Schoenmaker and 
Wierts (2016)21. That should include the risks posed by synthetic leverage 
from the use of derivatives. 
Another aspect to highlight is that the whole set of reforms has taken 
a long time to be approved and it is still far from implementation. In 
Europe, the Leverage Ratio, the NSFR, the Fundamental Review of the 
Trading Book are included in the revisions of the CRD /CRR, expected 
to be approved until December. The package related to the finalisation 
of Basel III has yet no proposal for transposition and includes: the treat-
ment of Operational Risk; the new Standardised regime of risk-weights 
for credit risk; the revision of the Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) in 
derivatives; the important revision of the Internal Models for credit risk 
and finally, the overall output floor of 72.5% binding the effect of using 
internal models which is to be gradually introduced until 2027!  All the 
other points I just mentioned are entering into force only in 2022 or 2023. 
This delay of many years since the crisis to conclude the new regu-
latory regime resulted from institutional and political gridlock and has 
created a lot of uncertainty affecting banks´ behaviour. It also generated 
so-called reform fatigue and opened the door to continuing pushback 
against regulation. 
After the change of Administration in the US, the expectation was 
that some backtracking in regulation would happen. This risk has not 
21 A convincing argument for a wide application of leverage ratios can be found in 
Schoenmaker, D. and P. Wierts (2016), “Regulating the Financial Cycle: An Integrated 
Approach with a Leverage Ratio”, Duisenberg School of Finance - Tinbergen Institute 
Discussion Paper, TI 15- 057 / IV / DSF 93. The risks from synthetic leverage have been 
outlined in ECB Financial Stability Review (2015) “Synthetic leverage in the invest-
ment fund sector” Box 7, May. See also V. Acharya (2014), “A Transparency Standard 
for Derivatives,” in Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling, M. Brunner-
meier and A. Krishnamurthy (eds), Chapter 6.
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disappeared, and international weakening or fragmentation may still 
develop. However, so far, divergences of regulatory implementation have 
not been very significant. In assessing the first round of transpositions of 
Basel III, the Basel Committee considered that the US was largely com-
pliant and the EU not compliant for two reasons: first, for allowing banks 
that have adopted the IRB (internal models) to use zero risk weights for 
credits to the public sector and reduced weights for SMEs; second, for the 
exemptions of a capital charge resulting from the CVA (Credit Valuation 
Adjustment) on certain derivative transactions with public entities and 
non-financial corporations. 
This year, two Reports from the US Treasury and some initiatives 
in the US Congress (The Choice Act), pointed to possible significant 
changes, regarding the Leverage Ratio (reduction and exemption for 
Sovereign Bonds and repos), the LCR, the NSFR, the market risk rules 
(FRTB) and the possible of the OLA (Orderly Liquidation Authority). 
In the end, the changes approved by the US Congress were much softer, 
namely, some exemptions for small and community banks as well as the 
increase from $50 to $250 billion the threshold for the enhanced super-
visory regime, although the FED was granted the power to make justified 
exceptions. Later, the Leverage Ratio was reduced to big banks (G-SIBs) 
by replacing the current 2% leverage buffer add-on with a leverage buffer 
set at 50% of each firm’s G-SIB risk-based G-SIB surcharge; reducing the 
current 6% threshold for covered insured depository institutions (IDIs) 
that are subsidiaries of G-SIBs to 3% plus 50% of the G-SIB surcharge. 
At the same time, the methodology of stress tests was softened. It seems 
strange to introduce these changes at the peak of the cycle, facilitating 
expansion even further, but even after these modifications the US is still 
compliant with the Basel standard of just a 3% LR. 
In Europe, the texts under discussion for final approval of the revised 
CRD IV / CRR contains several differences from the Basel III text, con-
cerning the LR, the NSFR and the FRTB, deviations that were opposed 
by the ECB in its public opinion22. In the LR case, these refer to the 
exemptions for inter-group exposures, for pass-through exposures of 
regulated savings, for export credits and the initial margin for derivative 
exposures related to client clearing.  The NSFR proposals also comprise 
22 See OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK of 8 November 2017 on 
amendments to the Union framework for capital requirements of credit institutions 
and investment firms, at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2017_46_f_
sign.pdf 
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four signalled deviations whereas the FRTB issues are basically related to 
the proposed transition regime. Hopefully, not all these deviations will 
remain in the final text and their material impact on banks´ prudential 
ratios will have to be carefully assessed. I believe that we can conclude 
that the risks of regulatory fragmentation foreseen since last year have, 
overall, not materialised. 
There are several reasons why financial regulation seems less prone to 
divisions than we see happening in the trade or environment fields. In an 
interesting paper, Young and Pagliari (2015)23 analysing quantitively the 
reactions of the regulated sector to regulatory consultations in energy, 
pharmaceutics, agriculture, telecommunications, and finance, find clear 
evidence that the unity of views and preferences is higher in finance than 
in all the other sectors. This is related with the wider reaching of finance 
as an economy infrastructure and the weakness of the intervention of 
outsiders lobbying about financial regulation with different objectives. 
I think we could also add the view that financial products are some 
sort of club good, where the group of suppliers and owners share mutual 
benefits, making several characteristics of these goods only collectively 
excludable. This feature of not being pure private goods, highlighted 
among others by Selmier (2014) and Cerny (2014)24 partially elucidates 
the unity of lobbying positions and explains why there are many exam-
ples of self-regulatory associations in the sector. This sometimes facili-
tates regulatory compliance, as peer pressure and the threat of ostracism 
exerts some degree of discipline. Nevertheless, as Cerny (2014) puts it 
“… from a political economy perspective, finance goods, like many other 
club goods, are provided not according to the logic of market efficiency, 
but rather that of market control and manipulation”. This angle links well 
with the criticism of the market efficiency hypothesis by Dimitri Vayanos 
and Paul Wooley (2008)25 and the Wooley (2010) analysis of rent-seeking 
23 Young, Kevin and S. Pagliari (2015) “ Capital United? Business unity in regulato-
ry politics and the special place of Finance” in  Regulation and Governance  and also 
available at City, University of London Institutional Repository http://openaccess.city.
ac.uk/12093/1/Young%20and%20Pagliari%20-%20Capital%20United%20~%20Forth-
coming%20in%20RegGov.pdf 
24 W.T. Selmier II (2014) “Why club goods proliferated in investment finance” ; P G. 
Cerny (2014) “ Rethinking financial regulation: risk, club goods and regulatory fatigue” 
. Both texts are chapters of the book edited by Thomas Oatley and W. Kindred Winecoff 
“Handbook of the International Political Economy of Monetary Relations” Edward Elgar, 
2014.
25 Vayanos, D. and P. Wooley (2008) “An institutional theory of momentum and reversal", 
The Paul Wooley Centre for the study of capital market dysfunctionality wp n. 1
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and principal-agent problems that “ … do a good job of explaining how 
the global finance sector has become so bloated, profitable and prone to 
crisis”26 Some of his recommendations to mitigate these features are the 
wider use of GDP-linked bonds, the recognition that mark-to-market 
accounting is inappropriate when pricing is inefficient, and that “ … 
regulators should not automatically approve financial products on the 
grounds that they enhance liquidity or complete markets”. I would add 
to this list the overhaul of housing finance to further reduce the risks of 
funding mortgage credit with short-term deposit liabilities. Many ideas 
have been put forward to change this27 including tilting even more the 
NSFR to correct that bias; encouraging securitisation with low maturity 
transformation; creating a new type of financial institutions specialised 
in mortgages or, introducing a new type of mortgage contract that would 
have more equity participation by lenders in exchange of sharing the 
returns of appreciating housing prices, proposed by Mian and Sufi in 
“House of debt”.28 
Housing credit has been growing steeply in importance for banks in 
most jurisdictions over the past decades, as shown by Jordá, Schularick 
and Taylor (2016) in their paper “The great mortgaging”29. In 17 developed 
countries, the weight of real estate bank lending in total credit increased 
from 25% of GDP in 1980 to 69% in 2010.  As they highlight: “… the 
core business model of banks in advanced economies today resembles 
that of real estate funds” They also show how mortgage credit has shaped 
the business cycles in the last decades, has created financial instability 
and contributed to slower recoveries associated with high household 
debt. It is, therefore, odd that the issues of housing finance have not been 
addressed by regulators and policy makes in different ways. Macropru-
dential policies, like Loan-to-value or (better) Debt-to-income, help to 
mitigate the risks but they still confront great resistance in being used 
and may not be sufficient. 
Let me add a brief reference to the institutional framework that 
organises the governance of production and enforcement of financial 
26 Paul Wooley (2010) “Why are financial markets so inefficient and exploitative – and 
a suggested remedy” Chapter 3 of the book by Adair Turner and others (2010), The 
Future of Finance: The LSE Report”, London School of Economics and Political Science.
27 See Goodhart, C. and E. Perotti (2017), “Containing maturity mismatch”, VoxEU. 
28 Mian, K. and A. Sufi (2014), “House of debt”, University of Chicago Press.
29 Jordá, O., M. Schularick and A. Taylor (2016), “The great mortgaging: housing finance, 
crises and business cycles”, Economic Policy Vol 31, n. 85.
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regulation. The big changes, after the crisis, were the strengthening of the 
G20 political role at the top of the process and the transformation of the 
FSF into a Financial Stability Board that, however, was never given the 
competences to become the fourth pillar of the global economic archi-
tecture in charge of financial regulation announced by the US Treasury 
Secretary.  It has now the coordinating role in preparing G20 decisions, 
working with several standard setters, and issuing recommendations 
about financial institutions not covered by the Basel Committee. Ini-
tial overlaps with the IMF have been streamlined and settled, with the 
IMF keeping his dominant role in analysing financial stability through 
country FSAPs and the compliance reports concerning the implemen-
tation of Standards and Codes. I do not think that it is worthwhile to 
consider changes in the international Institutions roles and competences 
about financial regulation.  
  Summing up, progress was made in stepping up regulation to make 
the system safer but, despite the big financial crisis, no deep structural 
change was introduced to properly tame finance and debt, making the 
system prone to new crises.  





Global banking regulation: Why and how
The aftermath of the global financial crisis prompted regulators, legisla-
tors and industry actors to reflect on what went wrong, why, and what 
could be done. Cross-border finance had provided a massive credit 
boom, and leveraging enabled a huge amount of borrowing, facilitating 
the accumulation of risk and heightened vulnerability in the system. 
These features amplified the effects once the crisis erupted in 2008. Crises 
in the 1990s and early 2000s had been more contained, forcing authori-
ties to rethink models and innovate. 
As one participant pointed out, the alleged benefits of cross-border 
banking do not command consensus. They are 
not derived from a widely accepted theory, as 
for example is the case for trade). This helps 
explain why it is difficult to present a straight-
forward argument for global convergence of financial regulation: there 
are just as strong arguments for decentralising the governance of scaled-
down and less internationalised banks. Assuming banks remain what 
they are, there seems to be some convergence around the notion of public 
goods in global finance. However, some reactions to the crisis aiming at 
securing these may have in fact exacerbated the downturn, from which 
the system is only just recovering ten years afterwards. 
Session I - Regulatory convergence or divergence 
Effectiveness and quality of global standards
Banking regulation post-crisis has been challenging to implement, and 
it is unclear whether it is effective. Most (if not all) participants agreed, 
however, that had the regulation in place now been in place before the 
crisis, the effects of the crisis might have been considerably lessened – 
but it would not have been averted. One participant noted that failings 
in banking regulation have run concomitant with a deeper shift in the 
“There is no 
Ricardo of finance.”
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nature of the activities of banks, from deposit collection and lending to 
more profitable asset management activities; another suggested that reg-
ulation might be more efficient by targeting banking activities rather than 
institutions traditionally understood as banks. One participant asserted 
that as financial crises are in fact inevitable, the point of regulation is to 
limit the burden to taxpayers when one strikes again. 
Some participants were optimistic, noting several encouraging 
advances. Basel III standards have spread through a mix of peer pressure 
and international cooperation, increased capital and common equity 
requirements and liquidity ratios in a bid to ensure stability in the finan-
cial system. Regulatory consistency is monitored by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision. A framework is emerging for the resolution of 
troubled cross-border banks. The EU has been building a banking union, 
strengthening its ability to prevent crises and deal with them. 
Others were however more pessimistic about the state of current reg-
ulatory coverage. A rush to implement outdated and ultimately inappro-
priate structural measures took attention away from governance issues 
proper. Important issues (such as wholesale funding, money market 
funds, shadow banking, or special purpose vehicles) were more or less 
left out; national accountability was completely ignored. International 
measures clashed with national interests, decreasing political will to 
implement them effectively, spurring risks of regulatory competition and 
a race to the bottom. Banks now face poor returns on capital, and unless 
their profitability improves, their ability to perform intermediation func-
tions might be impaired. Credit might dry up, impacting growth.
Basel III is a set of global standards that at least has the virtue of 
existing, allowing comparability across banking institutions. But, as one 
participant observed, it remains an empirical question whether there is, 
from a positive point of view, difficulty in attaining convergence; or, from 
a negative point of view, significant divergence. Different national circum-
stances in politics and the industry make the setting and implementation 
of global standards a thorny coordination problem. This is compounded 
by the fact that these standards now seem to blur the line between regu-
lation and supervision. One participant mused that this reflects a deeper, 
“philosophical” shift in regulatory strategy from setting ratios and bench-
marks for banks to defining and testing their capabilities.




As one of the epicentres of the crisis, the EU has responded by initiatives to 
strengthen its regulatory environment. The creation of the Single Supervi-
sory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism have streamlined 
ex ante and ex post measures to ensure financial stability in the Eurozone. 
According to many participants, the emergence of the banking union in 
the EU has significantly consolidated the regional regulatory landscape. 
It remains incomplete however without a common deposit scheme, and 
the problem of sovereign exposure (the “doom loop”) remains. National 
resistances hamper quick and effective implementation. 
The EU’s regulatory preference goes to heavier supervisory demands, 
focusing on structural issues. In an underlying divergence in preferences, 
the US prefers a lighter touch 
with more emphasis on personal 
responsibility within banks. But 
both face the same regulatory 
dilemmas: the question of the 
distribution of costs that regula-
tion can imply, and the fact that a desire for reinforced supervision 
requires a more complex system. Keeping supervised institutions at arms’ 
length means the supervisor will have less information at their disposal, 
whereas a more embedded supervision is costlier and makes regulatory 
capture that much more of a risk. 
One participant noted the critical role of big data in supervision efforts 
and expressed concern about the EU’s data protection regime towards 
that end. Taking a broader view, one participant highlighted the potential 
for regulatory divergence inherent in supervision activities, since they 
entail a degree of subjective appreciation for the situation at hand, based 
on different methodologies and different underlying interests.
What should be done at global level? 
Several participants were in agreement that global regulation should be 
concerned with core issues, leaving detail to the national level; many 
however recalled the concomitant risk of regulatory divergence. One 
participant expressed sympathy towards the agenda of international reg-
ulatory convergence, but called attention to its prior failures and path 
dependency. Increasing the footprint of international regulation could 
“Having uniform regulation 
without uniform supervision is 
like having a lighthouse and not 
switching it on.” 
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provoke a backlash; and transnational supervisory colleges were men-
tioned as a type of structure capable of handling a lean regulation agenda 
at the regional level. 
On the issue of divergence in enforcement, another participant noted 
that whereas taking repressive measures against bad conduct within 
banks is relatively robust, enforcement of prudential regulation is weak 
and contested. The EU itself has been found materially non-compliant 
with Basel III, and has not yet faced pressure sufficient to enact correc-
tions. While one participant asserted that this is a case of significant 
divergence, another felt that it is relatively unimportant and that the 
development of the assessment process outweighs it.
One participant identified two major challenges for regulatory con-
vergence: the place of China in the international banking system; and the 
Trump administration. China’s banking sector is now the largest in the 
world, but remains almost completely opaque and detached from global 
regulatory standards. While it is moving towards global integration, con-
trol of the banking system remains largely politicised: benignly, this can 
be considered a stabilising factor; or malignly, as a worrying lack of rule 
predictability and supervisory transparency and honesty. 
On the American side, thus far, the Trump administration has not 
initiated significant regulatory divergence, despite President Trump’s 
manifest aversion for multilateral methods. Deregulatory action has only 
brought supererogatory American standards down to match lower global 
ones, despite heated rhetoric from Trump loyalists like Congressman 
McHenry, who sent a letter in January 2017 to then Chair of the Federal 
Reserve System Yellen, demanding the US withdraw temporarily from 
all international financial regulatory bodies until President Trump could 
appoint officials that “prioritise America’s best interests”. 
Divergence appears limited for now, though this may be the result of 
a relatively hierarchical structure of global finance, thus far dominated by 
large players from selected jurisdictions. Most participants agreed that 
there are two more pressing issues. First is the complexity of regulatory 
coordination: domestically with other policies, internationally between 
regulators, and at both levels for macro policies. Second is citizens’ hos-
tility towards international financial regulatory efforts, stoked by pop-
ulism: one participant pointed to the current backlash against elites, 
wondering whether such regulatory efforts were not merely “shuffling 
chairs on the Titanic.” 
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Session II - Crisis prevention and macroprudential 
coordination
The counterpart of higher interconnectedness is systemic risk. Following 
the global financial crisis, a consensus emerged on the necessity of mac-
roprudential policy to help prevent crises (or at least smoothen finan-
cial cycles and improve bank resilience). MacroPru policies aim at com-
plementing the microprudential approach, which is oriented towards 
ensuring safety and soundness of individual financial institutions. Mac-
roPru regulation is actively implemented in a number of jurisdictions, 
even though its objectives, contours and effectiveness are hotly debated. 
While recognising that it has had positive effects on real estate mar-
kets and credit growth, one participant was critical of macroprudential 
regulation as designed until now. He deemed it too focused on banking 
institutions and the real estate sector, and too lim-
ited to the national level. It was pointed out that 
national supervisors often have little incentive to 
stop build-ups of known causes of financial imbal-
ances (such as credit or real estate booms) until 
spillovers become egregious; and that build-up of less well-understood 
causes of imbalances (due to maturity transformation or shadow banking 
for example) remain unaddressed. Another participant noted that mac-
roprudential policies are “necessary, but not sufficient,” as they do not 
deal with problems such as regulatory capture or leakages, or “credit pop-
ulism”. 
Macroprudential policy raises a host of coordination issues. It was 
observed that these concern both coordination across policies and coor-
dination across jurisdictions. The latter is difficult because macropru-
dential policies may involve significant spillovers (especially when credit 
markets are dominated by foreign banking institutions) and because 
instruments have to be tailored to the specificities of different credit 
markets. Participants touted the governance of MacroPru policy efforts 
as a modestly successful example of a transnational regulatory network, 
cautioning however that it would be difficult to scale up to global gov-
ernance.
Some participants were critical of macroprudential policies per se, 
asking whether they were not redundant in the face of monetary policy. 
They did admit however they might be useful in the limited case of an 
“It’s all about 
mortgages and 
housing credit.”
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exogenous shock where monetary policy stays unchanged. Speaking 
against this view, one participant pointed out the relevance of macropru-
dential policies in the Eurozone, doubting whether monetary policy can 
“fill in all the cracks”: where there is a single monetary policy, macropru-
dential policies can tend to the national level. 
Another participant concurred, suggesting that “the fact that mon-
etary policy goes in all the cracks is part of the problem, not part of the 
solution,” recalling that these policies appear to deal primarily with the 
real estate market. Echoing this, one participant recalled that central 
banks have several instruments at their disposal, and that the issue is 
calibrating them so they complement each other. The same participant 
warned that since financial stability is a public good, it is imperative to 
connect practitioners and the general public, and to reduce complexity in 
the system for better governance and transparency.
Session III - Cross-border resolution
Ten years after the global financial crisis, a strong point of consensus 
which has emerged is that formal procedures or frameworks are nec-
essary to resolve financial institutions in distress, especially those that 
engage in banking activities across borders. None such framework existed 
pre-crisis, and the several bank collapses, starting with Lehman Brothers, 
demonstrated that disorderly insolvency is an unaffordably costly event. 
Now, firms and authorities have realised the need for clarity and trans-
parency in managing a bank’s failure and assigning costs. One imperative 
that has emerged, in the face of citizen’s backlash, is to avoid bailing out 
institutions with public funds, even if they are deemed “too big to fail”. 
Cross-border resolution presents particular problems however. An 
international border between parent and subsidiary means that there is 
more than one responsible supervisory authority. Appreciations on the 
viability of the institution and who has the power to decide that resolu-
tion is required necessarily vary, as well as how resolution liquidity and 
new equity should be provided. This is the inevitable consequence of 
information asymmetry and diverging interests. There are good reasons 
to be sceptical about how adequate current resolution instruments are in 
an international context. The important time dimension in resolution, 
also questions how long the perspective of institutions and regulators 
should extend regarding the viability of a troubled institution. One par-
“The thrust of resolution in the 
EU is about rescuing; not winding 
up and bankruptcy.”
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ticipant warned that “when there is a liquidity crunch, timing constraints 
don’t conform to models”. 
One participant called attention to the problem of ensuring contin-
uing operations after resolution, prompting a discussion over the ulti-
mate objective of the process. Many participants agreed that resolution 
should not necessarily imply 
liquidation and exit: in the EU 
at least, resolution aims to sal-
vage what is salvageable. Many 
also agreed that liquidity could 
be provided by central banks if the institution undergoing resolution is 
solvable, though there was debate over how long it should be extended 
and under what conditions.
Some participants criticised current resolution frameworks. One lik-
ened resolution requirements as “making banks carry their own coffin, 
which might not even fit in the end”; another wondered whether the 
resolution process was not mostly for psychological benefit. Broad con-
sensus was reached in characterising resolution as financial reconstruc-
tion, useful to manage situations of a globally systemically important 
bank failing. It is less than clear however whether resolution strategies 
could treat a generalised crisis: situations where public intervention is 
necessary to backstop liabilities and eventually recapitalise the system 
can still arise. While the development of resolution regimes in all juris-
dictions (except China) is a notable achievement, they are not a panacea.
Session IV - Challenges of digital transformation
Digital transformation is profoundly reshaping banking activities, while 
regulation can only hope to play catch-up fast and smartly enough to 
avoid potentially dire outcomes. Information technology and the huge 
amounts of data it requires and processes are being used to disrupt tradi-
tional banking activities. Cryptocurrencies chal-
lenge the very idea of fiat currency, while the 
blockchain technology they are based on has the 
potential to radically disrupt banking infrastruc-
ture. The threat of cyberattacks has become the new normal for banks, 
with potentially serious consequences for global financial stability. 
One participant raised three aspects of transformations due to big data 
“Pandora’s box 
is open.” 
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for consideration. First, that big data will be used to devise new financial 
services; second, that big data will increasingly condition market entry 
and the landscape of competition within the sector; and third, that these 
changes will have implications for systemic risk and regulatory efforts. A 
banking model of the future was sketched out, based on a small number 
of platforms (due to high entry costs), resembling Amazon, providing 
products, services or applications relying on data storage and analysis 
(with much lower entry costs), creating an environment with more com-
petitive prices at every stage. 
Other participants debated whether more competition was always 
positive, highlighting that new entrants and new products could bear 
significant, or even systemic risks, while escaping regulatory attention. 
Another underlined the enormous advantage to incumbent platforms, 
questioning the extent of predicted disruption and envisaging rather 
a slow eviction of riskier activities from the industry. Yet another was 
sceptical of the Amazon analogy and professed to be unconvinced about 
comparison in cost structures. Many agreed however that fintech would 
soon catch the attention of regulators, most likely due to consumer pro-
tection issues: as one participant asked, “Who is responsible if an algo-
rithm gives bad advice?”
Another participant underlined the similarities between the tech-
nology and banking sectors, in that they both establish sophisticated 
platforms to match supply and demand. In their ideal state, the empirical-
ly-derived methods and procedures in both are highly standardised, scal-
able, fault-tolerant, safe and secure, structured around quality with robust 
testing and clear methodologies to do so. Both try to operate in organised 
and relatively transparent ways, relying on trust to exchange information 
globally. This is a solid basis for synergies, which the industry is already 
taking advantage of; the same participant estimated that IT staff in large 
banking institutions represented up to a quarter of the total workforce, 
and that it is standard for US boards to include at least one person, or 
even a committee, with some expertise in technological stakes and issues. 
On the other hand, traditional banking institutions are also under 
siege by tech firms moving into banking territory. They remain protected 
for now by a “wall” of sector-specific regulation, reserving their exclu-
sive right to accept deposits: as one participant asserted, “The deposit 
contract is the linchpin [of banking activities]… Whichever fintech com-
pany offers to accept deposits is a bank and should be regulated as such.” 
However, banks have had to face major disruptions such as losing exclu-
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sivity of the management of payment systems and the rise of peer-to-
peer lending (especially in China), bypassing commercial banks and the 
central bank system in settlements. Another concern is cryptocurrencies, 
though one participant dismissed them as speculative assets, not curren-
cies, assuring that “Currency needs the power of the state. Fiat currency 
cannot exist without it.” 
Banks are apprehensive of this complex and fluid environment, and 
some are asking for regulatory action and enforcement, while potential 
systemic risks are still poorly understood and the full implications of 
current changes are not yet clear. Some participants argued that heavy 
regulation on some issues was an appropriate response to slow financial 
innovation, “a train going at 200mph”. Others argued instead that the 
absence of regulation can work positively, not granting legitimacy to the 
use of an instrument (like cryptocurrencies) by not giving it regulatory 
ground to establish itself. 
Wrap-up - Lessons for global governance
All participants agreed that digital will be the point of focus of future 
banking regulation, but differing emphasis was put on the equilibrium 
between on one hand risk and innovation, and on the other regulation 
and the contested concept of systemic risk. Most agreed that supervision 
would have to evolve as well in a more global direction. Overall, there was 
consensus that reforms in the governance of international banking need 
to ensure they are fighting the battles of tomorrow, not those of yesterday.
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Taxation Governance in Global  
Markets: Challenges, Risks and  
Opportunities
Seminar insights1
George Papaconstantinou, Jean Pisani-Ferry and  
Pascal Saint-Amans2
Progress in tax governance: a miracle or a new paradigm?
1. Amongst the different global governance policy areas, tax govern-
ance presents a unique contrast: with taxes at the core of national sover-
eignty, it would in principle be a particularly difficult area for effective tax 
coordination and cooperation arrangements to be agreed on and imple-
mented; for decades, indeed, lasting cooperation failures led to ever-in-
creasing tax avoidance. And yet, in practice there has been substantial 
progress in recent years, and while hard challenges remain to be tackled, 
international cooperation undoubtedly benefits from a momentum. 
Some speak of a “miracle”; others of an aberration; or, perhaps, a new par-
adigm for collective action has started to emerge. Whichever way, there 
are important broader lessons for global governance to be drawn from 
the circumstances and methods in which progress has been achieved, as 
well as from the limits encountered in the search for workable solutions 
in global tax governance.
1 The seminar was held on 18-19 February 2019 in Paris (France), jointly organised with 
the OECD. 
2 Director of the Center for Tax Policy and Administration at the OECD
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2. Beyond the issue of sovereignty, major obstacles hamper interna-
tional cooperation in the field of taxation:  
• First, preferences differ across countries as regards both the level and 
the structure of taxes;
• Second, tax competition pays off: many countries can individually 
benefit from lowering effective tax rates on highly mobile factors;
• Third, players in the tax competition game are not only countries: 
we have witnessed the endogeneous emergence of aggressive subna-
tional tax jurisdictions that are not part of the web of international 
policy cooperation agreements;
• Fourth, the global framework for international coordination is seri-
ously outdated: its essential principles reflect the channels of inter-
dependence that characterised the goods-producing economy of the 
early 20th century, not today’s technology-driven, digital, service-in-
tensive economy; furthermore, it relies on a myriad of heterogeneous 
bilateral agreements rather than on common rules. 
3. Yet results have been obtained despite all these obstacles. As far as 
individuals are concerned, bank secrecy and the resulting evasion from 
income and wealth taxes is largely a thing of the past: 150 jurisdictions 
have committed to exchanging information on request and close to 90 
participate in automated information exchange through about 4500 
bilateral conventions. According to the OECD, bank deposits in inter-
national financial centres have decreased by one-third since 2008 and a 
significant part of this decline is attributable to cross-border information 
exchange. No equivalent result has been reached as regards multinational 
corporations, but a structured multilateral process has started within the 
framework of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative of the 
OECD. Moreover, discussions are being held on possible cooperative 
solutions to the tax challenges arising from digitalisation.   
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How progress was achieved, and where 
1. Progress achieved in the field of bank secrecy was due to a conflu-
ence of factors: 
• Acute public finances needs in a series of countries; 
• Public opinion pressure for international tax fairness following the 
crisis; 
• A conceptually simple problem to solve (abolishing banking secrecy); 
• One country (the US) using its power and extra-territorial reach to 
impose change; 
• An alignment of interests of the largest advanced and emerging sov-
ereigns participating in the G20; 
• The existence of a nimble institution which seized the moment 
(OECD). 
2. It was a case of unilateralism helping pursue multilateralism. Inten-
tionally or not, the unilateral US decision to coerce financial institutions 
to disclose individual data (through the FATCA scheme) resulted in 
triggering international discussions on a cooperative solution to tax eva-
sion. After the goal of ending bank secrecy was supported by other major 
economies and endorsed by the G20 in 2008, the (small) veto players that 
had successfully blocked any agreement within the framework of the EU 
or the OECD were forced to concede defeat.     
3. The role played by the OECD illustrated how institutions can flex-
ibly serve global governance beyond their formal remit. The OECD 
convention does not give it an explicit mandate in the field of taxation and 
it does specify that all decisions are taken by unanimity by its member 
countries. And yet, it served as a venue for international tax discussions 
that included non-member countries and jurisdictions and resulted in 
overcoming long-standing oppositions to cooperation. Instead of the 
organisation functioning on the basis of its formal mandate and rules, 
the OECD secretariat was effectively tasked by the G20 to work in inclu-
sive format and to participate in putting pressure on reluctant players 
(including some of its members). 
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4. Implementation still lags behind commitment. Despite success in 
legislating, enforcement and supervision remain problematic, and for a 
number of countries a lack of capacity building limits the effectiveness of 
data exchange.
Why corporate taxation and the challenges of 
digitalisation have not been successfully tackled yet 
1. Efficiency and equity issues raised by reform of the international 
regime for corporate taxation are an order of magnitude larger. As far 
as efficiency is concerned, existing formulas for allocating taxing rights 
among tax authorities is based on an outdated model of international 
interdependence. They do not take into account synergies within multi-
national firms and do not match the actual location of value creation in a 
world of global value chains, intangible investment and digital presence. 
But interests are not aligned when it comes to defining methods to appor-
tion profits or determine where value is being created in a digitalised 
economy. As far as equity is concerned, reform is bound to raise major 
distributional conflicts: while ending bank secrecy only resulted in losses 
for wealthy individuals and a few tax havens, a comprehensive solution 
to corporate tax avoidance will create winners and losers amongst major 
countries. Against this background, the BEPS framework has helped 
improving transparency and curbing the development of preferential tax 
regimes, but progress towards tackling tax avoidance has been limited 
thus far. 
2. The way forward is not to separate out the taxation of digital ser-
vices, but to redefine principles and instruments for corporate income 
taxation in a globalised, digital economy. Problems with taxing pro-
viders of digital services are not fundamentally different from those when 
taxing other multinational companies. They are just bigger and more vis-
ible. Concepts underlying the international tax cooperation regime (such 
as that of permanent establishment) or instruments tax authorities rely 
on (such as transfer prices) are fatally outdated. What is needed is a rad-
ically new set of principles and instruments for today’s global economy.    
3. Whether or not the international community is able to rise to these 
challenges will have deep consequences for efficiency, equity and the 
legitimacy of globalisation. The issue of global corporate taxation is not 
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a technical issue for specialists anymore. It affects business models and 
internationalisation patterns. And as citizens worldwide are now acutely 
aware of the problem, failure to tackle it undermines support for con-
tinued international economic integration.    
4. It is possible, but by no means certain, that unilateral action will 
again help unlock multilateral discussions. Though their motivations 
and stances towards international cooperation differ markedly, the 
Trump administration’s decision to effectively impose a minimum taxa-
tion on the global income of US multinationals (through the BEAT and 
GILTI schemes) may be a game-changer in the same way the Obama’s 
decision on FATCA was instrumental to end bank secrecy. After it has 
lowered the corporate income tax rate markedly, the US government has 
now a vested interest in taxing all multinational companies, including the 
digital ones.  
5. The outcome of this discussion will also have institutional implica-
tions for the governance of globalisation. For some, the current frame-
work of tax cooperation provides a template for achieving results in other 
fields. For others, it is an idiosyncratic setup, useful in exploring solutions 
in increasingly intractable tax areas, but exhibiting problems in enforce-
ment and monitoring, with effectiveness already showing diminishing 
returns, and difficult to replicate in other policy areas. 
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Keynote – A European perspective on recent 
developments in international tax coordina-
tion3
Pierre Moscovici, European Commissioner for Economic 
and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs
Global taxation problems have achieved a great amount of salience in recent 
years, with the leaks of confidential documents swaying public opinion and 
bringing the issue to third place in citizens’ concerns in a recent Euroba-
rometer poll. The speaker was pleased to recall that thanks to the work of 
the OECD under G20 instruction, 14 international proposals against tax 
evasion as well as 8 against tax fraud have been adopted by EU member 
states since 2014: more than in the 20 preceding years. 
The speaker emphasised three guiding principles for working towards 
coordination in international taxation: transparency, cooperation, and 
modernisation. Much progress has already been made on transparency: 
banking secrecy has for the most part been abolished with the extension and 
automatisation of exchange of information procedures, making it more dif-
ficult to hide revenues and assets. Efforts are under way to make reporting 
of tax planning schemes mandatory in EU member states by 2020. 
On international cooperation, there is robust dialogue with states who 
use their taxation rates as a comparative advantage. The speaker empha-
sised that working only within the European perimeter was insufficient, 
crediting interactions between the EU, the OECD and the G20 for a good 
implementation of rules and an effective name-and-shame process against 
non-cooperative jurisdictions. To one participant questioning the wisdom 
of EU designs for a digital services tax while the US-led trade war ratchets 
up, he answered that it was not such an uncooperative move, as different 
reactions had come back from different parts of the administration: for 
example, the Trade Department was openly hostile whereas the Treasury 
was not opposed.
Finally, the speaker recalled the need for modernising outdated tax rules 
leading to tax injustice, highlighting the European Commission’s proposals 
for VAT reform (which could recover 50b€ per year), for a consolidated 
3 Summary by Adrien Bradley.
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corporate tax base, or for a digital services tax. He deplored the fact that 
despite successes in fighting tax fraud and evasion, certain member states 
have been blocking these bolder proposals due to the unanimity imperative, 
and voiced his support for unblocking the issue with the passerelle clause 
and advocated for clearer governance within the EU, with a Eurozone 
Minister for Finance with powers over taxation. The speaker concluded by 
looking forward to action on digital taxation and a unified EU position for 
the G20 in Osaka.




Adrien Bradley and Alexander Sacharow4
Session I - The framework for transparency and exchange 
of information: achievements and shortcomings
Critical to the social contract is the idea that all must pay their fair share 
of taxes. Before the global financial crisis, it was estimated that a signifi-
cant proportion of global wealth (some 6% or 9T$) was held in offshore 
accounts, impacting developing and less-developed countries dispropor-
tionately. Information exchange was very limited due to banking secrecy. 
Public outrage after the crisis and a series of leaks detailing how individ-
uals and multinational corporations (MNCs) were avoiding paying their 
fair share goaded governments to step up their abilities to identify and 
capture mobile tax bases. 
Effective action was initially slow beyond conditional information 
exchange upon request, prompting to G20 reaction in 2008. In 2009, the 
Global Forum on tax transparency and Exchange of Information, which 
now includes more than 150 jurisdictions, created and implemented a 
peer review mechanism, ensuring a level playing field on the application 
of information exchange on request. 
But it was unilateral action by the US that had game-changing effects, 
paving the way for further multilateral initiatives on automatic exchange 
of financial information. The 2010 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA) used the US market power to coerce financial institutions to 
report data concerning US citizens or face penalties. This created prob-
lems in jurisdictions where complying meant violating domestic law. 
Their financial actors lobbied for a solution, kicking off the debate on 
information exchange led by the OECD. FATCA conventions and con-
cepts were essentially multilateralised by the OECD and were adopted in 
2014 as the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), instituting automatic 
exchange of information. While concerns exist about the information’s 
quality (it does not include assets such as real estate for example), its usa-
bility for developing countries, or its potential misuse by authoritarian 
regimes, it is a powerful step forward in international taxation govern-
ance.
4 Research associate at the German Bundestag and the Hertie School of Governance.
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To date, 108 jurisdictions have agreed to automatic exchange of infor-
mation (excluding, notably, the US), 90 have begun exchanging, and 
95B$ has been recovered. However, success was attained only because the 
interests of the largest sovereigns aligned with other countries’ against 
those of tax havens: there was no developed/developing countries divide 
since the benefits of cooperation were non-rival. Attempts to replicate 
this strategy for corporate taxation would most likely backfire due to the 
underlying distributional issues. Politicians have celebrated perhaps pre-
maturely and complacently the progress made, out of step with public 
opinion for whom it is less effectively visible; the result may be increased 
demand for more radical change.
Discussion among participants focused on present challenges in 
automatic exchange of information, remaining problems in taxation gov-
ernance (especially corporate taxation), and anticipated the discussion of 
taxation of the digital economy. One participant praised the ongoing 
work within the OECD’s Global Forum on tax transparency and exchange 
of information as well as the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) on outstanding issues such as benefi-
cial ownership, transfer pricing, taxpayer rights, and country-by-country 
reporting, while recalling the difficulty of supervision and enforcement 
even when national legislation has been enacted. 
Exchanges took place over the necessary degree of transparency of 
the information exchanged: while some confidentiality is necessary to 
ensure member states’ trust in the instrument, more transparency can 
be a powerful tool. Several participants underscored the fact that data 
exchange without capacity-building is ineffective, even for developed 
countries: one pessimistically remarked that we could be facing a situa-
tion where “Before, rich people lied and governments did not know; now, 
rich people lie and governments do not act.” To one participant remarking 
that taxation, for simplicity’s sake, had long focused on immobile factors 
of production, which led governments to taxing those they were account-
able to, another participant suggested that corporate taxation could be 
conducted at the individual level for the same reason: this would require 
more global cooperation, but raise less thorny distributional issues. 
Some questioned whether 
the issue of corporate taxation is 
as intractable as was presented, 
since it is has an (admittedly dif-
ficult) distributional conflict, but 
“Before, rich people lied and 
governments did not know; now, 
rich people lie and governments 
do not act. Which is better?”
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with the possibility of recovered income and side-payments. One par-
ticipant asserted that the US had solved the issue for itself by imposing 
a minimum tax on MNCs headquartered in its jurisdiction to capture 
stateless income, whereas the EU had not. The same participant had to 
concede, however, that such a tax only works for some large jurisdictions; 
it is residual, creating a floor unlikely to impulse additional cooperation; 
and it only works as a global solution if there are compliance mechanisms 
to ensure no defectors. 
It also leaves the problem of mobility intact, and questions were raised 
as to whether the level of the tax is sufficient to discourage offshoring. 
Nevertheless, with revenue thus assured, it is ironically the US which is 
willing to shift the principle to taxation from source to destination market 
base, whereas it is the EU that is reluctant due to the distributional issues: 
it seems to prefer to try to capture revenue from American tech giants 
and platforms, but not have its own big companies or financial institu-
tions taxed elsewhere. To the unease over the method used as expressed 
by one European participant, an American participant responded that 
American unilateralism had been an effective use of realpolitik that had 
benefitted both the US and the world; but later exhorted other countries 
to put pressure on the US to join the CRS.
Session II - Tax coordination and the digital economy: 
Alternative ways forward
Digitalisation of the economy has not only disrupted traditional busi-
ness models, but also triggered a difficult debate on its taxation: most (if 
not all) countries, as well as large and increasing swathes of public opin-
ions worldwide believe it is still not being taxed in a satisfactory manner. 
Earlier iterations of BEPS sought to address the issue but backfired in 
strengthening the arm’s length principle while deadlocking over transfer 
pricing rules, creating perverse incentives for companies to offshore 
profits. This led to the US unilateral move to minimum taxation. While 
at first glance this rationale can be invoked to justify the EU’s proposed 
Digital Services Tax (DST), as well as similar measures being enacted 
in European countries while it stalls (France in particular), some argue 
it would conflict with existing and developing tax treaties, or that it is 
a quick-fix solution, artificially separating the digital economy from the 
rest of economy (ring-fencing). The crux of the debate is how to allo-
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cate profit depending on observable factors: much more than BEPS, this 
raises difficult distributional issues.
The OECD lists two other models for capturing the same revenue 
apart from the DST, which is based on “significant economic presence” 
in a given jurisdiction and aims at changing the definition for perma-
nent establishments of businesses. The UK proposal is based on “user 
participation”, but does not avoid the problem of ring-fencing. The US 
favoured proposal is based on “marketing intangibles” but poses difficul-
ties regarding the substantiation of linking intangibles with specific mar-
kets and the apportionment of market intangibles to other intangibles. 
Taking a wider look, the failure in capturing the digital economy is 
merely an extension of the fact that large enough companies can essen-
tially choose where to make profits and 
pay tax. Public pressure, especially 
brought to bear after the LuxLeaks, has 
been a driver of change, but it is slow, dif-
ficult, and there is an enormous lack of 
data that could contribute to better 
policy formulation and the emergence of international leadership. In this 
context, unilateral or regional measures (such as the DST) have their use, 
as they can jumpstart action. 
Participants agreed that revenue and employment impact on states is 
a concern in this debate, though some argued that changes in tax policy 
may be less of a factor than believed. All agreed that smaller, developing 
countries have specific issues requiring consideration. One participant 
analysed digital profit in three categories: IP rent, brand rent, and data 
rent, and insisted that the principle that data has taxable value should 
be recognised. Participants largely agreed that more and better data is 
needed to achieve a better understanding of the global landscape.
The discussion centred on the three big approaches to digital taxa-
tion. The proposed European DST promises a fast solution for taxing 
the digital economy, but it only captures some digital business models, 
and member states are deadlocked. It was also criticised on the grounds 
of being protectionist, based on a minimum tax threshold, and poten-
tially involving double taxation issues actionable before the ECJ; it was 
argued that if this approach were to prevail it would be better to apply 
at least at OECD level. Moreover, the UK opposes this approach within 
the EU. Its own user-based contribution approach, and the US marketing 
intangibles approach were credited for circumventing a thorny debate on 
source/destination allocation. 
“Allocation is the biggest 
question: who gets what 
and why?”
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While the US had been unwilling to change the transfer pricing model 
more than marginally, and had rejected discussions of digital taxation 
under the previous administrations, its recent tax reform had a structural 
effect causing it to find renewed 
concern over its own tax base. It 
endorsed BEPS and unilaterally 
enacted its own minimum tax legis-
lation in an attempt to effectively 
capture stateless income and tackle low tax payments of digital compa-
nies. It was argued that this approach could be an effective instrument to 
stop the race to the bottom of corporate tax rates. However, it was rebutted 
that such a tax only works for large jurisdictions; it is residual and creates 
hardly any revenue for smaller jurisdictions, and by establishing a floor it 
can inadvertently turn it into a ceiling. It also leaves the problem of 
mobility intact, and questions were raised as to whether the tax is suffi-
cient to discourage offshoring. 
Nevertheless, the US is now disposed to tax the digital economy, 
whereas it is Europeans who are reluctant. One participant strongly 
defended continuing work on updating current transfer pricing rules 
as the politically feasible incremental step, and drew attention to the 
underlying conceptual debate over whether users should be considered 
sources of value (and therefore be considered for corporate taxation), or 
providers of data in exchange for services. Others cautioned that the issue 
might not be resolvable by corporate taxation measures alone, and that 
following through on these measures might entail having to accept aban-
doning some local tax policy competition.
Session III - Assessing the institutional framework: 
participation, incentives and the drivers of cooperation
Speakers examined the institutional framework that has emerged after 
BEPS and sought to identify further drivers of cooperation. The OECD 
and the G20 have gained new roles, in part by exploiting the sudden polit-
ical consensus around ending banking secrecy. While they are impressive 
achievements of international cooperation, new tax policy instruments 
raise the question of their inclusivity and efficiency, first numerically 
speaking, but also notably with regard to developing countries. The EU 
has emerged as an important agenda setter, but suffers tax policy ques-
“Tax rules are the cream 
on the coffee: the business 
environment is the coffee.”
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tions of its own. NGOs and civil society groups have also emerged and 
taken active part in the process. 
Globally, there is an encouraging growing commitment to avoid 
double non-taxation, but the increasing complexity of the landscape 
causes uncertainty and unpredictability. Other dangers loom. Poorly 
designed unilateral action in a tense global context can be used or inter-
preted as protectionist measures. Moreover, the pace of technology 
may impose speedy responses, which may be equally poorly designed, 
whereas international coordination is a much slower process. The arm’s 
length standard is no longer fit for purpose and it is unclear what can 
replace it; perhaps radical changes such as a destination-based cash flow 
tax or residual taxation. But most options under consideration involve 
some form of modifying allocation, a redistributive problem. The dig-
ital economy taxation debate reflects the underlying absence of a strong 
shared sense of what is value creation and how tax revenues should be 
shared. 
Participants wrestled with the issue of trust, between all actors and 
stakeholders: countries, governments, NGOS, tax administrations, and 
tax paying citizens. Without trust there can be no effective leadership 
or cooperation. The OECD was deemed effective at mitigating double 
taxation, but perhaps less suited to tackling evasion and avoidance; the 
EU however disappointed in generating cooperation and policy change. 
A lack of dispute settlement mechanisms incentivises countries to deviate 
from their commitments, while their necessary complexity in the face of 
proliferating complex new business models hampers the implementation 
of the agreed-upon rules. 
One participant proposed a game theoretic approach to the situation 
as a repeated coordination game (but partly exhibiting characteristics of 
a prisoners’ dilemma); another voiced doubts that any perfectly satisfac-
tory answer could be found for the problem of profit allocation. Some-
what incredulously, one participant asked whether a “miracle” had taken 
place, where a conceptually simple yet vexing problem 
(banking secrecy) had been resolved by a conjunction 
of crisis, aligned interests, and a nimble institution 
which seized the moment.
Another participant praised the OECD’s method 
as the most promising, recalling the need to quickly lay down founda-
tional principles in view of the Osaka G20 in June. Another refuted the 
idea that special rules are needed for the digital economy, and against its 






current “barter economy” where users trade their data for services under 
conditions of poor understanding and control, sketched out a specula-
tive economic governance scheme based on individuals possessing their 
data and monetising it as they wish, a possible basis for a “universal basic 
data income”. One participant drew attention to the intimate proximity 
between sovereignty and tax policy: whereas its sensitivity had impeded 
progress, effective international cooperation has vastly improved, flowing 
down from ministerial level to national tax departments through peer-re-
view mechanisms. 
While participants agreed that one should not simply pay lip service 
to inclusivity and that technical assistance must be provided to coun-
tries that require it, there was disagreement on who might provide it best 
between the OECD and the UN as a better representative of non-OECD 
countries’ interests. The complexity of the system was also a concern for 
some, though others refuted that a more complex system is necessarily 
more unfair; one participant highlighted the fact that increased com-
plexity affects workers doubly, by enabling profit-shifting and corporate 
opacity.
One participant brought up the understudied interaction between 
tax and competition policy, and warned that the monopolisation of the 
digital economy was unsustainable. Another remarked that attempts to 
tax away monopoly profits, using tax policy as a second-best substitute 
for competition policy because it proved incapable of breaking them up, 
would test the limits of a fragile system. Another participant contested 
the characterisation of the digital economy as populated by monopolies, 
suggesting instead that they are monopsonies on data collection, and that 
competition policy is poorly equipped to address such a situation.
Wrap-up - Lessons for global governance
Summing up, one participant returned to the current “miraculous” (and 
under-acknowledged) progress in international tax governance, driven 
by a nimble institution exploiting a newly salient political urgency, and 
questioned whether diminished returns should be expected due to the 
difficult issues lying ahead. Personal taxation reform being difficult 
enough to elaborate and implement, corporate and digital taxation will 
be even more so. Perception of the situation as a zero-sum game might 
make it difficult to do anything else than tinker with the current frame-
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work, while unilateral action is taken and the underlying problems posed 
by few large tech companies go unaddressed. The participant recalled 
that these might be better solved if the nexus between tax and competi-
tion policy were explored. 
In the discussion, participants’ exchanges involved national sover-
eignty implications of monitoring and enforcement, their effectiveness, 
as well as interpretations of principles and concepts like value creation. It 
was agreed that some kind of international yardstick for profit allocation 
is sorely needed. 
One participant welcomed the debate over allocation and value crea-
tion, drawing a parallel to the practice of competition policy: in both, it is 
necessary to come to an agree-
ment over where profit lies and 
whether it is legitimate and tax-
able. The same participant drew a 
further parallel with climate 
change action and banking super-
vision to explore the line between 
enforcement and monitoring 
mechanisms, and their effectiveness. Another participant responded that 
whereas it is unclear what value creation is, it is becoming clearer what it 
is not, which was the focus of the earlier iteration of BEPS. 
Some participants reiterated criticism towards the EU, internally par-
alysed due to leadership dissonance (UK) and its own internal decision 
procedures (unanimity), and recalled that the current driver of change is, 
unexpectedly, the Trump administration. One affirmed that whereas the 
other EU leaders boast concern for tax issues in the G7, their minimum 
taxation proposal is really meant to counter American designs on the 
reallocation of taxation, and that it might give rise to race to the bottom 
problem: the minimum rate floor could turn into a ceiling. They expressed 
doubts of the existence of a digital economy, arguing that speaking of a 
digitalisation of the economy may be more appropriate, and reminded 
participants that it is still the US that is blocking serious work on taxation 
solutions for inclusive growth and against inequality (capital taxation), as 
well as for environmental challenges (transport fuel tax); though a recent 
Republican shift on the subject of carbon taxes may change this. Partici-
pants echoed the caution against politically improbable action that could 
destabilise a fragile system.
“It is important to have this 
discussion in tax analysis, 
similar to the one in 
competition analysis: what is 
this profit and what part is 
legitimate and taxable.”
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Migration Governance - A Common 
Approach?
Seminar insights1 
Andrew Geddes2, George Papaconstantinou and  
Jean Pisani-Ferry
1. Global migration governance is important to study, not because of 
its successes but because of its failures. It is the oldest form of economic 
interdependence: it developed long before any international trade took 
place. And yet, there is no comprehensive global regime for migration 
governance and barely any regional regimes. Although mass migrations 
triggered by geopolitical, natural or economic events, and the response to 
them, involve strong cross-country spillovers, international cooperation 
is generally weak and ineffective – if not conflictual.
2. Analysis has to start from the unique characteristics of the field. 
Chief amongst these characteristics is a high asymmetry between the 
origination and the destination of migratory flows; this has repercussions 
on (dis-)aligning incentives and hence on the difficulty in arriving at com-
monly agreed solutions and governance rules. It is a process chiefly driven 
not by states but rather by people (migrants, intermediaries assisting their 
migration and businesses who hire migrants), including against the will 
of states. The recent flows which have dominated the policy debate are 
simply a more visible component of broader displacement and of deeper 
trends. Interdependence tends to be regional rather than global. States 
1  The seminar was held on 20-21 May 2019 in Florence (Italy), jointly organised with the 
Migration Policy Centre at the EUI’s Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.
2 Chair in Migration Studies and Director of the Migration Policy Centre, Robert Schu-
man Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.
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react to the movement of peoples, usually in crisis situations, mostly in 
regional settings. Governance is characterised by several interconnected 
but separated layers corresponding to different “migration regimes” (the 
protection regime, the travel regime, and the labour migration regime); 
however, these cannot always be distinguished in practice and decisions 
taken for one regime may spill over onto the other ones. 
3. Interactions across layers and amongst countries are complex and 
impacts are disputed. The evidence on the migration costs and bene-
fits for sending and receiving countries depends amongst other factors 
on the scale of migration, demography, skill levels, and the time horizon 
involved. “Brain drain” for sending countries is often combines with 
“brain waste” in terms of over-qualification for existing jobs in receiving 
countries. There is significant substitutability across different migration 
layers. For example, restrictions to labour migration lead more poten-
tial migrants to seek asylum. There can also be significant substitutability 
across countries. Home countries are often substitutable when consid-
ered as pools of labour. Destination countries are often substitutable 
when considered from the point of views of personal safety and economic 
opportunity. For these reasons there are major spillovers across layers and 
amongst countries (e.g. the effects on country A’s labour migration policy 
on refugee flows into country B). Such substitutability makes estimates of 
costs and benefits of migration harder. 
4. The migration governance regime is incomplete and fragmented. 
The migration governance landscape is characterised by high hetero-
geneity of preferences amongst countries, and as a consequence by few 
rules, no institutions, and no enforcement at a global level. It is mainly 
characterised by frequent unilateralism, patchy regional agreements, a 
web of bilateral agreements as well as by the intervention of subnational 
actors (cities, NGOs). The relevant knowledge base regarding both pat-
terns and impacts has become highly politicised and is as a result also 
highly contested. Unlike what happens in other fields where “epistemic 
communities” have significant influence on policy, the debate on migra-
tion governance tends to be driven by ideological beliefs rather than by 
hard facts. An additional complicating factor is that migration cannot 
be easily separated from other fields (trade, aid) in negotiations between 




5. The flawed governance regime has major social, economic and 
political impacts. Recent crises have highlighted the major human and 
welfare costs for people of mass and often sudden migratory flows that 
are being opposed through unilateral and often very brutal measures. 
Next to human costs, efficiency costs from the lack of a functioning gov-
ernance regime lead to serious obstacles to development, especially in 
the loss of a large number of skilled people in origin countries. Interna-
tional frictions abound as a result of migratory flaws and the lack of a 
migration governance regime, including a commonly agreed set of core 
rules and procedures for migration and assimilation. The toxic and often 
fact-free debate surrounding migration in destination countries has had 
adverse domestic political consequences, polarising positions (liberal 
rights vs. majority rule, national vs. human security), with some coun-
tries choosing ethnic homogeneity irrespective of economic outcomes. 
It has also undermined migration regimes such as that for international 
protection that enjoy governance structures, making it harder to arrive at 
commonly accepted international norms and agreements.
6. A hesitant and controversial step forward at global level. Spurred 
by the 2015 migration crisis in Europe, the Global Compact for Migra-
tion (GCM) affirms for the first time a multilateral approach to man-
aging migration and provides common but non-binding principles for 
national policies and international agreements. The agreement is softer 
than soft law, with no monitoring but regular reviews. However, while it 
remains non-binding, and cannot be invoked to claim rights in courts, it 
could progressively become more binding by repeated reference in legal 
practice. Nevertheless, despite its deficiencies and limited character, the 
GMC is a step forward; its usefulness will be tested in its implementa-
tion. In principle the GCM could produce effects through peer pressure, 
potentially through courts and by providing a template for international 
agreements; it has the advantage of setting out a framework and a menu 
of possible measures/policies for discussion and implementation.  In 
practice it may have already backfired; during its adoption it has been 
misrepresented by demagogues, with the US and some European coun-
tries withdrawing, and generally little ownership). In addition, the GCM 
may be flawed in specific respects, such as in its approach to regulating 
labour migration. 
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7. Going beyond the inadequate response at European level. The dis-
cussion surrounding migration in EU MS has obscured the potential 
gains from a common high-skill labour migration policy, which would 
arguably help limit the EU disadvantage vis-à-vis US, and harmonisation 
of policies to create legal pathways of migration to the EU. The recent 
migration crisis in Europe has highlighted the fact that a no-border space 
and heterogeneous asylum policies are incompatible; the asylum and 
migration debate has had inevitable spillovers onto the Schengen regime. 
Europe’s asylum system is broken; the internal coordination regime is 
beyond repair: it is inefficient, with no agreement on principles, cap-
tured by interior ministries, and externalities that are not dealt with. The 
external joint action regime remains ineffective: the EU lacks compe-
tence and means to negotiate with source countries or transit countries, 
and states do not cooperate. A workable solution requires (a) coalition 
of like-minded countries, (b) single law and a single agency for asylum 






Session I - Deciphering the migration governance 
landscape
The first speaker introducing the session sketched out four points cur-
rently driving and affecting global migration governance: 
1. Economic, political, social, demographic and environmental changes 
form broad trends informing migration dynamics. Economically, 
the mutation of regulatory environments has increased pre-existing 
expectations for governance, as well as created new ones, on the part 
of citizens (not only in migration). Politically, state-to-state conflict 
has decreased, which bodes well for migration governance, but this 
may conceal new challenges such as intra-state displacement. Social 
media have become a prime vehicle for inflammatory disinformation 
about migration. Demographically, while world population growth 
is slowing, an “African youth bulge” might contribute to migration 
patterns in the future. Finally, the likely catastrophic effects of cli-
mate breakdown on migration are raising particular concerns.
2. While historically multilateralism was used to smooth over power 
differentials and reinforce states (and was perceived as doing so), 
appetite for it is diminishing. Absent its possibility, governance is 
produced through other means: “minilateralism”, soft law instru-
ments, involvement of sub-national (cities) or non-national (NGOs) 
actors.
3. Migration governance is so complex because it is so difficult to 
reduce to broad categories to think about and deal with their gov-
ernance. The three regimes concept (protection, travel, and labour 
migration) can be supplemented with more regimes:  for interna-
tional students, family reunion or retirement abroad for example, 
complicating the governance landscape.
4. Difficulties abound for migration governance going forward. Right-
wing nativists employ populist tactics use migration governance fail-
ures as a wedge issue, polarising electorates and profoundly affecting 
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politics, nationally, regionally and globally. This undermines migra-
tion regimes that already enjoy governance structures, such as the 
international protection regime: for example, support for asylum 
claims is fragilised by their conflation with economic labour migra-
tion to developed host countries. In turn, transit countries are seeing 
their leverage increase. The political leaders of cities, important and 
underestimated usually positive actors in migration governance, 
may cave under the multiple pressures they are facing, further fra-
gilising migration governance.
The second speaker introducing the session covered similar ground in 
five points: 
1. Migration governance is a patchy and weak regime complex whose 
existing structures, especially at the sub-national and the regional 
levels, have potential for bolstering; recent developments have been 
uneven, however.
2. Perceptions (especially of decision-makers) frame action, though 
the situation may have changed factually: the perception that migra-
tory pressure at the border is a “new normal” may be without empir-
ical grounding.
3. Mobility is increasing worldwide, but unequally: European citizens 
enjoy twenty times the mobility of African citizens. The trend is 
towards divergence and greater gaps in mobility opportunities.
4. Careful attention must be paid to the structure and drivers of atti-
tudes towards migrants in host countries. There is significant evi-
dence that the cleavage over “globalisation” has become more salient 
than ever in developed host country politics, especially its migration 
aspect, and this must be taken seriously. While some will be intrac-
table, others’ attitudes are amenable to change.
5. Research, data and knowledge production on migration are pro-
gressing, providing better evidence of trends and dynamics, but it 
remains difficult to connect it effectively with decision-makers.
The ensuing discussion revolved around the problems caused by the 
complexity stemming from overlapping migration governance regimes 
and the subsequent lack of policy coherence. One participant recalled 
that governments have in fact little power to control migration: its true 




migration (and often profiting from it), and the businesses who will 
hire them. Some governments are even giving up more control, priva-
tising border control and search-and-rescue functions. Beyond harming 
migrants, poorly thought-out policies can harm established patterns of 
migration, or have negative spillover effects on other states; but some-
times what looks like bad policy is in fact the point. 
Multiplying obstacles to migration or outsourcing migration control 
functions is not irra-
tional, but functions as 
deterrence, a signal in 
domestic politics, or a 
means to apply pressure 
in international politics. 
One participant sug-
gested it is illusory to expect policy coherence, as people are not coherent 
themselves, employing undocumented workers while deploring their 
supposed effect on the economy, or rejecting migrant workers but wel-
coming international students. The complexity and diversity of the 
migration landscape is often understated.
Discussion also touched upon questions about the reliability and pres-
entation of indicators and their effects on attitudes towards migration. 
Policy-making should rely on data and facts, but discourse surrounding 
migration is notoriously impervious to them. Experts already face diffi-
culty in swaying public opinion, but decision-makers aren’t much more 
receptive; they often presume that their electorate is hostile to migration 
and act in consequence, in a self-fulfilling vicious circle reinforced by 
media and politicians misrepresenting the situation as an ongoing exis-
tential “crisis” for host countries. In fact, attitudes towards migration are 
more complex and less hostile than presumed. 
Negative attitudes to migration are generally attributed to two causes: 
economic concern over redistributive outcomes, and cultural concern 
over “identity”, with the accelerating factor of mass media and the manip-
ulation of content. One participant disagreed with this characterisation, 
arguing that economic concerns are what really matter and that cultural 
concerns are a form of “false consciousness” where migration is scape-
goated. Another cautioned that evidence on this is patchy, but that the 
psychological dynamics of concern over migration are clear enough: it is 
easy to activate and difficult to shift. Inflammatory narratives play well in 
electoral politics, which compound the problem precisely because they 
“The US is currently in a governance 
arrangement of ‘how much can I get 
away with’. Migration is used as a 
bilateral irritant or sweetener… It’s sheer 
bloody-mindedness, and it’s working.” 
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cannot be fulfilled. Governments also engage in damaging doublespeak 
in governance fora, professing toughness on migration and making a 
show of uncooperativeness, while quietly signing up to implementation 
measures. Resulting anti-migration attitudes may originally target a frac-
tion of migrants, but quickly affect all of them, discouraging even offi-
cially desired migrants. 
One participant drew attention to the fact that measured attitudes 
may not be towards migration per se, but of its control and management, 
and that focusing on integration could provide potential for a fruitful 
dynamic. Another advocated humility in the expert community, recalling 
the near-universal approval of trade liberalisation while the dynamics of 
the redistributive effects turned out to be deeper and more complex than 
touted. One participant summed up the changes in attitudes and policy 
by distinguishing three types of issues: those with low salience, where 
special interests have a large potential to drive policy; and those with high 
salience, which can be contested, or not. Of the high-salience issues, the 
uncontested ones (like growth) will be driven by general public opinion. 
High-salience contested issues (as migration has become in the last dec-
ades) will no longer be driven solely by special interest groups, nor by 
the public (since it is contested): in this case parties are the ones who will 
drive the issue.
There was also discussion about another factor of complexity: the 
interdependence of migration and other fields of global governance such 
as trade, development, or climate change. Attitudes to one do not cor-
relate well with another: the left/right cleavage remains more pertinent. 
Existing international treaties and agreements, though imperfect, can be 
key tools for accountability and policy-making; while at the national level 
it is important to emphasise that migration is not a destabiliser to a previ-
ously balanced system, but an integral part of it. One participant recalled 
that migration is only one side of the story: 96% of the world population 
is not mobile, often trapped in poverty and exposed to deleterious condi-
tions: it is the richer and more capable of the global poor who can migrate 
to escape their situation. 
The speakers concluded the session by summing up the consequences 
of the increased salience of migration. It has been seized upon in political 
narratives, driving a discussion based on issues of security and leading to 
instances of its weaponisation. Its intertwining with other bilateral, the-
matic and geographical processes is increasingly recognised and engaged 




influenced by media (traditional 
and social) and far-right nativists 
employing populist tactics, can 
become reality in governments 
and administrations with little crit-
ical examination. The increased salience of migration has not translated 
enough to attention paid to source countries however, where important 
regional and sub-regional dynamics and processes remain under-exam-
ined.
Session II - Labour mobility and skills
The first speaker introducing the session presented three basic challenges 
in matching demand for skills in host countries with mobile labour.
1. Harmonisation of policies to create legal pathways of migration to 
the EU has had limited success and created few effectively binding 
frameworks, due to member state (MS) reluctance to establish joint 
strategies.
2. The asylum regime is inappropriate to deal with labour migration. 
Cooperation with origin countries has become a priority, but there 
is intense political tension.
3. A better match of academic or professional skills of migrants to 
host country needs requires a system of competence checks, which 
remains to be developed. 
The second speaker recalled the fact that the educated and/or skilled 
are twenty times more likely to migrate than average. There is a global 
market for skills, but in fact migration flows are extremely concentrated, 
with half of the total going to the US, another quarter to Anglophone 
countries (principally the UK), and the remaining to the rest. The need 
for a regulatory framework is evident but attempts to integrate this into a 
policy narrative encounter virulent resistance, and tend to fail if there is 
no long-term path to integration. On the side of origin countries, there is 
concern over brain drain, but it is perhaps overstated: it creates incentives 
for these countries to retain and train their human capital. Trade and 
migration are complementary: both build bridges, enhancing the circula-
tion of positive factors of production. The speaker saw less scope for gov-
ernance mechanisms, judging that, at least for highly skilled migrants, 
market mechanisms might work well enough.
“There is a democratic deficit 
inbuilt in migration: the people 
who decide are not the ones 
who are affected.”
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Discussion focused on the relative costs and benefits of skilled migra-
tion to origin and host countries. While skilled migration can give rise 
to fears of brain drain, which is naturally viewed unfavourably by origin 
countries, discourse has shifted to how it can be leveraged for their ben-
efit, through skill transfer programmes or encouragement of return 
migration. These countries already benefit from the remittances sent back 
by migrants, which exceed FDI in Africa for example; and their depar-
ture may level inequality with low-skilled workers there. Brain drain fears 
are often exaggerated however: “brain overflow”, whereby skilled workers 
do not meet with adequate demand, may be the more pressing problem. 
Correspondingly, there is “brain waste” in host countries, where migrants 
are overqualified for the positions they hold: in the US for example, a full 
half of migrants hold degrees. This points to the need for programmes to 
recognise skills and competences (acquired formally or informally). In 
the long term however this phenomenon can result in a persistent failure 
to concentrate and agglomerate high-skilled workers in origin countries, 
compounding international inequality. 
One participant, summing up the dynamic, identified the basis for 
cooperation in this case as 
the interest in counter-
acting long term excessive 
concentration in host 
countries and its negative 
consequences for development and growth in origin countries, and asked 
what policy tools could be employed to do so, apart from outright trans-
fers or restrictions (preferably temporary) on migration flows. Another 
participant contested the identified basis for cooperation as unsound, 
since developing origin countries in fact gain in the short term and there-
fore have little incentive to oppose flows: they diminish unemployment 
and thus stabilise social conditions, while ensuring much-needed remit-
tances. 
Many participants argued against restricting flows on normative 
grounds; some advocated instead, more or less ambitiously, the use of 
industrial policy, the creation of larger, regional poles to spread the costs 
and benefits, enhanced mobility schemes ensuring circular flows, or joint 
host/origin country training schemes; but short term electoral concerns 
make it difficult for MSs to cooperate with EU institutions on pilot projects 
for legal migration. One participant highlighted that to regulate migra-
tion, policies in origin countries (such as encouraging education, return, 
“Host countries gain; skilled migrants 
gain; origin countries lose short term 




specialisation, niching in a sector, greening…) have the most impact. 
Another participant recalled that almost all legal migration in developed 
host countries are guest worker programmes that, without integration 
programmes, have not had a good track record in effectively regulating 
migration. Moreover, they are accused of inflaming xenophobia, despite 
a compromise where newer migrants are allowed access to the labour 
market but excluded from welfare state benefits. This poses the question 
of countries, such as Japan or Hungary, who prefer economic stagnation 
or decline as the price to pay for ethnic homogeneity. 
Discussion also focused on the tension between high- and low-skill 
migration, by way of con-
trasting legal avenues of migra-
tion: the labour regime and the 
protection regime (while they 
do not map exactly to each 
other, there is a fair degree of overlap). Most participants agreed that the 
line between the two regimes is blurring, a worrying development. One 
participant strongly advocated keeping these two regimes strictly sepa-
rated, arguing that both have different logics, and that if legal pathways 
for migration don’t exist then the asylum regime will be abused to that 
end, putting it in danger. One participant questioned how the existing 
two regimes could be strictly separated, as they follow similar processes 
and feed into each other. 
Another participant suggested that it is difficult to disentangle asylum 
seekers and economic migrants, but that the former tend to arrive in 
waves whereas the latter tend to arrive as a more steady flow; another 
responded that however difficult to parse, these categories matter very 
much as they confer different bundles of rights and access to labour mar-
kets. In any case, all will need to acquire or upgrade their skills to inte-
grate the labour market of their host country; thus programmes to facil-
itate this in short time are necessary, as are integration programmes that 
will take longer. However, looming automatisation and digitalisation will 
impact future migration flows as well as host country societies, increasing 
the imperative for reskilling and upskilling of workers. One participant 
evoked the importance of not leaving by the wayside refugees who due 
to injury or trauma cannot join the labour market; another recalled that 
while in general labour market participation of refugees takes longer, the 
situation consistently rebalances after the second or third generation. 
Concluding the session, the first speaker recalled that skilled migration 
“We need good governance for 
asylum; we need governance tout 
court for economic migration.”
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is self-selecting; it is a normative question with serious consequences 
whether decision-makers act on concern over their country’s human 
depletion: pithily put, acting to prevent ghost towns may end up creating 
zombie states. The good situation of the origin country is key to fos-
tering return migration. The second speaker took the EU as an example, 
deploring its limited competence and limited appetite of its MSs for devel-
oping migration policy, urging experimentation on the national level to 
create a dynamic of regional progress, possibly leading to harmonisation. 
Session III - The Global Compact for Migration
The first speaker introducing the session presented the process leading to 
the GCM and its content. Mounting salience of migration as an issue led 
to it being taken up in various international fora, until the 2015 migra-
tion crisis in Europe tipped the balance, spurring the UN process towards 
adopting the GCM. It enjoyed a large consensus initially (only the US 
refused to even be involved in its negotiation), but the decision to delay 
formal adoption and endorsement at Morocco’s request, so it could orga-
nise the ceremony in Marrakesh, allowed opposing forces to mobilise and 
spread disinformation, leading to a number of countries to drop out of it. 
The GCM is the first internationally negotiated agreement on migration 
in all its aspects: not legally binding, it is a political and fairly coherent 
document affirming a multilateral approach to managing migration, 
achieving balances between individual rights and states’ prerogatives, 
and between origin and host countries. It is structured in three baskets: 
reducing the negative drivers of migration (such as smuggling and traf-
ficking); amplifying its benefits (investment, development, using migrants’ 
skills, etc.); and bringing order to the process (improving data collection 
and their quality, providing relevant information to migrants, etc.). It 
contains three kinds of objectives: specific and non-controversial (e.g. 
data collection); specific but controversial (e.g. cooperation on returns); 
and broad and idealistic (e.g. eliminating discrimination). MSs decided 
to include such numerous 
and heterogeneous mea-
sures and objectives to 
dilute the more contested 
issues. It is much too early 
to gauge its effectiveness, but it has the merit of setting out a framework 
with a menu of measures. Time will tell whether their implementation 
will be effective or not, yet there are cautious grounds for optimism. 
Section 6: Migration
“The GCM is an incremental step 
in the right direction. It’s full of lofty 
goals, all on paper; but at least they’re 
down on paper.” 
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The second speaker focused on the objective of regulating labour migra-
tion contained in the GCM, arguing that there exists a gap between its 
contents and the reality of labour markets, which will obviate its effec-
tiveness. Its objectives touching upon labour market access are in ten-
sion with the use of temporary work permits, the major tool of developed 
countries. These are awarded in function of labour market tests to eval-
uate demand for certain skills from employers, to show that no domestic 
workers are available; whereas the objectives emphasise the right to 
change employers. But if migrants can change jobs or sectors, this negates 
the original incentive to facilitate their migration. 
The speaker thought it better to focus on defining a core of rights for 
migrants (as ILO has done for workers) and was pessimistic about the 
GCM’s effect on regulating labour migration. The first speaker offered a 
rejoinder, recalling that the GCM had emerged in response to anarchical 
mass flows, not narrower, practical concerns over labour markets; and 
that the value of the GCM lies in its process as the first global negotiation 
over migration, overcoming taboos in previous migration governance 
fora. 
Discussion revolved around on the drawbacks and benefits of the GCM. 
Whereas many participants expressed measured praise towards its con-
tent and relief that it managed 
to be adopted at all despite 
mass diffusion of inflamma-
tory “fake news”, some felt it 
was not ambitious enough. 
One participant pointed out the positive impact of civil society groups in 
helping to draft it, in a fairly open and transparent process: even migra-
tion-critical groups were invited to contribute, but elected not to. This 
NGO involvement may have diminished state ownership of the text. Sev-
eral participants agreed that these non-state actors will be key in the 
implementation and review processes. 
Some participants drew attention to the fact that negotiation was con-
ducted by foreign affairs ministries, creating tension with home or labour 
ministries who will be the ones to deal with the effects. Others questioned 
the feasibility of the prescribed measurement and reporting, citing the 
example of crisis-hit and displaced populations. One participant quipped 
that it is easy to criticise ex post: the process will go through gradual, long 
term build-up. If having it in place will stop some abuses, and if it can it 
be used proactively, then the benefits will outweigh the drawbacks.
A prominent part of the discussion focused on just how legally binding 
“It wasn’t the best time or place for 
the GCM. It’s better to have it than 
not, but it really could have gone 
the other way.”
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the GCM is and might be in the future. Participants concurred that it was 
explicitly designed as non-binding “soft law”; the text pays overt obei-
sance to national sovereignty. It is a statement of principles followed by a 
“shopping list” of measures states can pursue, with no obligatory actions 
or sanctions. It can be referenced in legal practice, but not invoked to 
claim rights in courts. However, it can gain bindingness progressively by 
repeated reference, linkage and use in related processes (one participant 
suggested the SDGs), as its language and principles spread down and out; 
the European Parliament has already made reference to it. Origin coun-
tries could take into account other countries’ action on its measures in 
undertaking new bilateral (or regional) agreements with them.
The session concluded with the first speaker elucidating the envisaged 
implementation method of the GCM: it is the responsibility of states, 
which have no individual formal monitoring and reporting obliga-
tions or standardised indicators. A global review will be conducted in 
four years however, as well as alternating regional reviews. The speaker 
reflected on the role of EU MSs, who at the time of the crisis needed to 
involve origin countries and thus bought into a global process which may 
have unexpected consequences for them. The second speaker advocated 
for more and better data collection and scholarship to obtain a granular 
understanding of key issues at regional and national levels.
Session IV - Migration governance in the EU
The first speaker introducing the session presented some statistics on 
migration in the EU and drew conclusions. Asylum-seekers represent a 
tiny 0.4% of all cross-border movements. Since the financial crisis, labour 
migration has almost halved; asylum claims spiked during the 2015 
migration crisis but are rapidly declining (40% of Council meetings at the 
time dealt with this subject); it is family migration that contributes most 
to migration to the EU. 30% of migrants end up in three MSs (DE, UK, 
IT); 90% end up in 10 (+ ES, FR, SE, AT, BE, NL, PL; the latter because of 
flows from Ukraine). 
Responsibilities for different aspects and types of migration are splin-
tered between the Commission and MSs; the latter’s uncoordinated deci-
sions create externalities, while they compete to attract skilled migrants. 
The situation is sub-optimal: third countries could more easily be 
approached by the Commission, and marketing the EU as a single desti-




to strengthen the external dimension of the Schengen system supporting 
inter alia naval action in the Mediterranean, with mixed results. It also 
facilitated “gentleman’s agreements” with Turkey and Libyan actors and 
developed carrot-and-stick approaches towards other sending countries 
(mostly African), with some effectiveness, but at the cost of belying its 
professed values. 
However, it failed in resettling already arrived migrants, as some MSs 
flatly refused to implement the first Council QMV decision in this field. 
The EU faces a number of challenges stemming from migration: with an 
ageing and shrinking labour force, it must attract the right migrants for 
its labour markets, while ensuring the freedom of mobility of its citizens, 
the protection of refugees, and the security of all on its territory. More-
over, it must manage its diverse societies and promote integration. One 
major challenge, however, is that historically European conceptions of 
national identity integrate migrants much less easily than those of other 
states such as the US or Canada. 
The second speaker covered similar ground with a more institutional 
lens. The EU needs a longer term strategy to protect freedom of move-
ment and deal with demographic challenges, detached from a narrow 
and unhelpful focus on security; at the moment there is no common view 
and thus no common policy. Migration governance is especially difficult 
due to the intertwined competences of the institutions and the MSs, 
which blame the former when things go wrong; cities can be powerful 
actors (for better or worse), but do not receive adequate support. The EU 
brings a striking amount of resources to the table, but much of its impact 
is wasted due to lack of coordination and inability to foster synergies. The 
humanitarian/security/development/external relations nexus that lies at 
the heart of migration is inextricable; but more so for MSs alone. 
However, the EU has many design flaws in dealing with migration: the 
Dublin asylum system suffers from serious flaws, and is not balanced by 
a corresponding system for labour migration; in external relations, the 
unanimity requirement in the Council and the EEAS being walled off 
from relevant issues with domestic impact (e.g. trade) is a serious imped-
iment. In order for the EU to grapple with the challenge properly it needs 
a complete set of sectoral policies at its disposal; to acquire this, it needs 
political will and the backing of MSs. It has begun to seriously engage 
with origin countries, but more work is needed. 
One participant was extremely critical of the state of EU migration 
governance: obstinacy in maintaining the failed Dublin “non-system” 
is now threatening the Schengen system. Countries of first arrival failed 
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to apply it due to lack of means 
and general EU solidarity; this, 
plus lack of mutual recognition 
by MSs in asylum decisions, led 
to forum-shopping by migrants, 
and in the end has fed far-right 
populist nativism. EU-tabled reforms are completely inadequate, pro-
posing more of the same. This obstinacy is not irrational however, since 
the point of the system is deterrence rather than actual governance; 
moreover, it is now deeply embedded in the administrative cultures of 
EU institutions and MSs (where one very negative factor is the manage-
ment of asylum by home ministries). 
Even more danger lies in outsourcing asylum (as in e.g. the deal with 
Turkey): it runs against all professed European values and MS constitu-
tions; and what’s more is not even efficient. A fitter, three-level system 
could be a solution: a revamped asylum regime (with e.g. mutual recog-
nition of asylum decisions, an EU asylum agency with real authority); a 
new humanitarian regime (which could accommodate climate refugees 
for example); and a labour regime to deal with economic migration. Yet, 
host countries’ concerns over identity or their choice of homogeneity 
over growth must be taken into account somehow as well. 
Discussion pursued the theme of flaws in EU migration governance 
and ways forward. Participants concurred for the most part that the focus 
on security concerns, linking border control, immigration and cross-
border crime to asylum, is unhelpful; so are ethically dubious stopgap 
agreements. One participant disagreed however that this focus on secu-
rity concerns is strong in the foreign policy facet of migration, ques-
tioning what a strongly coordinated EU foreign policy would be able to 
effectively achieve, and arguing that smaller policy items (e.g. visa facil-
itation for countries included in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy) could 
have broad reverberations. 
One participant questioned the Commission’s role in asylum exter-
nalisation, asking how it can better evaluate and monitor coordination 
partnerships largely put in place by the European Council and regain 
influence; another replied that it does not enjoy much competence in 
this area and is hemmed in by MSs, as the ignored QMV decision on 
resettlement demonstrated. New attempts at coordination will have to 
take a basis that MSs are profoundly divided on the issue, to the point 
where legally binding decisions are not implemented and with no pos-
sible sanction to boot. Another participant put forward that the principle 
of differentiated responsibility could have been applied, whereby recal-
“If we don’t manage to fix this, it 
might be an existential threat to 
the Union… Let’s put it this way: 





citrant MSs could have refused resettlement but paid more of the costs. 
One participant urged passionately to not miss the forest for the trees, 
recalling that the main goal should not be to salvage systems, but people.
The session concluded with the first speaker questioning the hard 
practicalities of EU solidarity: if a MS receives significant funds with little 
improvement, it is difficult to justify spending more. Mutual recognition 
is double-edged: asylum rejections by migration-critical MSs would have 
to be recognised too. Relocation is unjust because for many the destina-
tion country will be designated arbitrarily, and is in any case extremely 
difficult to enforce. The second speaker echoed points made in discus-
sion, regretting the lack of tools and clear governance mechanisms at the 
Commission’s and MSs’ disposal, and drawing a comparison between the 
migration crisis and the Eurocrisis. The fundamental question is how to 
share the burden: there is a window of opportunity now with the drawing 
up of a new EU budget and rule of law consultations with certain MSs. 
Wrap-up - Lessons for global governance
The speaker introducing the session summed up the points made during 
the day and pointed out some under-dis-
cussed issues such as supra- or sub-state 
levels of governance (regional consultation 
processes; cities), the role of transit countries, 
or GCM implementation. Discussion touched upon the patently insuffi-
cient political action in the face of crisis and mass human suffering; one 
participant urged to maintain a politics of hope rather than a politics of 
fear. Another participant underscored the tensions at work in migration 
governance: the liberal rights regime vs. majority rule, national vs. human 
security, expertise vs. values.
“This has been the 
rawest seminar.”
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The Governance of Climate Change: 
Making it Work 
Seminar insights1
George Papaconstantinou, Jean Pisani-Ferry and  
Laurence Tubiana2
1. Climate change is the most pressing and challenging collective 
action issue. Climate change mitigation exhibits all the characteristics 
which ought to drive collective action. The preservation of the climate is 
a paradigmatic public good problem whose urgency is underscored by 
abundant and unequivocal scientific evidence. Climate is also a policy 
area where delays may lead to potentially irreversible damage. At the 
same time, it involves an unavoidable risk of free-riding on any solutions 
commonly agreed, as regards governments’ willingness to enter into 
commitments to reducing carbon emission or in implementing these. 
Furthermore, climate change raises daunting intergenerational and inter-
national equity issues that are hard to solve in theory and even harder 
in practice. Any solution involves distributional choices along those two 
dimensions, and also raises in all countries further issues of distribu-
tional equity amongst living citizens. 
The transition to a socially superior equilibrium therefore creates 
both relative winners and losers across generations, between countries 
and within countries. For these reasons collective action in the field 
of climate requires solving major problems of intertemporal choice, 
1 The seminar was held on 20-21 June 2019 in Paris (France), jointly organised with the 
European Climate Foundation.
2 CEO of the European Climate Foundation; former Special Representative for the 2015 
UN Climate Change Conference (COP21) in Paris.
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international coordination and distributional equity, as well as tackling 
enforcement challenges.
2. The global climate governance framework is not up to the task. At its 
centre sits the 2015 Paris Agreement on mitigating climate change, which 
de facto substituted the more coercive but far less comprehensive Kyoto 
protocol of 1997. After having failed in 2009 to negotiate and implement 
binding targets for each and every country, the eventual agreement on a 
series of nationally determined, non-strictly binding objectives was and 
remains indicative that the international community has chosen breadth 
at the expense of depth. Yet, despite the fact that “the house is burning”, 
the sum of individual commitments by countries, local authorities, busi-
nesses and investors do not add up to the collective objective set by the 
Paris Agreement: limiting the average temperature increase to well below 
2°C, aiming for 1.5°C. 
The Paris Agreement reflected a new reality and a recognition that 
emission reduction pledges could not be limited to the advanced coun-
tries, that the model of timetables and targets could no longer work, that 
national sovereignty could not be circumvented, and that agreements 
needed to represent the diversity of the multiple players involved. It was 
a watershed as it represented a shift from negotiated national commit-
ments to coordinated unilateral pledges. In essence, it defines a process, a 
learning method, an enabling framework coupled with a peer review and 
an agreement to assess at regular intervals whether intentions and actual 
actions measure up to the commonly agreed overall goal. 
It is meant to be a platform for accelerating climate action, a way 
to motivate countries — but also the many other actors of the climate 
regime, through a process of information exchange, of constant bench-
marking and pressure, with the aim of aligning objectives as a substitute 
to a centralized governance mechanism. Its effectiveness however is yet 
to be ascertained; it has certainly been hamstrung by political shifts since 
2015, most notably the US withdrawal from the Agreement. Neverthe-
less, commitments under the Agreement must be revised and increased 
by 2020, when it starts its effective implementation. The idea is to pro-
gressively internalise the long-term goal as net zero GHG emissions by 
2050, making it become the new reference point for governments and 
other actors. 
As things stand, the intended contributions registered under the Paris 




ride by under-pledging and under-delivering remain massive. Further-
more, climate coalitions are by nature unstable and leadership risks being 
ineffective as first-movers in the emissions reduction game end up having 
made themselves, by their very success, irrelevant for the next step of 
climate action. This best-performer curse is inherent to the problem at 
hand.        
3. Departure from the simplistic one-agent, one-period model may 
lead to more optimism. Climate change mitigation strategies cannot be 
assessed through simplistic lenses. To start with, states are not the only 
players. Cities and local governments are also involved, especially as 
greenhouse gas emissions and local pollution are often correlated. Sev-
eral have started using the regulatory means at their disposal to foster 
speedier decarbonisation than envisaged by national governments. 
Second, private companies have incentives to engage in the development 
of low-carbon technologies because of the first-mover advantage that 
may result from early research and investment. Third, states themselves 
have reasons to encourage such investment because of the comparative 
advantage that may result from having been involved in the shaping of 
new technologies. 
The important point here is that for those dynamic forces to be set in 
motion and strengthen the drive towards decarbonisation, it may not be 
necessary that international agreements be credible and deliver decar-
bonisation with a high probability. It is sufficient that they credibly set 
the course towards an irreversibly greener economy. This may be enough 
to change the nature of the game and make it possible that a soft agree-
ment such as the Paris Agreement provides enough incentives to action 
to affect private behaviour significantly. 
4. A widening gap between frontrunners and laggards raises concerns 
about the adequacy and the viability of the current framework. The 
Paris Agreement brings under the same umbrella front-runners (such as 
Scandinavian countries) actively engaged in the decarbonisation of their 
economy and laggards (such as Poland, the US or Gulf states), whose 
commitment to reducing emissions is at best shallow. The question is how 
long all these can remain, nominally at least, part of the same endeavour. 
Front-runners are likely to be increasingly concerned they are incurring 
the cost of climate action while others free-ride on their dedication while 
enjoying the benefits from lower production costs. Laggards may feel that 
they are not part of the race for technology leadership and are unlikely 
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to reap the benefits of investing into clean technology. The former may 
insist on more binding agreements or compensatory measures. The latter 
may fall further behind as following the lead is a challenge, with little 
scope to expect being rewarded for one’s effort. 
This logic may result in an unstable bimodal distribution of efforts 
and outcome, with the consequence that an economically inefficient 
and politically toxic two-tier club structure may emerge. Solutions to 
such divergence may involve specific trade measures (such as adjust-
ment taxes) and/or transfers on a wider scale than envisaged (and hardly 
implemented) thus far.     
5. The plethora of available policy tools need to be harnessed to deliver 
the desired result. The climate governance challenge today is to create 
a collective action framework which amounts to more than the sum of 
its parts; to reconcile precise and binding global top-down goals with 
voluntary bottom-up contributions that do not add up to the stated goals 
- certainly not to the aspirational goal of capping temperature increase to 
1.5°C or carbon neutrality by 2050. 
Given the size of the task and the collective action challenge, this 
necessitates an approach which combines incentives for behavioural 
change (such as agreements to reduce emissions in particular sectors) 
with direct action (such as direct carbon capture). It is also an approach 
which needs to pay more attention to the problems both consumers and 
producers are faced with in the transition period, and to issues of bur-
den-sharing and fairness. Practically, this may also imply segmentation 
as a future policy direction: breaking up problems into pieces and looking 
to create agreements on smaller climate-related issues, as a complement 
to the global climate framework rather than a substitute. 
A number of policy tools have been used for climate change mitiga-
tion: Pigouvian price-based such as carbon taxes; Coasean rights-based 
such as emission trading permits; regulatory, driving the adoption of 
cleaner technologies; and legal requirements, which have helped phase 
out harmful substances. These have all individually contributed to cli-
mate change mitigation but have not however created the critical mass 
required. 
Part of the reason lies in the lack of political support for tools such 
as a global carbon tax or the coordinated phasing out of fossil fuel sub-
sidies. Such support has been undermined by policy design not taking 




example incremental costs to developing countries being borne by richer 
countries). More broadly, an impact assessment on the various policy 
tools is required; a broader view incorporating their macro (economic 
and social) impact, and their potential to help tip the incentives from the 
static costs to the dynamic benefits of shifting to clean technologies.
6. The climate emergency is also a unique investment challenge. Seen 
in a dynamic setting however, a major policy challenge is to change busi-
ness expectations concerning the future in order to generate a critical 
mass of investment in clean technology, renew the capital stock, accel-
erate the transition and turn the climate issue from a catastrophic vision 
to a solution for growth. This requires the transformation of private 
finance to support such investments (some of which is already taking 
place), coupled with large public investments in the same direction that 
act as demonstration effects and as incentives. 
It is often hoped that a change in investors’ attitude and the promotion 
of green finance will be key drivers of the transition to a carbon-neutral 
economy. Despite the certainty about the impact of climate change, how-
ever, there is a case of market failure combined with information failure 
when it comes to forward-looking investments: the existing uncertainty 
as well as the increasing returns involved in clean technology are bound 
to generate investment below what is socially optimal in the longer run. 
7. Climate action must not be left to specialised bodies and institu-
tions. Governance at global level is mostly driven by states; and it is most 
successful when political support (expressed for example at G7 or G20 
level) combines with existing multilateral institutions to generate coop-
erative behaviour and solutions. This is unfortunately not the case in cli-
mate governance at the moment: global institutions such as the IMF and 
the WTO are in principle supportive of climate action but not actively 
engaged in promoting it.
There is by now a clear need to mainstream climate change mitiga-
tion, so that it is taken on board in policy design, policy coordination and 
policy surveillance. This should apply for example to public finances, tax 
policy, financial stability policies (where action has started already) and 
trade and investment policies, to mention key fields only.      
Climate governance furthermore exhibits some promising char-
acteristics. One is the already mentioned mobilizing role of sub- and 
supra-national entities (cities and regions); these cannot substitute for 
action at state level, but act as complements, generating pressure as well 
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as a real contribution towards attaining climate goals. A second is the 
political pressure from grass roots movements. Both in the US and in 
Europe, civil society is making up for lack of leadership at political level; 
as a result, climate issues have risen in the political agenda. This may help 
generate the required ambition in the governance framework, with the 
danger however that whatever positive governance developments mate-




Keynote – The Paris Agreement and its 
future3
Laurent Fabius, President of the French Constitutional 
Council. Former French Prime Minister; former chair of 
the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference (COP21)
Almost four years after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement (PA), the 
speaker made five points about it, followed by five forward-looking points.
• There is an unfortunate discrepancy between goals, commitments, and 
results. The goals were simple and ambitious; commitments are looser; 
and results are far from satisfactory, putting the world on a track for 
3-5°C of additional warming. The PA itself is criticised for this, despite 
the fact that it is states that are responsible for not fulfilling their com-
mitments.  
• Institutional fora have less and less spectacular results. This results 
from a decline in authority of COPs and G7-20s. This is in line with 
the crisis of multilateralism and international law, leaving irrespon-
sible attitudes unpunished globally. These can be outdated, but it 
would be a mistake to abandon them. 
• The necessity of consensus made sense when multilateralism was 
vibrant; now it can only produce minimal results. The PA was made 
possible by an alignment of forces (US, EU, China) that no longer 
exists. Facing the ecocidal Trump and Bolsonaro administrations, 
the EU faces difficulties assuming a leadership role, and China is 
unlikely to move forward absent a richer counterpart. Worse, Trump’s 
announced withdrawal from the PA gives other states license to do the 
same or ignore it.
• Meetings and coalitions between and with non-state actors (cities, 
regions, NGOs, PPPs) are developing and taking an important gov-
ernance role. Subnational actors, scientist groups, youth movements 
and courts are having a growing influence on climate change govern-
ance. This is challenging the prevailing perception that climate change 
is a long-term, international issue whose solution cannot come from 
3 Summary by Adrien Bradley.
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short-term oriented, democratic choices made within national con-
texts. States retain a decisive role, but subnational actors in particular 
can drive effective action. California, New York, universities, cannot 
force Trump back into the PA, but they can uphold its goals with sig-
nificant effect.
• Different environmental problems are interrelated, whereas political 
agreements within the framework of the prevailing global governance 
regime are mostly sectoral. This creates a dangerous and underesti-
mated potential for governance gaps.
• Complex governance structures and new international organisations 
could be dreamt up to deal with these points, but it is important to be 
realistic. 
• Political will must be insisted upon more than ever before. Epistemic 
communities and public opinion can block, sway or eventually replace 
ecocidal governments. Political will must also be deployed to at least 
maintain COPs as institutional fora for taking stock, reporting and 
comparing commitments; or more, to improve them. COPs should be 
better coordinated with IPCC reports to leverage effects of scientific 
work on public opinion and political leaders. Their core should be 
opened to non-state actors, who are for now kept to side-events.  They 
should be prepared with Finance ministers to remind governments of 
the nature and structure of commitments made, and to highlight costs, 
benefits and opportunities of climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion efforts for states. By the same token the IMF should get involved. 
They should pay serious attention to innovation in technology. In all 
of these respects, the 2020 COP26, where revised NDCs will be sub-
mitted, will be very important as a chance to enhance COPs as mean-
ingful mechanisms of climate change governance.
• Focus must be brought to under-discussed sectors and themes, such 
as greening air travel, shipping, agriculture, finance, and technology, 
as well as drawing attention to the effects of climate change on global 
health. Immediate action on mitigation and adaptation is imperative, 
but two major mistakes must be avoided: losing the long-term, holistic 
vision, and framing the struggle exclusively as risks and negatives to 
be averted.




China and India; discussions can be held on the basis of specific objec-
tives. Action plans requiring consensus have foundered (e.g. recently 
the Global Pact for the Environment project proposed by President 
Macron): states should have the courage to start taking some decisions 
by QMV. 
• Special attention must be paid to two issues. First is coal, which rep-
resents the bulk of the problem: if all currently projected projects are 
completed, there will be no way to avoid catastrophic climate change. 
Second is carbon pricing, which, as the only feasible tool in a market 
economy, commands widespread support in theory, but needs hard 
work to materialise in practice. Coalitions supporting it exist but are 
insufficient. 
• Attention must also be paid to the question of a just transition. The 
PA addresses this only imperfectly, and frustrations due to mis-
matches between climate policies and poorer people have become glar-
ingly obvious with the emergence of the Gilets Jaunes movement for 
example. This concern must include the issue of climate refugees. 
The 2019-21 period will be critical. NDCs will be reviewed and states will 
have to start integrating the 2050 horizon; there will be short-term conse-
quences, but it is the first time so many states will have to look so far ahead, 
and that is worth supporting. 
A daring comparison of the PA to the Final Act of the 1815 Congress 
of Vienna can be made. They were very different ways of doing diplomacy 
and tackling problems in two very different worlds. Vienna was secret; Paris 
had to deal with public opinion. Vienna involved only states through their 
Foreign Affairs ministers; Paris involved all relevant state and non-state 
stakeholders. The same format can and should be used in the future for 
other topics, though established institutions will still have a role to play. 
Optimism should be maintained moving ahead.





Session I - The framework for climate governance: 
Exploring international achievements and shortcomings 
at global level
The first speaker explored what has been learned since the adoption of 
the PA. The Kyoto model of timetables and targets did not work, and the 
club model did not work alone. National sovereignty cannot be bypassed 
(especially relevant for the US, where the Senate is a near-insuperable 
barrier) and top-down measures do not work: there are multiple loci of 
decision. Climate change governance is a regime complex, which must 
be approached with tools of multilevel governance; its actors are engaged 
in a learning process to break through its impasses and achieve collective 
action that amounts to more than the sum of its parts. In this respect, the 
PA is meant to be a “hook” on which to hang more action on decarbon-
ation.
The NDCs were designed to try to conciliate the (top-down) global 
goals and national sovereignty, by allowing states to determine their own 
contribution towards emissions reductions. While the numbers aren’t 
binding, the surrounding framework is; as are the hard-fought bench-
marks of carbon neutrality by 2050 and the goal to limit warming at 
1.5°C, which is where the battle will lie. The PA sets out a form of exper-
imentalist, learning governance where numbers, metrics, and policy are 
uncertain, thus mandating stock-taking and revision every five years 
to update wrong predictions. Repetition is therefore a key condition to 
cooperation.  
Implementation and enforcement thus rest upon peer pressure and 
common expectations of the future, which can be enhanced by state- and 
non-state actors (cities, regions, businesses, financial institutions…). 
The goal would be for all to integrate in their decision processes the PA’s 
goals, turning rational expectations into a self-fulfilling dynamic, with 
civil society as a watchdog. The scientific community has a role to play in 
shifting from catastrophistic, victim-mentality narratives to ones empha-




Significant headwinds can be expected however, the most obvious 
being the Trump and Bolsonaro administrations. Subnational actors and 
civil society involvement, picking up the slack of national leadership, is 
vital, but needs to go further. It remains to be seen how far businesses and 
financial institutions will align with the PA’s goals.
The second speaker took a historical look at climate negotiations. At 
the 1988 informal Toronto conference, a plurality of states (led by the EU) 
managed to set a collective target for emissions reductions, and agree on 
the instrument of a carbon tax to avoid free-riding, but the positions of 
the US (energy costs) and developing countries (differentiated respon-
sibility) meant that negotiation was pushed back to the Rio conference. 
The Kyoto Protocol enshrined the principle of differentiated responsi-
bility and top-down negotiated targets, but the US refused to ratify it; but 
on a deeper level, lack of enforcement mechanisms made it unworkable, 
and the same reason doomed the Copenhagen conference. This is where 
language shifted from commitments to contributions, diminishing coun-
tries’ individual responsibility towards achieving a collective goal. The 
process was rescued at Cancun, leading to Paris.
The PA manages to state the collective goal more precisely than 
before, but at the price of leaving the means to achieve it severely unde-
veloped; it scrupulously respects national sovereignty while appealing to 
states’ responsibilities and self-regard 
through peer pressure. Intended NDCs 
(I-NDCs) are very different from the 
negotiated targets of Kyoto, but even if all 
fulfilled and added up, emissions would 
still continue to rise, which is completely incompatible with the stated 
goal. While there has been a change in rhetoric, the free-rider problem 
remains intact.
One successful instance of curbing free-riding while tackling a col-
lective action problem is represented by the Montreal Protocol and its 
Kigali Amendment on curtailing HFC emissions. A key provision is its 
trade ban between parties and non-parties of HFC-containing goods, so 
that participating states can keep trusting others’ commitments. It is an 
example of coordination, not voluntary cooperation, with no presump-
tion of an inability to enforce its provisions. It would be possible to forge 
ahead on climate change governance in the same way as with HFCs, 
acting on different aspects of the problem discretely; the PA opens the 
door to this. A more radical approach would be a Nordhaus-style climate 
“The Paris Agreement 
changes what the players 
say, if not what they do.”
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club with border tariffs, but it does not factor in potential retaliation, nor 
that its carbon pricing is too low. Thus, beyond the fact that coordination 
games are difficult to play, it is not even certain that their conditions are 
met; and were they met, and a critical mass of states assembled, the sum 
total of avoided emissions might not be sufficient. It may become neces-
sary to seriously count on immature or speculative technologies such as 
mechanical carbon capture and storage (CCS), or solar geo-engineering.
In discussion, one participant proposed that when a problem can’t be 
solved, the context should be widened. International tax reform coordi-
nation could ignite self-fulfilling expectations for business and the public, 
moving the politics and easing the way for governments. Another partic-
ipant (Victor) agreed with the need for this, calling it “deep tax reform” 
as opposed to the (equally necessary) shallow tax reform of eliminating 
subsidies to emitting industries.
Post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacies should not be committed in 
assigning success to the Montreal Protocol cautioned one participant: the 
emissions it covers come from essentially a single technology (refrigera-
tion); the US was favourable as Dupont was phasing out the gases; wide-
spread anger in India helped ratification there. The alignment of a single 
issue with a clearly identifiable political economy made it an easy issue 
to tackle. Another participant opined that what had worked for Montreal 
and Kigali was a clear and mutually acceptable fixing of the distribution 
of short term-costs in the deal; but recognized this was difficult to attain, 
politically difficult to sell, and potentially socially divisive. 
Selective history is indeed a danger agreed one participant, observing 
that Montreal was not simply a bargaining exercise but a learning one 
as well. It may not be an adequate bearer of lessons for the PA: the pre-
vailing, top-down bargain view of the world that produced an excellent 
but politically unworkable result at Toronto has given way to a learning 
view, where more actors than states are used to experiment in co-creating 
governance. Learning implies making mistakes however, and institutions 
and states must face the politics of admitting them. Learning is also a 
slow process — which, given the pace of climate change vs the uncer-
tain possibilities of new technology, is likely lead to undermitigation or 
overadaptation.  
One participant com-
mented that the learning 
view of climate change 
governance implies ana-
Section 7: Climate
“Greenpeace has done a better job than 




lysing it as an information failure as well as a market failure. As such, 
like the keynote suggested, it would be good for COPs, which bring all 
actors together, to be coordinated with IPCC reports; though this would 
not be sufficient to shape expectations, as the first speaker called for. This 
is a big problem, as good forecasts are needed when commitments are 
being elaborated. One learned lesson is that the current system has per-
verse incentives to set low targets so they can be easily met and revised. 
Another is that the sectoral approach (like Montreal) can be a useful 
complement, and should be applied to coal, aviation and maritime ship-
ping, despite the difficulty. The WTO rules can also be leveraged. 
To another participant, the PA is not just a learning model of govern-
ance, but an enabling one through its incentives. It has “carrots”, but only 
the weak “stick” of peer review. Incentives and disincentives should be 
seen as dynamic and kept on the agenda; the G7-20 should get more 
involved. Another participant agreed that leaders should actively explore 
what mitigation efforts could be pursued 
outside the PA. One called for radical 
ambitions to be set due to the discrep-
ancy of PA goals and commitments, 
warning that if Trump is re-elected the 
PA risks falling apart and geoengineering 
becoming, frighteningly, necessary. 
There is no way of knowing what the costs might be and who would bear 
them, not to mention the global democratic problem this kind of scheme 
would pose.
The second speaker defended the positive, future-oriented effects of 
Montreal: it stimulated R&D, innovation and patent applications. The 
distributional and enforcement aspects are indeed crucial: richer coun-
tries should pay the incremental costs, e.g. of switching to less-emitting 
technologies for poorer countries. This kind of scheme exists in Montreal 
but not in the PA. Advancing CCS is the only way to stabilise tempera-
tures without behavioural change; it just requires financing and is akin 
to a coordination problem. Other than technologically, this can be done 
by large-scale reforestation, though this poses land-use problems. Solar 
blocking should also be seriously examined. It will take decades to ascer-
tain whether action has had the right impact, but the risk of inaction is 
much greater.
The first speaker recalled that the PA cannot be more than a hook 
on which outside action (such as sectoral action) should hang. G7-20 
“If we want to limit 
warming to 2°C, we need 
three times the NDCs’ 
ambition. If we want 
1.5°C, that’s six times.”
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involvement may not be ideal however: the G20 in particular is disin-
clined to produce more global goods than in the financial domain, and 
that was spurred only by a huge, tangible crisis. There is a failure of global 
leadership and institutions here. Montreal will soon be truly tested, as 
CFC emissions are growing illegally, probably due to China; it remains 
to be seen how this will be dealt with. Informational failure is a reality: 
governments, but also businesses and civil society hold false beliefs about 
the costs and feasibility of renewable energy generation. This extends to 
the distributional issues: e.g. determining what is rent-seeking and what 
is a legitimate demand for assistance to transition for fossil fuel indus-
tries. Good governance is attained where there is the capacity to articu-
late different mechanisms and get to common measures, bridging power, 
bargaining interests, and the learning process. 
Session II - Second-best solutions: Regional coalitions, 
creative coalitions and other alternatives to a global 
agreement
The first speaker evoked the proliferation of non-state/subnational actors 
since the PA and the importance of supporting them to pressure gov-
ernments, especially in non-democratic countries like China. China is 
guided by three principles: its self-interest; its sovereignty; and enhancing 
its international image. The PA was acceptable to China because China 
has redefined its self-interest as lying in clean energy. China does not 
want to be seen as lagging on targets, but will not commit to them unless 
it is certain it can attain them (unlike some other states). This domestic 
and international interplay can create virtuous circles, as happened with 
sulphur emissions in shipping: China figured out how to meet its own 
pollution targets, then supported the International Maritime Organisa-
tion’s global cap, and then reinforced its own regulation. This highlights 
the importance of bringing together domestic coalitions and fostering 
local champions for effective sectoral action; these can be leveraged to 
raise China’s long-term decarbonisation ambitions. To do so, it is nec-
essary to collect detailed information on impacts and how to distribute 
efforts; develop good policies to propose to local governments; and dove-
tail with national priorities (like the 5-year plans). Globally, a carbon 
neutrality club will be key for the future. Many state and non-state actors 




wide range of actors to work out how targets can be met at subnational 
level based on common goals. 
The second speaker was more pessimistic, noting that while fos-
tering virtuous circles and grassroots mobilisation is important, precise 
mechanisms of change are unknown. Mobilisation can be fungible (e.g. 
extending concern from plastic pollution to the petrochemical industry), 
and is increasingly questioning corporate concentration and financial 
power; but it can be a double-edged sword, helping or hindering action. 
Institutional investors and ratings agencies are beginning to demand and 
use better environmental impact assessments. These kinds of signals (also 
from business, courts, shifting consumption patterns) were important in 
getting to the PA, and will be more so moving ahead. Widening the scope 
(to tax, trade…) to tackle the problem is a good idea; all levers of action 
should be used by creative coalitions. 
It is less important to analyse leadership than followership, proposed 
one participant. On the one hand, best performers become irrelevant: the 
more one actor does to attain their commitments, the more they mar-
ginalise themselves in terms of volume of emissions. A systemic view 
should be privileged. On the other hand, when experimentation yields 
good results, studies should be made on how these early “niches” of 
activity propagate: e.g. France’s development of unprecedented ramping 
technology for its nuclear power plants, allowing greater contribution of 
renewable energy to the grid. Fragmentation is inherent to the exper-
imentalist process, but governance and innovation are developed best 
organically at small-scale; there should be a mechanism to sift the chaff 
from the wheat. The lure of first-best coordinated strategies should be 
weighed carefully against the reality of second-best solutions. 
Successful small-scale initiatives should be built on regionally to 
coordinate wider application added one participant. Another participant 
seemed the followership game view pertinent, as the EU represents 8-9% 
of global emissions now, 5% by 2050; other actors will matter far more. 
China’s consulting the EU on carbon markets design in a context of com-
parable sub-unit diversity is a good case of followership exhibiting exper-
imentation and learning. A darker example would be 
the EU imposing tariffs on the US, possibly in view of 
protecting the PA, following the Trump administra-
tion’s “first shot” and continued assault on the WTO. 
One participant warned against using the trading 
system unilaterally for other policy goals: the use of trade measures in 
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Montreal was multilaterally agreed upon and dissuasive only.  
One participant argued in favour of leadership however, considering 
it counterproductive to introduce conditionality in emissions reducing 
schemes: a carbon border adjustment tax for example would just prompt 
other countries to tax the exported products at the same rate. The main 
question is distributive: the EU 
should unilaterally act in the 
global interest by comple-
menting the ETS scheme with a 
carbon tax, and use its “carbon dividend” to support green investments 
and poorer regions. 
Another participant recalled the leadership role of non- and subna-
tional actors. Business has a role to play as economic signal co-creators, 
but the PA is silent about accountability for its commitments. Cities 
played an important role in shaping and carrying out the PA. They exper-
iment at a level close to their constituents, lead by example and put pres-
sure on national governments; but also exacerbate a dangerous growing 
rural/urban political divide. This defined the last European election; 
better to focus on broader sectoral approaches (e.g. food production and 
land use, transport and energy, social cohesion). 
One participant thought the first speaker’s bottom-up coalition 
building model could be usefully linked with development agencies’ 
practice. Direct involvement of Finance ministers is also important to 
mainstream green tools in their field; they should participate in COPs. 
The SDGs can serve to frame or hook climate issues. Another participant 
judged recent youth movements an effective form of creative coalition 
that has provided productive political pressure — but feared that pressure 
would also rise from catastrophic climate events.
 The question should rather be which second-best to choose based 
on enforceability, argued one participant. The MARPOL Convention on 
maritime pollution has been successful as a coordination game with a 
critical mass of players, for example. Another participant expressed sup-
port for market mechanisms. A third participant added that much action 
has been focused on demonstrating immediate demand to provide polit-
ical cover for governments for action; now action must be shown to be 
credibly taken. Another participant urged for widespread action with 
as many instruments as possible (markets, taxes, innovation support, 
public opinion leverage), recalling the role of contingency (e.g. Diesel-
gate spurring electrification) and the virtues of nimbleness and creativity 
in reacting to it to direct the political economy. 
“Macron has understood it is not 
possible to increase fuel taxes and 




The session concluded with the first speaker commenting on the BRI: 
China is sensitive to criticisms of a project meant to enhance its inter-
national image, and has set up committees to deal with them (though 
some are hypocritical). The rural/urban divide is also relevant there, 
keeping the authorities from really cracking down on coal. The second 
speaker saw the PA less as a hook than as an umbrella, covering partial, 
second-best governance structures in need of coagulating mechanisms 
to make them tend towards the first-best solution. Instruments based on 
consumption emission measurement could be considered anew.
Session III - Taxes, subsidies, R&D and private finance for 
clean technologies: The battle between dirty and clean 
technologies as an instrument against climate change
The chair drew attention to the wide variation in market and state instru-
ments employed, from a US market extreme to a more statist China. The 
EU stands in between.
The first speaker enumerated several tools at states’ disposal to fulfil 
their commitments within the PA framework, which specifies none. 
Carbon taxes in particular are an effective instrument compared to e.g. 
grants, effectively leveraging an existing system and extracting revenue. 
The Swedish carbon tax has become a cornerstone of its climate policy: 
it started early and ramped up gradually, and has achieved decoupling, 
combining significant emissions reductions with economic growth (as 
currently measured). It is flexible: it abolished its remit over the covered 
industries when the ETS scheme was introduced; it was reintroduced in 
certain sectors (not subject to competition) when its price was too low; it 
was combined as necessary with time- and scope-limited grants or excep-
tions. 
The speaker conceded that the Swedish carbon tax was adopted as 
part of a broader tax reform package, and that Sweden holds a higher 
preference for tax instruments than other countries. A carbon tax is polit-
ically difficult to introduce, but international organisations and national 
financial authorities are networking their experience and knowledge, 
including on cooperating to mobilise private investment and phase out 
fossil fuel subsidies. This and the “Greta effect” of new climate move-
ments means international awareness and willingness to act is rising, but 
some sectoral issues (aviation, maritime shipping) are gridlocked due to 
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existing international agreements. Bilateral arrangements to remedy the 
situation are being evoked.
The second speaker took the EU’s past and recent action as a case 
study for instruments used. Transition costs are estimated to be huge, 
and the big question is how to pay for them. Carbon pricing procures two 
dividends, by cutting emissions and raising revenue. In the EU, the ETS 
and renewable energy regulations, covering 45% of industry and energy 
production, have reduced emissions by 29% in 14 years while raising 
14B€ in 2018. The speaker did concede however that it was unclear in 
what proportions the avoided emissions were attributable to the ETS, 
renewable energy production or energy efficiency amelioration. Indus-
trial exports kept increasing (concrete, chemicals, textiles), but there is 
genuine reduction: emissions were not displaced by imports (Chinese 
steel). More energy-intensive states receive more revenue, and all mostly 
follow recommendations to spend the revenue on climate change adap-
tation and mitigation projects. Revenue is also used to constitute innova-
tion and cohesion funds. 
The EU budget is another instrument. Currently 20% of it is cli-
mate-related; there is ambition to increase it to 25%.
Despite all this, the sums do not nearly match the needs. Private 
investment must be leveraged, through e.g. public/private schemes. The 
EU must achieve a capital markets union, while devising an action plan 
on sustainable green finance; it is already making a taxonomy of green 
bonds. There is active demand and interest for this in central banks and 
by institutional investors, especially long term-looking ones (pension 
funds). 
In addition, the EU contributes to international climate finance, 
raising 20B€/year for the whole range of climate expenditure. But in sum, 
much more is needed, and it is not clear what signals can produce the 
right incentives.
In discussion, one participant recalled a controversial statement 
by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa on the usefulness of taxes in providing 
public goods. 
The remaining 
u n c o v e r e d 
55% of emis-
sions in the EU 
could be dealt 
with by carbon 
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taxation and if necessary border adjustment taxes. This would provide 
own resources to the EU, to be used on social cohesion and productive 
sustainable investment. A European Citizen’s Initiative on the topic is 
ongoing. The second speaker was sceptical however: national preferences 
on taxation instruments are very far apart; the EU lacks competence in 
the field; and border measures, attempted for e.g. aviation, were quickly 
abandoned due to international pressure. Carbon markets may be the 
more politically realistic instrument.
Macroeconomic implications of massive renewable energy produc-
tion deployment and infrastructure decarbonation needs are becoming 
clearer reported one participant: states and international financial insti-
tutions are beginning to apprehend the opportunities of zero- or neg-
ative interest rates for investing in the future. Economists are devising 
new macroeconomic models based on sustainability, e.g. Kate Raworth’s 
Doughnut Economics. Impact attribution of different measures remains 
a difficult problem however, and measurements and analytics are needed; 
better ones, integrating subsidy costs, would show that investment in nat-
ural gas is a bad bet for example. Ex post assessment should also take 
place to transparently evaluate efficiency and social impact of the used 
instrument. 
One participant drew attention to the distributive effect of climate 
policies, which tend to be more regressive than necessary. There is an 
opportunity to bridge policy and politics here: technocratically focusing 
on policy does not positively engage people. 
Another participant drew attention to the need to set expectations, 
for renewable energy production in particular. Feed-in tariffs are useful 
instruments to develop new capacity, but the larger challenge is the 
decarbonation of installed capacity: an exit committee for coal on the 
German model could be set up, following the UN Secretary-General’s 
call for no new coal plants to be built. Gas is defensible as cheaper than 
full electrification in some places, and can even be carbon-neutral if pow-
er-to-gas technology can be scaled up. Investments are plateauing, but 
are still sorely needed for innovation in electrical storage technology and 
efficiency projects. 
The second speaker concluded by responding that innovation is also 
needed to decarbonise whole industrial sectors (concrete, steel, chem-
icals), not just energy production, to build the cities and infrastructure 
of the future. The question is how to incentivise the larger actors to do 
more; sometimes economic incentives don’t work and regulation must 
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be resorted to. The EU may be facing unique constraints due to the Euro 
and its debt and deficit rules. The first speaker concluded the session by 
agreeing that better measurements, ex ante and ex post, are indeed nec-
essary; as is the inclusion of all stakeholders, and taking seriously the 
distributive aspects while ensuring alternatives and choices for citizens.
Session IV - Fostering popular and efficient policies 
conducive of political support: Framing the popular and 
political debate to achieve carbon emissions reduction 
goals
The chair drew attention to the recent sharp politicisation of climate 
issues, and its mobilisation by all actors: 
the Gilets Jaunes affirm to be acting with 
ecological interests at heart. Equitable 
distribution and accountability issues 
are coming to the fore.
The first speaker warned that latest 
IPCC reports predict significant differ-
ences between 2 and 1.5°C trajectories 
in terms of global warming and extreme climatic events: the lower target 
should guide the use of the full panoply of instruments available given 
the inevitable march of rising emissions pushing the planet dangerously 
beyond its boundaries. 
Three doublings will occur: the global economy will double in the 
next 20 years, led by currently emerging economies. So will the stock 
of infrastructure and the extent of urban space and population. Lock-in 
effects of capital and spatial expenditure will resonate in the future: 9/10ths 
of global urban areas are in floodable zones. This makes mitigation and 
adaptation a huge challenge. 
The world stock of capital is 5-600T$. Its doubling must be coupled 
with the imperative of getting to zero net emissions by 2050. Even if all 
this new capital stock is decarbonated, emissions must still be cut. The 
technology exists to accelerate phase-out of polluting assets and build 
new ones according to new standards, but investment choice issues and 
arbitrary debt ceilings obstruct the extraordinary level of needed invest-
ment. It will pay for itself (and ensure the viability on the planet), but 
clear models are needed to secure revenue over the long term and tap into 
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spillover effects. Japan is a unique example.
Even as these models are needed, the urgency of change has to be 
imparted to the financial sector despite the immediate nature of capital. In 
DC, water and waste renovation faced huge capital requirements: smart 
metering provided a reliable long term revenue model, and once demon-
strated, was used to raise capital for a 100-year green bond. This very 
long term timeframe is already a challenge; capital markets in emerging 
markets have even less depth or structure to take it up. The private sector 
won’t simply step in with reasonably cost finance: development finance 
will be needed at unprecedented scale. Nor will carbon pricing at the 
necessary scope and price. The UK model of infrastructure investment 
seems promising, mostly private-oriented but financially innovative and 
long term-driven.
The second speaker drew attention to the specific challenges of 
emerging economies, taking the example of Brazil. President Lula spear-
headed climate action domestically 
and cooperation internationally on 
energy as well as land use and food 
production aspects. The current 
Bolsonaro administration is resolutely following an opposite path, instru-
mentalising global reproval to drum up domestic fervour and support. 
Private and financial actors are seeking bilateral solutions, especially with 
China, but they may still be open to other actors. Regional, but also 
national development banks can have an important role to play. Emerging 
markets should not be viewed as homogeneous; India is not Brazil. The 
G20 is not adapted to lead on holistic climate change action, but can work 
on some sectoral issues (energy). China’s BRI is driving a massive demand 
of concrete, a significant source of emissions (global 3rd if the industry 
counted as a country). Bilateral and regional cooperation form a valuable 
“new multilateralism”. 
The effects of catastrophic climate change will be huge. Brazil is 
already hosting climate refugees. Global health will become a strategic 
issue as endemic illnesses shift geographically. Worse, the science is still 
unclear on the possible tipping points at which damage becomes irrevers-
ible: preserving the Amazon and the oceans is vital to preserve and foster 
carbon sinks and biodiversity. In Brazil, the military considers climate as 
a strategic sovereignty issue, linked to securing territory and extracting 
its resources. Militaries have large carbon footprints (the US’ would be 
global 3rd if counted as a country).
“30 million people live in the 
Amazon; not just monkeys.”
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One participant noted the leading role of new youth movements for 
climate in mobilising and informing about the scale and urgency of the 
task, as well as the enthusiasm in the US around the Green New Deal; the 
rhetoric of both is infused with social justice, but their effects remain to 
be seen. Another participant reported that President Macron had become 
convinced of the necessity of more robust climate action internationally 
when President Trump withdrew from the PA, and domestically with 
the Gilets Jaunes movement. It remains to be seen what his international 
orchestration efforts on the Global Pact will bear.
Deliberative processes have been successful in managing complex 
trade-offs and engaging citizens recounted one participant, with better 
results than classical 
representative demo-
cratic processes; 
though this might be 
attributable to their 
globally exceptional 
democratic environ-
ment. The framing 
must shift to the costs of inaction rather than action, and social justice 
rhetoric is an insufficient mobiliser. There will be distributional issues to 
face head-on, but the imperative seems to have penetrated in most quar-
ters; even the CDU. It is telling that the extreme right is targeting climate 
movements. Climate issues can be leveraged against populists to take the 
wind out of their sails: making them debate on the topic reveals their lack 
of seriousness and wider governance vision.
It has become acceptable to talk with the urgency that is truly needed, 
while states are beginning to take repressive measures pretexting climate 
imperatives argued one participant. Widespread societal destabilisation 
and civil wars are real threats. This urgency should be used to mobilise 
support on action, starting with collecting and using better data and 
measurements to deal with the distributional issues; e.g., the PNR for avi-
ation carbon tax purposes, though some participants expressed doubts 
on the privacy aspects of such a scheme. Some participants thought cata-
strophist rhetoric counterproductive and potentially dangerous.
The session concluded with the first speaker insisting on the fact that 
worldwide opinion polls show the depth and breadth of concern over cli-
mate change. This must be translated to political action by building a new 
narrative; until now however this has not penetrated domestic or inter-
“Humans are more concerned about 
future humans than politicians are about 
future politicians. Social justice rhetoric is 
not enough: you need to tell people, “You 





national orchestrators levels sufficiently. The 2000s debt relief campaign 
is an interesting parallel of mobilisation on a similarly neglected issue. 
Phasing out coal requires intense thinking in political economic terms: 
vested interests may weigh more towards capital than labour. The cost of 
capital is a key factor: infrastructure in emerging markets is not inher-
ently riskier, but there are temporal, monetary and informational asym-
metry issues that make it look astronomical. The second speaker stressed 
the contingency of politics and advocated acting bravely in peoples’ 
needs at all governance levels; Parliaments are important democratic loci.
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The Governance of Trade, Finance 
and Macroeconomic Cooperation: A 
Historical Perspective since the 1970s
Seminar insights1
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol2, George Papaconstantinou 
and Jean Pisani-Ferry
1. The ‘paradise lost’ feeling that there was a golden age of global 
governance dominates policy reflections. Nostalgia of this golden age 
inspires recommendations to make globalisation sustainable again by 
revamping its rules and by strengthening the institutions that support it. 
Recurrent calls for a “new Bretton Woods” illustrate the attractiveness of 
an idealised past. 
2. But the core task of historians is to de-idealise the past and this 
applies very well to global governance. Even a cursory assessment of a 
few key episodes of the recent decades leads to question the widely held 
assumptions that there was a time when the global economic governance 
framework was comprehensive, unified, rules-based and cooperative.
3. The framework of governance rules and institutions was never com-
prehensive enough to cover adequately the multiple channels of inter-
dependence. In fact, tension between the actual pattern of integration 
and the institutional set-up has been nearly permanent and the history of 
global governance is one of institutional arrangements catching up slowly 
and haphazardly with reality. 
1 The seminar was held on 14 November 2019 in Florence (Italy).
2 Senior Lecturer at the University of Glasgow's Adam Smith Business School.
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• International trade offers a case in point: the Uruguay round 
launched in the 1980s was intended to fill existing gaps in the sec-
toral coverage of the international trade rules, while an enlargement 
of membership in the GATT (not least to China) was being pursued 
in parallel. It was an ultimately successful, but conflictual and imbal-
anced process, the outcome of which generated frustrations and 
grievances on the part of emerging as well as advanced countries; 
• Supervisory coordination in banking and finance is another case. 
Attempts to define an international regime for supervision and res-
olution started in the 1970s but failed to produce meaningful results 
and degenerated into weak cooperation procedures. It is only in 
response to successive crises (the Latin American debt crisis of the 
1980s, the financial accidents of the late 1990s, the global financial 
crisis of 2008) that rules were tightened and that monitoring proce-
dures were strengthened. 
4. Complaints about the fragmentation of the global governance 
regime go back to the 1970s at least. The lack of a coherent, or even 
unified regime was actually one of the key motivations for instituting 
regular summits of the heads of state and government (the Gs). At the 
first summit in Rambouillet in 1975, British PM Harold Wilson already 
complained about the proliferation of institutions; but he, and his col-
leagues, noted at the same time that these institutions gathered officials 
at ministerial level only. Heads of government did not have an interna-
tional forum where to meet on a regular and frequent basis. The G7, and 
later the G20, took up the responsibility of orchestrating the responses to 
prevailing challenges – by coordinating national policies but more often 
by setting priorities and tasking institutions. Whether the emergence of 
this rather informal mode of governance (and of the parallel institution 
of the European Council, whose creation occurred a little earlier, in 1974) 
should be regarded as a testimony of the failure of the rules-based insti-
tutional order, or as a necessary complement to it, is a matter for debate. 
5. The “rules-based” regime was never entirely rules-based – or when 
it was, rules could be breached. This is very apparent in the monetary 
field. Surveillance of national policies has generally been toothless and 
even the concepts that underpin it have been left trailing reality. In the 
early 1970s the US unilaterally departed from the rules of the Bretton 
Woods system by taking the dollar off gold, devaluing it and ultimately 
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going for a floating exchange rate regime. This was a major break away 
from a fundamental rule of the post-war system. Their decision repre-
sented a trauma for Europe. It created confusion and international ten-
sion, before cooperation resumed and eventually resulted in defining 
new rules.   
6. A recurring theme of the history of global governance has been 
whether it changes because of the need to adapt to evolving interde-
pendence structures or as a result of power struggles between partici-
pating nations. If anything, the question has gained relevance in today’s 
context. 





Session I - Macroeconomic cooperation and leadership in 
the 1970s
The speaker introducing the first session noted that the early 1970s were a 
time when international relations 
were widely perceived to be in 
the throes of a multifaceted crisis. 
The decision of the US to unilat-
erally terminate convertibility of 
the dollar to gold in 1971 effectively brought the Bretton Woods system 
of fixed exchange rates to an end. This was compounded in 1973 by 
OPEC’s decision to proclaim an oil embargo against nations perceived as 
supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur War, quadrupling the price of 
oil. The sense of urgency in the face of generalised crisis was underscored 
by a shared epistemic script based on a fear of a repeat of the crisis of the 
1930s and the Second World War that ensued. Also furthering this senti-
ment was the Cold War context, where leaders felt they had to present a 
united front to prove the superiority of their values and economic system. 
The situation led heads of state and government to look for new 
venues where they could discuss macroeconomic cooperation. Existing 
fora such as the UN, the IMF or the OECD (or on the European level, the 
Council of the EU) were felt to be unfit for that purpose, too formal or 
too technical. Other international gatherings were emerging at the same 
time, such as the meetings in Davos and the Trilateral Commission, but 
they were private endeavours. It was also felt that reliance on expert solu-
tions was fuelling a democratic deficit, and that global governance was 
impaired due to a fragmentation of issues. In the context of increased 
interdependence, specialised institutions were perceived as unfit for the 
purpose of strengthening across-the-board cooperation. 
December 1974 saw the creation of the European Council, bringing 
together European heads of state and government (of Belgium, France, 
West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, plus the newly 
joined Denmark, Ireland and the U.K.). The creation of what would 
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become a key pillar of the EU institutional architecture followed informal 
summits in 1961 and 1969. In a similar vein, November 1975 marked the 
first G6, bringing together for informal exchanges the heads of state and 
government of the world’s major industrialised countries (France, West 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US). Canada was invited to join 
in 1976, completing the G7. Annual G7 summits soon became a pillar of 
global economic cooperation (and they lost their informality).  
Three historical milestones stand out: the 1975 Rambouillet Summit, 
the 1978 Bonn Summit, and the 1985 Plaza Agreement on exchange 
rates, which was followed by the 1987 Louvre Accord. The Rambouillet 
Summit is noteworthy in that it was the first of its kind, acknowledging 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods architecture and the new international 
monetary non-system. While French President Valéry Giscard-d’Estaing 
had initially envisaged a summit on narrower monetary issues, German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt helped broaden the scope, setting the themes 
of macroeconomic cooperation that have remained on the agenda since. 
The Bonn Summit is remembered for producing a comprehensive 
agreement on Japanese and German reflation as well as on the US fight 
against inflation. More generally, it reflected 
the shifting international balance of eco-
nomic weight, away from the US dollar and 
towards Europe and Japan. The agreement 
was celebrated at the time, but was short-
lived; despite this, it is remembered by some as having been very suc-
cessful, while others (especially in Germany) regard it as having pro-
duced ill-conceived plans. In contrast, the Plaza and Louvre Accords 
were landmark international agreements between G7 member states 
(France, West Germany, Japan, the US and the UK, joined by Canada for 
the Louvre Accord). Beyond the agreement to depreciate and the stabilise 
the US dollar, they delivered an exchange rate coordination regime that 
lasted for several years.
While the G7 meetings are not treaty-based, their creation resulted in 
lasting governance changes, plugging a glaring gap in global governance 
and enabling leaders at the highest level to exchange and develop shared 
diagnoses of the economic situation and the economic challenges. These 
changes were not necessarily major in terms of outcome, but certainly in 
terms of process:  a permanent forum for cooperation and trust-building 
was established that offered the leader the possibility of setting priori-
ties for technical discussions and of reaching agreements that involved 
“The core job of the 
historian is de-idealise 
the past.”
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cross-sectoral trade-offs (for example on trade and at the same time on 
exchange rates). Nevertheless, these arrangements remain informal, with 
a low level of enforcement. This executive deficit in global governance 
persists today.
In the discussion that followed the presentation, one participant 
reflected on the role of the US then and now in setting up and main-
taining governance arrangements, seeing 
concern over the lack of rules and con-
structive search for political discussion 
arrangements at the time; this was met with a rejoinder that it was the US 
which had toppled the Bretton Woods system to begin with. One partic-
ipant recalled that the Bretton Woods rules-based system was far from 
autonomous, requiring significant intervention to keep exchange rates 
stable.
Participants debated whether the establishment of the G7 reflected a 
failure of formal institutions and a breakdown of a rules-based system, or 
whether it simply filled a gap in that same system. One participant noted 
that the continuation of G7 meetings was by no means acquired from the 
start, only resulting from an informal agreement in 1977, comparing it 
with the institutionalisation of the European Council in the 1986 Single 
European Act. Another contested the parallel, arguing that the Euro-
pean Council resulted from the European Community’s institutional 
development whereas the establishment of the G7 reflected institutional 
failure. The same participant expressed surprise that the involvement of 
heads of state and government was not seen as necessary until then, and 
reflected on the evolution of the method of their meetings, from a direct, 
“hands-on” approach to one of agenda-setting. 
Session II - The challenges to the governance of trade in 
the 1980s
The speaker introducing the second session suggested that the trade 
governance regime was under great pressure by the 1980s for five main 
reasons. First, several commodities like agricultural products and tex-
tiles were exempt from GATT disciplines, and the absence of an agreed 
framework led to tensions between developed and less developed coun-
tries. Second, trade in services was expanding without corresponding 
GATT rules. Third, advanced countries were beginning to feel frustra-
“It’s all about the US.”
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tion over the lack of protection of intellectual property rights. Fourth, 
emerging economies had an increasing weight in global trade but they 
were either acting as free riders within, or weren’t part of GATT. Fifth, 
finally, GATT’s relevance was diminishing: China was not (yet) part of 
it and major geopolitical and economic changes (such as China’s eco-
nomic reform and the opening up of formerly socialist countries) were 
not reflected in the governance of international trade. 
These tensions provided the impetus for an American-European 
“deal” to seek to strengthen the rules and institutions of the multilateral 
trade regime while integrating new members: this was the origin of the 
Uruguay Round and the resulting creation of the WTO. 
GATT rounds until the 1960s had mostly focused on reducing tariffs. 
The Kennedy Round, started in 1964, 
added anti-dumping as a concern; the 
Tokyo Round, started in 1973, signifi-
cantly expanded the agenda by including 
non-tariff issues. The Uruguay Round 
began in 1986, concurrently with China’s accession request, and ended in 
1994: it not only achieved further tariff reductions, but also saw the inclu-
sion of services (GATS), intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and invest-
ment (TRIMS) under its remit, as well as an agreement to gradually 
include textile and agricultural products in its disciplines. It also trans-
formed the GATT into the WTO, a full-fledged international organisa-
tion equipped with a binding dispute settlement mechanism. Its creation 
had been strongly advocated by European countries and Canada, with 
the argument that liberalisation had to be matched by institutionalisa-
tion. 
In hindsight however, institutionalisation went against long-held US 
preferences, concerned with maintaining their sovereignty and wary of 
creating more international bureaucracy. As far as trade negotiation were 
concerned, developing countries have considered that they gave up more 
in the Uruguay Round negotiations than what they gained; and while 
international trade volumes increased, it is unclear whether the nego-
tiated tariff reductions and assorted agreements can be held directly 
responsible, though it has become part of the WTO’s self-promotional 
narrative. 
China’s bid for GATT/WTO accession took 15 years of negotiation, 
but it finally gained membership in 2001. Its aim was to stabilise and 
gain larger access to Western markets in order to support its export-led 
“As Pascal Lamy said, ‘If 
you liberalise you must 
organise’.”
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economic growth. On the other hand, the US’s aim was to oblige China 
to abide by enforceable trade rules, while pushing Chinese leadership to 
reform the country’s economy so as to make it more compatible with the 
global capitalist economy. In this, the US’s strategy changed from con-
tainment under George H. W. Bush to engagement under Bill Clinton, 
the latter being a driver for Chinese accession. In contrast, the European 
priority was to place economic and trade relations with China under 
a legally binding framework. China did not gain its accession cheaply 
however, having to make protocol commitments substantially exceeding 
those of other members. However, one seminar participant noted that 
China effectively retained a number of tariffs, while gaining by being 
freed from its burdensome annual review of trade relations by the US 
Congress.
The Uruguay Round was the last to be dominated by American and 
European interaction and preferences, as evidenced by the stalemate of 
the Doha Round where developing countries have reshaped the bar-
gaining dynamics. Both the US and the EU shifted priorities to pursuing 
plurilateral agreements like TTIP and TPP, with the more or less explicit 
goal of isolating or forcing compliance on China. While TTIP foundered 
for political reasons, TPP, however, was repudiated by President-elect 
Trump, whose approach to trade governance has been explicitly transac-
tional and bilateral. Participants agreed that while US grievances against 
the WTO began before his tenure, he has imposed tariffs on steel and 
aluminium under the dubious pretext of national security, and has been 
blocking the nomination of judges to the Appellate Body, gravely threat-
ening the multilateral trade regime.
In the discussion, participants agreed that challenges in trade gover-
nance have stemmed from both geopolitical and structural factors. On 
the one hand, the system was dominated by the US and European coun-
tries, refusing to play by the agreed-upon rules once they suited them no 
longer and cede some of their power to newcomers, provoking a back-
lash on their part. On the other, it was changing patterns of trade that 
made the system meant to govern it obsolete. Participants questioned the 
degree to which the WTO could function with the US acting in bad faith, 
groundlessly invoking the national security “nuclear option”, or indeed 
without the US, to which the answer was pessimistic. 
One participant asked why the establishment of the WTO coincided 
with the rise of regional trade agreements, taking the example of NAFTA. 
Another explained that NAFTA was designed as an alternative to the 
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Uruguay Round by aiming for deepening regional integration, and that 
opinion is mixed on whether it was a stumbling block or a stepping stone 
to further trade liberalisation. The same participant noted however that 
other trade agreements of the time were mainly geopolitical and had little 
to do with trade qua trade. 
Session III - Financial account liberalisation and the 
challenges to the governance of finance
The speaker introducing the second session suggested that the late 1970s 
and the 1980s were a transformational period for the international mon-
etary system, whose governance challenges bear more than a passing 
resemblance to those of the 2000s. The period saw a rapid internation-
alisation of banking and finance, with corresponding financial innova-
tion and risk; accompanied by, on the other hand, trade protectionism, 
commodity shocks (especially oil), and accumulation of sovereign debt. 
Accordingly, attempts were made to bolster existing and set up new gov-
ernance frameworks to face these challenges. Elements of these comprise 
the IMF and bilateral central bank swaps, to provide emergency liquidity, 
and the Basel Committee, to provide uniform banking guidelines: an 
incipient global financial safety net.
Bilateral central bank swaps were part of a two-tier global financial 
safety net before the 1970s. Renewable swap lines were established in 
the 1960s, climbing to significant amounts. Recourse to these lines was a 
“first line of defence”, before having to go to the IMF.
When the US suspended dollar convertibility, effectively kicking off 
the world floating exchange rate regime, the IMF attempted to head off 
and mitigate potential effects by publishing its important surveillance 
decision in 1977, which remained unchanged until 2013. It puts forth 
the obligation for members avoid manipulating exchange rates or the 
international monetary system; and recommends that members intervene 
in the exchange market to counter disorder, while taking into account 
other members’ interests. An additional provision was added in 2007 to 
the surveillance decision, that members should avoid exchange rate pol-
icies that create external financial instability. The decision specifies the 
situations in which the IMF can engage a dialogue with a member state; 
but appreciation of when this is warranted is inevitably very difficult due 
to the political sensitivity of such a decision. This kind of dialogue is in 
any case only advisory and bilateral, and has displayed a mixed record in 




The IMF’s Special Drawing Rights system had been introduced in 
1969 to supplement a shortfall of preferred foreign-exchange reserve 
assets. They underwent reform in the 1970s and 1980s. The SDR was 
made the unit of account of the Fund in 1972, but more ambitious plans 
such as devising a “market SDR”, to be used widely in global financial 
markets, or allowing the creation of an SDR-denominated substitution 
account housed in the IMF to facilitate reserve diversification and shift 
exchange rate risk away from the dollar, foundered mostly due to US dis-
interest. 
International financial surveillance was glaringly lacking in the 1970s. 
A series of bank failures and fraud led in 1974 to the creation of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) by the G103, plus Luxembourg 
and Spain. The committee was estab-
lished within the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements and it is composed 
of central bank and regulatory authority representatives. Original proj-
ects for an early warning system or a coordinated supervisory arrange-
ment were quickly abandoned due to sovereignty concerns, falling back 
on informal communication and best practice sharing. This “Basel Con-
cordat”, established in 1975, failed however to draw clear-cut rules about 
where responsibility for supervision ultimately laid between home and 
host countries, since international supervision had been rejected.
The BCBS works as an informal forum encouraging convergence 
towards common standards and approaches. However, its functioning at 
its inception was reluctant and slow, and the standards it produced were 
backward-looking and, since they were negotiated with the banks it was 
attempting to regulate, vulnerable to regulatory capture. The three pains-
takingly negotiated Basel Accords have done little to prevent crises, and 
still rely on national interpretation and implementation of their guide-
lines. Rules-based financial regulation may not be an optimal solution: 
incentives-based regulation may work better, due to the pace and depth 
of innovation.
In the discussion, seminar participants remarked that issues con-
sidered novel today are in fact not new, though significant qualitative 
changes have taken place. They agreed that some past and present gov-
3  Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
UK, US
“BCBS members were like 
regulatory generals fighting 
the last war.”
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ernance problems were common, such as issues with the IMF’s traction, 
legitimacy and even-handedness, or the difficulty of requesting help 
from the Fund due to stigma; or more broadly, the fact that the burden 
of adjustment still weighs on for the greater part on debtors. One par-
ticipant noted that a regional/global two-tier global financial safety net 
system has already emerged, sharing the same problems as the bilateral/
global system preceding it: the global level remains too weak, while at the 
infra level creditors may have difficulty refusing to extend loans to close 
partners. They also likened private information held by banks as a kind of 
wealth, which prompted another participant to observe that willingness 
to share this kind of information with a central repository is growing and 
that it would be useful to have a global authority capable of presenting a 
complete picture of the financial situation. 
Wrap-up - Lessons for global governance
Summing up, it was put forward that increased systemic complexity may 
have favoured fragmentation; but it may be perception of complexity that 
is the more relevant factor. In keeping up with the core historian’s task 
of de-idealising the past, all three speakers thus insisted that the wide-
spread impression that today’s crises were more complex than those 
that occurred 20, 30, or 50 years ago was often a retrospective construct: 
policymakers confronting these problems in the past equally felt over-
whelmed by the complexity of policy challenges then. The challenges of 
the credibility of institutions, and of their trade-off between inclusivity 
and efficiency, remain. The institutions themselves display continuity 
through structural shifts, which have sometimes been brutal; in parallel, 
solutions to their problems have also displayed surprising continuity.
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Collective Action in a  
Fragmented World
Jean Pisani-Ferry1, July 2019 
Highlights 
1. The need for international collective action is an order of magni-
tude larger than it has ever been. The menaces of catastrophic climate 
change and of a collapse of biodiversity epitomise the increased impor-
tance of global commons and the urgency of coordinating responses at 
global level. But heightened need for collective action also arises from a 
series of other challenges: risks to financial stability, threats to internet 
security, mass migrations and tax avoidance by multinational firms, to 
name only some of the most prominent ones. 
2. Obstacles to global collective action are no less formidable. The 
stance of the Trump administration is currently the single most signifi-
cant one, but impediments to global governance are of a more structural 
nature: The China-US rivalry is in the process of restructuring the system 
of international relations, while the emergence of a multipolar world and 
heterogeneity of preferences complicate the functioning of the global 
policy regime. 
3. The global governance apparatus provides a weak basis for collec-
1  European University Institute, Bruegel, the Hertie School and Sciences Po. This note 
is based on research undertaken jointly with George Papaconstantinou at the EUI. 
It builds on remarks given on 22 March 2019 at the ECB conference Challenges for 
supervisors and central bankers organised on the occasion of the farewell of Ignazio 
Angeloni. Thanks to Adrien Bradley, Pascal Lamy, Manuel Lafont-Rapnouil, George 
Papaconstantinou, André Sapir, Reinhilde Veugelers and Georg Zachmann for com-
ments on earlier versions.
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tive action. The rules and institutions inherited from the post-war era 
provide limited coverage, limited effectiveness and limited legitimacy. 
As exemplified by issues such as climate change or internet governance, 
the formal legal and institutional architecture of the rules-based global 
system is increasingly at odds with the shape, depth and intensity of 
international interdependence. It is furthermore undermined by a pro-
cess of fragmentation that has started to affect its core tenets. 
4. None of the main players is able and willing to provide leadership. 
The ability and willingness of the US to promote, uphold and guarantee 
the global policy regime has been permanently diminished by the decline 
of its relative economic weight. China is unwilling to invest in a rules-
based system that is alien to its own system of government, whose prin-
ciples and procedures have been designed by others, and where it does 
not enjoy adequate representation. Europe is too weak and fragmented 
to offer leadership.  
5. New forms of cooperation have nevertheless emerged in a series of 
fields. These are soft mechanisms relying on the pledge-and-review tem-
plate, cooperation between independent agencies endowed with similar 
mandates, coalitions of the willing and open partnerships involving pri-
vate players, subnational governments, civil societies and epistemic com-
munities. Their effectiveness depends on the incentives to cooperation 
that participants face, which in turn rests on the nature of the underlying 
interaction and the resulting game structure.  
6. International collective action is in search of a new paradigm suited 
to a more interdependent but also more diverse, multipolar and sover-
eignty-conscious world. As international cooperation can only draw on a 
limited toolkit, clarity should prevail on what can be expected from soft 
arrangements. At the very least they should rely on (a) a parsimonious 
set of universal principles, (b) coalitions of the willing that help break the 
deadlock of unanimity while remaining consistent with such universal 
principles, and (c) the involvement of non-state actors and epistemic 
communities. To be effective, collective action should furthermore be 
served by (d) nimble and legitimate institutions. In some cases, enforce-
ment mechanisms such as (e) pecuniary levies remain indispensable. 




1. State of play
1. The 1990s represented the high noon of the collective action model 
characteristic of the post-WW2 system. This system relied on universal, 
treaty-based institutions tasked with the organisation of international 
cooperation and the enforcement of legally binding rules in major fields 
of interdependence. At the time, the template became truly universal as 
membership in the Bretton Woods institutions was extended to Russia 
and the former Soviet bloc, while preparations were made for Chinese 
and Russian membership in the WTO. However, this system did not gain 
wide sectoral currency. Efforts to replicate it in fields such as investment, 
competition and climate action have been frustrated. 
2. Once regarded as a milestone towards the completion of the insti-
tutional architecture of globalisation, the creation of the WTO did 
not achieve its aims. Since the mid-1990s multilateral negotiations have 
stalled, trade governance has fragmented into a myriad of preferential 
agreements, and China’s membership in the WTO has failed to trigger 
the convergence of its economic system (let alone its political system) 
with the Western model. But although the combination of multilateral 
and bilateral or regional arrangements was fragile, the essential GATT 
principles and the dispute settlement mechanism instituted with the cre-
ation of the WTO were upheld until mid-2010. Since then, the Trump 
administration’s focus on bilateral balances and its deliberate sabotage of 
the dispute settlement mechanism have undermined the core tenets of 
the post-WW2 order. The one success the WTO could claim, its conflict 
resolution system, is at risk of paralysis.  
3. For the Bretton Woods institutions, the Asian crisis of the late 1990s 
was a turning point. Intrusive and economically misguided IMF pro-
grammes were seen as testimonies that these institutions were at the ser-
vice of the Western powers. A decade later, the multilateral response to 
the euro crisis was regarded as a further proof of this built-in bias. Polit-
ical events and economic forces have jointly contributed to a growing 
fragmentation of the global financial architecture. 
4. The global financial crisis did not result in a permanent upgrade of 
global governance. While the response to the financial meltdown and 
the ensuing recession was swift and forceful, and while the elevation of 
the G20 to leaders’ level adjusted the political leadership body to the new 
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reality of the global economy, changes to the rules and institutions of 
global governance fell short of the leaders’ 2009 promise that “a global 
crisis requires a global solution”. Financial regulation was upgraded, but 
international macroeconomic coordination was short-lived and hopes 
that the crisis would provide an opportunity to reform the international 
monetary system were frustrated. 
5. The urgency of climate change mitigation did not result in a revival 
of the post-WW2 template. At Kyoto in 1997 and Copenhagen in 2009, 
attempts to create a legally binding, enforceable system of negotiated 
emission reduction commitments failed. The Paris agreement of 2015 was 
based on an entirely different paradigm: national “contributions” are uni-
laterally determined and non-binding. The expected effectiveness of the 
collective endeavour to contain the rise in temperature relies on review 
mechanisms, peer pressure and the involvement of non-state actors.  
6. The governance of the internet epitomises the obsolescence of the 
post-WW2 model. The emergence of the first truly global, borderless 
infrastructure has essentially been based on uncoordinated state and pri-
vate initiatives coordinated by broad principles and a series of informa-
tion exchange protocols. Its governance structures have remained weak 
and informal, and all attempts to give them a more formal structure 
ended in a deadlock. Since the start of the decade divergent preferences 
as regards privacy and the limits of free speech, and more fundamentally 
state control over national citizens, have given rise to a process of bal-
kanisation. The unity of the internet has become a thing of the past and 
the question now is what geometry will emerge from its fragmentation. 
7. The historic core of the global regime – trade and finance arrange-
ments – is undergoing a process of fragmentation. Global rules and 
institutions are still there, but their grip is fast diminishing and a new 
geography made up of partially overlapping blocks has started to emerge. 
Existing multilateral arrangements lost muscle already in the 2000s and 
the early 2010s, and the process is accelerating. Trade rules are fast giving 
way to a new US-initiated bilateralism. Development finance is under-
going a process of balkanisation, most notably as a consequence of the 
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and its adverse consequences on mul-
tilateral debt relief procedures. In international finance, several layers 
of unilateral, bilateral and regional safety nets have piled up, not least 




IMF is being questioned; a further decomposition may well arise in the 
medium term with the emergence of a multi-currency monetary system. 
2. Geopolitical obstacles
1. The post-2016 political context certainly complicates global gov-
ernance. Multilateral rules and institutions embody all what populist 
nationalists love to hate: a non-national definition of the common good, 
equality amongst nations, supranational bureaucracies, limits to discre-
tionary power, and the influence of experts in policy design. 
2. The stance of the Trump administration is currently the single most 
significant obstacle to global collective action. Its worldview does not 
build on the premise that a series of issues require global cooperation 
and that well-structured collective action may yield benefits to all partic-
ipants. It favours a transactional approach of international relations and 
regards most international issues as zero-sum games. 
3. US grievances against, and doubts about global rules and institu-
tions however did not start with this administration. Already in the 
1940s, the US Congress rejected membership in the US-designed Inter-
national Trade Organisation. President Clinton objected to the creation 
of the International Criminal Court. President G.W. Bush refused to 
ratify the Kyoto protocol. The Obama administration expressed serious 
concerns about the functioning of the WTO. 
4. Changes in the international stance of the US reveals deep and 
widely shared doubts about the benefits of continued international 
leadership in the current context. From World War 2 to the 2000s the 
US mostly played by the international rules of the game and it further-
more acted as a guarantor and an insurer of the global system. This stance 
rested on the leverage this system provided to the global hegemon, but 
also on the hypothesis that it was in its best interest to promote, uphold 
and guarantee a global rules-based regime. Yet the declining relative eco-
nomic weight of the US is prompting a reassessment of the benefits it 
derives from trading-off exorbitant duties for an exorbitant privilege.
5. China’s assertiveness questions the stability of the global system. 
Seen from Beijing, the rules-based system embodies the preferences and 
privileges of the incumbent powers. Whereas China values the global 
trading regime, it has no ownership of a multilateral system that was 
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designed by Western powers and whose rules embody their preference. 
The significance of the Belt and Roads Inititiative remains ambiguous, 
but it may be sowing the seeds of a different kind of system of interna-
tional economic relations.  
6. The US is reassessing its decades-long strategy towards China. 
From Richard Nixon to Barack Obama, all US presidents followed the 
same inclusive approach. It was assumed that China’s disruptive power 
would be best tamed by shaping the direction of its development through 
making it a full member of the rules-based global economic community. 
But if this strategy has helped China to develop and catch up techno-
logically, it has not led to system convergence and it has not contained 
geopolitical rivalry. 
7. Europe remains the staunchest advocate of the multilateral system 
but it lacks force and coherence. As a rules-based construct, the EU feels 
at home in a rules-based system and it regards itself as a laboratory of 
global governance. But it does not stand ready to substitute the US as an 
anchor of the system and its hesitant response to the euro crisis contrib-
uted to its weakening.  
3. Economic challenges
1. Beyond China, the emergence of a multipolar world is a systemic 
challenge for the operation of the global policy regime. Together 
with rules that apply to all countries, the post-war regime rested on the 
assumption that the US was responsible for exercising leadership and 
for undertaking discretionary action in times of crisis. It was implicitly 
agreed that it would remain the issuer of the main international currency 
and that it would act as liquidity provider of last resort, importer of last 
resort and crisis manager of last resort. In an economically more bal-
anced global system, it is not clear how these roles should be distributed. 
2.The heterogeneity of preferences is an obstacle to collective action. 
As participants in global interaction have become economically, system-
ically and culturally more diverse, it has become harder to agree on rules 
and governance mechanisms. From the Bretton Woods conference in 
1944 to the Chinese accession to the WTO in 2001, the broadening of 
global governance has proceeded through the gradual co-optation of new 




The failure of the Doha round symbolically signalled that this process 
of homogenisation had come to an end. Developing countries, big and 
small, rightly claim that they cannot be simply asked to sign on rules that 
were shaped by the preferences of advanced countries. But while they 
have often been effective veto players, their positive contributions have 
been rare. Despite the BRICS, developing and emerging countries lack 
unity and leadership.  
3. The formal architecture of global economic and financial gover-
nance is increasingly at odds with the shape and intensity of inter-
dependence. The mandate of the WTO was predicated on an economic 
interdependence model that has been superseded by the rise of global 
value chains and foreign investment, and that is being overburdened by 
attempts to adjudicate trade-related matters increasingly removed from 
trade. The lack of a competition leg is increasingly a concern in the con-
text of globally rising market power. The mandates of the Bretton Woods 
institutions were predicated on a financial interdependence model that 
has been superseded by unfettered capital flows, international banking 
and cross-border balance sheet interdependence. Moreover, major new 
interlinkages have developed that do not belong to the remit of any sig-
nificant institution. This is evidently the case for environmental external-
ities, data flows, and migration, to name only the most important ones. 
4. The growing asymmetry of the global economic system weakens 
multilateral rules and institutions. Network-based interdependence in 
fields like finance, international currency, global value chains and data 
flows confers exorbitant power and responsibility to whoever is in con-
trol of the nodes of the system. The assumption that all countries are 
equal never matched reality. But interdependence once seemed to be an 
equalising force. This is less the case today than ten or twenty years ago.    
5. Conflicting representations of the same reality are a serious obstacle 
to collective action. As recently illustrated by European disputes over the 
solution to the euro crisis, “battles of ideas” are often harder to win than 
disputes arising from divergent interests. This problem is bound to be 
an order of magnitude bigger in a more diverse world. Investment in the 
building of common knowledge through the development of epistemic 
communities remains the most effective, though limited way to over-
come such obstacles.     
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4. The toolkit for collective action
1. Ambitious global agreements on new, legally binding rules sup-
ported by new, universal institutions are highly improbable. The polit-
ical and geopolitical conditions for such agreements are unlikely to be 
fulfilled anytime soon. In this context the agenda for rekindling inter-
national collective action can neither be to defend a twentieth century 
system whose adequacy has weakened, nor to make plans for unrealistic 
reforms. It must be to make the most of the web of existing rules and 
institutions inherited from the previous decades and to combine them 
with softer, much more ad hoc forms of governance of interdependence 
and global public goods management.  
2. Soft mechanisms that do not curtail national sovereignty can effec-
tively tackle a whole category of collective action problems. A solution 
to a collective action problem does not necessarily require compulsion 
to abide by international rules or to delegate decision powers to inter-
national organisations. The prisoners’ dilemma model is less univer-
sally applicable than often believed and many obstacles to coordination 
can be tackled by ensuring transparency, creating trust and monitoring 
actual behaviour. In banking regulation, for example, significant results 
have been achieved through the negotiation of non-mandatory global 
standards and the thorough monitoring of their implementation. Such 
examples should not be overinterpreted: not all problems can be tackled 
by soft mechanisms. But they show that for a whole range of problems 
information exchange, indicative standards or pledge-and-review mech-
anisms can deliver results – on the condition that national behaviour is 
monitored effectively and transparently.  
3. Independent agencies endowed with similar mandates can also 
achieve significant results. Historically, central banks have provided a 
template for international collective action by being able to cooperate 
effectively on the basis of domestically-oriented monetary policy man-
dates. The same applies to sectoral regulatory policies and financial reg-
ulation. The record of such cooperation is uneven: whereas it has often 
been disappointing in the field of financial oversight, significant results 
have been achieved in the competition policy field where national author-
ities exercise extraterritorial powers in a cooperative manner. Inde-
pendent regulators generally work on the basis of common knowledge 




Whereas they cannot by themselves internalise externalities, they can 
and do prevent disputes, share information and organise coordination.    
4. Clubs may effectively address hard collective action problems, 
but they involve the risk of fragmentation. Soft forms of cooperation 
are hardly applicable to a collection of 200+ countries. They are more 
effective when the number of significant players remains limited – as for 
central banking, competition or banking regulation. “Coalitions of the 
willing” have developed in many fields, starting with international trade, 
sectoral regulation and the environment where the Montreal protocol on 
the elimination of CFCs provided an early template. The forming on a 
voluntary basis of sectoral, regional or development level-based coali-
tions can be an effective conduit to collective action, though at the cost 
that the policy choices embedded in flexible international agreements 
can be biased towards the preferences of their initial members, thereby 
restricting their size and limiting the gains they deliver. 
5. The adoption of a dynamic perspective may strengthen otherwise 
weak incentives to joint action. Some global problems involve strong 
incentives to free-ride on common disciplines, either by failing to 
commit or by failing to implement. Common-pool problems are of this 
sort and addressing them requires stronger cooperation incentives than 
those provided by trust-building devices and the monitoring of delivery 
on existing commitments. But these obstacles can be reduced (though 
not eliminated) through involving private-sector players who can but-
tress an otherwise feeble cooperation agreement. For example, the Paris 
accord on containing climate change does not involve any compulsion 
and it even lacks mechanisms to enforce delivery on commitments. It 
is therefore vulnerable to the free-rider curse. But it has been effective 
enough to lead manufacturers to redirect their research and development 
towards zero-emission technologies. Their incentive to act is based on the 
perceived cost of losing out in international competition by having failed 
to keep up with clean technology developments. The effectiveness of such 
a mechanism does not rest on universal participation but on the partici-
pation of a critical mass of committed state actors and on the expectation 
that access to their markets will depend on the adoption of clean tech-
nologies.    
6. Political leadership plays a decisive role by setting priorities and 
overcoming the curse of unanimity. Whereas the G20 has disappointed 
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hopes that it would give rise to a permanent economic coordination 
apparatus, it has been much more effective as agenda-setter and an 
orchestrator. It has occasionally been an arm-twister too. An important 
case in point is taxation: whereas agreement on eliminating bank secrecy 
proved impossible to reach within the OECD, the combination of US 
unilateral action, G20 pressure and OECD expertise made it possible to 
overcome opposition. A similar game has started being played in the field 
of corporate taxation.   
5. The policy agenda
1. Effective collective action for the 21st century should make a parsi-
monious use of the limited political capital available for multilateral 
endeavours. It can neither rely on an outdated and disputed global gov-
ernance model nor on non-committal intentions and the involvement 
of a multitude of non-state stakeholders. The range of solutions acces-
sible without having recourse to hard international law is however sig-
nificant. What is needed is an approach that ensures that the best use is 
made of necessarily limited legal, institutional and financial resources. It 
must rest on a series of principles that command universal support, like 
national treatment for trade or the no-beggar-thy-neighbour principle 
in international finance - underpinning a set of nimble institutions able 
to provide support to international cooperation, and precise matching 
procedures that assign adequate resources, institutions and mechanisms 
to well-identified problems. 
2. A way to control the risk of fragmentation involved in the reliance 
on clubs is to require them be rooted in common universal princi-
ples (“minilateralism”). This is actually the case with, for example, trade 
agreements that are subject to WTO scrutiny, must respect fundamental 
principles such as national treatment and may uphold the most favoured 
nation principle. Compliance with such principles ensures some coher-
ence in the evolution of the international system. These issues arise in a 
series of fields, from trade and investment to climate and financial safety 
nets.
3. Existing institutions – which can be regarded as the globalisa-
tion’s social capital - should be requested to serve collective action 
beyond the confines of their sectoral remit. Global institutions were 




system. But nowadays the fiefdoms hardly cover globalisation’s territory. 
With the principles, procedures and governance they are equipped with, 
institutions should rather be regarded as wells of social and informational 
capital that international collective action can draw from. The evolution 
of the IMF (from the coordinator of a financially autarkic world to that 
of a financially integrated one), the World Bank (from an infrastructure 
bank for Europe to, among other things, the promoter of educating girls 
in Africa) and especially the OECD (from the administrator of the Euro-
pean payments union to, among other things, the assessor of worldwide 
education systems) shows that institutions - some of them at least - can 
be nimble. A key priority for international collective action is to make the 
most of this social capital. This implies tasking institutions with respon-
sibilities for ex-ante assessment, ex-post monitoring, evaluation and sup-
port for negotiation in fields that extend beyond their usual remit. 
4. For universal institutions to be effective, it is essential to preserve 
their legitimacy. As far as rules are concerned, this requires distin-
guishing essential principles that command general recognition from 
more specific provisions that may reflect the preferences of advanced 
economies, or a subset of them. The re-examination of the IMF doctrine 
on financial account liberalisation was a case in point, as the institution 
departed from its initial stance to take on board the concerns of emerging 
countries facing repeated sudden stops. As far as governance is con-
cerned, legitimacy requires adjusting representation and voting rights to 
the new realities of demographic, economic and political development 
on a global scale. Institutions whose policy doctrine or modus operandi 
are perceived as being excessively dominated by incumbent powers are 
bound to lose legitimacy and to be partially substituted by alternative 
sectoral or regional groupings. Europe in this respect should wake-up 
to the trade-off it is facing: either to preserve its power in existing multi-
lateral institutions, with the risk of accelerating their obsolescence, or to 
concede a reduction of its role and influence, with the risk of not gaining 
much in exchange.   
5. The involvement of epistemic communities, civil society and sub-
national governments (“polylateralism”) can add to the effectiveness 
of otherwise feeble mechanisms. Shared knowledge is essential to iden-
tify issues and overcome obstacles to cooperation arising from divergent 
representations of the same problem. This is why the creation of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was a major step towards a 
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shared awareness of problems and solutions (and the absence of a shared 
knowledge base is also a reason why international agreement is so diffi-
cult in the field of migrations). In domains that speak to public opinion 
like the preservation of the environment, public health or the fight against 
tax evasion, pressure from below may also help counter the incentives to 
free-ride that governments are subject to, and help overcome obstacles 
to collective action. But polylateralism risks being too weak to overcome 
obstacles to collective action in critical fields such as climate change. 
6. In the absence of compulsory universal agreements, some collec-
tive action problems can only be tackled by having recourse to pecu-
niary levies and international transfers. Whereas it is wrong to assume 
that all international collective action problems can be represented by a 
prisoners’ dilemma game, it is equally incorrect to assume that all can 
be solved without mechanisms that contain free-riding. Absent univer-
sally enforceable rules, such mechanisms can be provided by strict club 
rules. This is most evident in the climate field: should a group of countries 
decide to implement significant carbon taxes while their trade partners 
would abstain from introducing them, a border tax would serve both as a 
way to limit the risks of endogenous breakdown of the climate coalition, 
and as a way to avoid its members losing out in international trade. The 
critical questions in the years to come will be whether the US joins the 
climate club (in which case it will most certainly introduce border taxes) 
or whether the EU and other countries introduce them in an effort to 
discipline the US.   
7. Democratic legitimacy is harder to ensure in a world of ad-hoc 
arrangements. Whereas it is a concern in a rules-based order, at least 
rules must be ratified and institutions can be subject to parliamentary 
oversight. A world that relies on a proliferation of clubs, institutions that 
operate beyond their mandates, private-sector participation, and soft 
arrangements is superficially less constraining, but substantially more 
alien to democratic principles. At the very least, it calls for scrutiny on 
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